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China’s achievement of developing a vigorous market economy is based on 
Chinese communist party (CCP)’s top-down reform and opening-up policies since 
1978. Meanwhile, political reform of the second largest economy in today’s world 
is continuously delayed. Without an agenda of bringing democracy and regulation-
making process into workplaces, China’s state-owned enterprises were swiftly 
transformed to be profit-oriented economic entities with managerial supremacy. 
As an authoritarian regime still run by communist party, China has to negotiate 
with its own socialist tradition, which entails not only restructuring labour 
relations in workplaces but its national ideology.  
This study explores Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) politics of labour 
management in China’s local state sector. With use of multiple qualitative 
inquiring techniques, the study selects two state-owned corporations located in 
Shanghai region as cases, and provides an in-depth analysis on Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) politics of managing labour force formulation as well as 
re-shaping employment relationship within those transitioning SOEs. The study is 
expected to illuminate the diversity within and across regions and industrial 
sectors in China. Also, these case studies suggest that CCP adopts pragmatic 
approaches over labour managing matters so as to ensure its sovereign influence.  
I will argue that the key to understand SOEs’ management rebuilding is CCP’s 
governing tradition of co-option and elite selection, which is a prolong legacy that 
has shaped the party’s personnel managing system since revolutionary era. It is 
also hoped that the findings of my empirical research will lead to theoretical 
discussion on China’s path of industrial relations in future: if such dynamic 
managerialism in the state sector is able to guarantee further delays of workplace 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Uncovering “unknown knowns”: motivation, scope and objectives 
“There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There 
are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we now know 
we donʼt know. But there are also unknown unknowns. These are things 
we do not know we donʼt know."  
- Donald Rumsfeld  
The former US Secretary of State for Defence made this infamous statement in a 
Pentagon news briefing on 12 February 2002, concerning the lack of evidence 
linking the government of Iraq with the supply of weapons of mass destruction to 
terrorist groups. It was widely ridiculed for its bizarreness among press circles, 
and has become a popular reference to the Bush administration’s lunacy and 
hysteria over the imagined threat from Saddam’s regime. However, Rumsfeld’s 
comment has also received an unexpected appreciation from the philosopher 
Slavoj Ž iz ek. In his The Guardian article (2008), Ž iz ek remarked it as an “amateur 
philosophising” attempt on theory of knowledge. He also pointed out that the 
Pentagon’s undeniable fault on Iraq derives from the missing piece in Rumsfeld’s 
matrix of knowings:  
“What he forgot to add was the crucial fourth term: the "unknown 
knowns", things we don't know that we know - which is precisely the 
Freudian unconscious. If Rumsfeld thought that the main dangers in the 
confrontation with Iraq were the "unknown unknowns", the threats from 
Saddam we did not even suspect, the Abu Ghraib scandal shows where the 
main dangers actually are in the "unknown knowns", the disavowed 
beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about, 
even though they form the background of our public values. To unearth 
these "unknown knowns" is the task of an intellectual.” (ibid) 
Oddly, Rumsfeld’s statement turns out to be an inadvertent tribute to social 
science epistemology, reminding us of the uncertain and variable nature of 
knowledge in a flawed but concise manner. Knowledge can be incomplete yet still 
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useable; sometimes it can even result in enormous impact (For Rumsfeld, this 
should be referred to “intelligence”). Regarding the “unknown knowns”, these can 
be seen as a philosopher’s reflection on our uncertain perceptions regarding the 
empirical world - knowledge could be shaped by the factors that we often overlook 
or are completely unconscious of, such as value and ideology. In the realm of 
theory building in social sciences, this form of knowing could be referred to as the 
tacit and prevalent approaches to the subjects, whereby knowledge of techniques, 
methods and particular rhetoric are often perceived as a priori constructs.  Such 
rationales can also be embedded in the use of language as well as particular skills 
and techniques. In general, even reinforced with the widely accepted scientific 
rationality, our perceptions would still to a large extent be governed by 
unconscious beliefs and prejudices. 
Academic engagement with China’s labour issues is clouded with such “unknown 
knowns”. In the past decades since China embraced a market economy, the 
selection of topics in relation to labour settlement changes in China by outside 
observers has been driven by the clear narratives pertaining to: 1) its rapidly 
growing labour intensive industries and the popular rhetoric of China’s “world 
factory” role; and 2) the ever-growing risk of industrial overcapacity and 
corporate debt in the state sector. Given such trends, the speculation on China has 
long been concerned with what  involvement in global capitalism would mean for 
the one-party state’s industrial relations in general. Without any agenda for 
political reform, the Party-state has initiated reforms on almost all aspects of the 
country. The incremental, top-down, path of reform has attracted scholars from a 
wide range of disciplinary backgrounds to engage in China’s labour issues. Topics 
range from discussions on the decline of “old workers” (see Shen, 2006) and the 
rise of migrant labour forces, to the observations on potential convergence or 
divergence of personnel management in the emerging organisations with mixed 
ownership, such as joint-ventures 1. Researchers have striven to offer meaningful 
                                                      
1 See Mann (1989) on different mentalities on working hours between local and foreign employees in 
Beijing Jeep; Taylor (1996) on how foreign managers in JV count on local "labour service companies" to 
be in charge of the local labour management; and Wang (2004) on divergence in employees' 
commitment between SOEs and FIEs. 
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explanations on China’s post-reform labour settlements on the basis of their own 
disciplinary backgrounds, leaving the literature rather fragmented and incoherent 
in terms of research focus. The nation’s fast pace of socioeconomic change has 
made the situation even more bewildering. As Warner (2012b) concluded, it is 
difficult to build a degree of precision when researchers attempt to grasp a 
“paradigmatic shift” in Chinese management.  
The motivation behind this thesis was to address the unresolved confusion about 
the functioning of the local state sector in Shanghai, a vibrant and highly hybrid 
economic segment in China’s largest city. As one of the most developed regions in 
China, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Shanghai appear in the form of large-
scale state-owned business groups. Both market-oriented practices of human 
resource management (HRM) and labour configuration driven by the CCP politics 
have been adopted in those groups. The aim is to undertake an exploratory inquiry 
to unveil the dynamics of regulation making within these party-controlled 
workplaces. Rather than tacitly adopting the pervasively accepted norms, such as 
the widely adopted HRM and other business school rationales, the objective is to 
build the analysis around the social and institutional factors that have shaped and 
are continuing to shape, the labour settlement in Shanghai’s local state sector. Also, 
the aim is to transcend the existing debates on the new formation of the working 
classes in post-reform China by unveiling the complexity of workers’ segmentation 
within these SOBGs, which will expose the diversity of labour, even within a single 
business group, something that previously has been overlooked. It is anticipated 
that  probing the experiences of those “national champions” will serve as an entry 
point for understanding the intertwined relationship between CCP’s politics and 
businesses. Furthermore, this thesis has the goal of developing theory beyond the 
scope of the local sector that can illuminate the underlying social and political 
forces that have been shaping labour settlements at firm level. In general, the task 
of this study is to unearth the underlying dynamics of labour rule making within 
the Party-controlled corporate world. Specifically, the aim is to reveal the subtle 
meanings of day-to-day management and the administrative practices within 
these local state-owned business groups (SOBGs), which are often overlooked, 
4 
 
because they are hidden behind the capitalist veneer, when in fact they play 
pivotal roles in the shaping of labour settlements.  
1.2 Exploring SOBGs’ labour management: Conceptual approach and 
research questions 
The thesis is set out to conduct an exploratory inquiry into Shanghai’s SOBGs. 
Using extended case study techniques, the research questions are expected to be 
refined in the process of subsequent case selection (elaborated upon in Chapter 
4). In this research, SOBGs’s practices in shaping labour rules and personnel 
management are conceptualised as “labour management”. There have been a 
couple of academic engagements attempting to conceptualise the complex 
institutional settings in China, namely: Lee’s “labour regimes“,  in her studies on 
China’s decreasing state workplaces and Lüthje and colleagues’ “politics or 
regimes of production” in their typological study on post-reform industrial 
relations. The concept of “labour management” highlights two realities of SOBGs’ 
labour settlement. Firstly, managerial approaches and mentality are 
overwhelmingly dominant in these state corporations’ labour rulemaking, i.e. 
there is little evidence in the extant research suggesting that there are any signs of 
independent voice expression from the labour forces in China’s state sector. 
Secondly, in addition to these groups’ highly market-oriented staffing strategies, 
some of their labour arrangements serve a purpose other than promoting the 
groups’ business interests. Hence, if HRM approaches are applied under the 
assumption that state-owned entities treat workers in a purely market-oriented 
manner, the groups’ deeper dynamics for managing their highly diverse, 
segmented workforces will not be brought to light. With this perspective, the 
question arises: who is actually “managing” “labour” and how.  
Guided by abductive reasoning, a form of logical inference, the “extended” case 
study inquiry (see subsection 4.1.1) starts with a general research question - who 
is/are governing the labour management arrangements in Shanghai’s local 
SOBGs? Furthermore, to what extent are such managing approaches shaped 
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by the political and institutional factors beyond the boundaries of those 
groups? The question is further broken down into three empirical sub-questions: 
1) What, if any, new deals are being made between labour and management? 
What are the labour managing mechanisms deployed in SOBGs?  
2) Is the voice mechanism institutionally constituted at the level of 
workplace? If not, then what kind of force(s) is/are representing workers’ 
voices, and how? 
3) How and to what extent does local politics in Shanghai involve the 
organising of labour managing settlements at the firm level?  
With a combined use of qualitative research techniques, it is anticipated that these 
questions will be addressed through the pilot study. Subsequently, a refined set of 
research questions will be generated based on these findings.  
1.3 Outline of the chapters 
After the pilot study, the research was driven in a direction that put more focus on 
the CCP’s governance over labour management within SOBGs. That is, this study 
bought to the fore the party’s multiple roles and flexible approaches in controlling 
labour managing matters at the different levels, which were deemed as deserving 
thorough scrutiny. In addition, the ontological understanding of the local SOBGs 
that contends it the necessity to view these Party-state organisations as supra-
organisational institutions rather than corporate bodies with pure business goals 
is questioned. In general, as the exploratory inquiry proceeds, it serves as a 
learning process for comprehending what existing genres of academic 
engagement have unconsciously overlooked due to the limitations of their own 
theoretical backgrounds and skill-sets. Also, such a reflexive approach helps to 
invent new language to deliver meaningful narratives about the labour rules 




Chapter 2 – Literature review  
In this literature review chapter, the fragmented condition of the extant writing is 
discussed, because researchers have been narrowly limited by their own 
disciplinary backgrounds. I also point out that the knowledge from existing 
debates regarding China quickly becomes obsolete owing to China’s fast pace of 
economic and institutional change. From the early debates on the “how has China 
adapted to the world?” to the subsequent “how has China developed its own 
managing pattern”, there has been confusion on how explain precisely the nature 
of “Chinese management” or the hybrid model of Chinese governance over labour 
issues. The main works from the business school genre of writings are reviewed 
in this chapter. The focus is on the topic of “China’s HRM”, with there being 
discussion about the inaccuracy of the use of the term; and shedding light on how 
China’s pervasive managerialism is enacted in the focal SOBGs. In addition, 
sociological research in relation to who the new “working classes” are, is also 
reviewed(see Shen, 2006; Lee and Shen, 2009), where it is pointed out that given 
the heterogenous and diverse nature of China’s labour segments, Marxian 
frameworks may well prove ineffective in terms of their application to the 
research. The chapter concludes with a call for in-depth observation of the SOBGs’ 
evolving history and current day-to-day managing practices.  
Chapter 3 – Background 
This chapter looks at the historical and institutional background of China’s 
ongoing SOE reform. Tracing this back to the beginning of state-driven opening-
up reform starting in the late 1970s, two crucial driving forces behind the shaping 
of the hybrid state corporations are identified: China’s enduring decentralising 
reform, or “Grasping big, letting small go”; and the national project of building the 
Party-state’s “champion” corporations in response to the ever-changing 
contingencies of a market economy. The chapter also anchors the location of 
Shanghai’s local SOBGs in China’s economic landscape, and also illustrates the 
mechanism that have enabled the local CCP to control the groups’ strategies at a 
distance. It is its piloting and showcasing roles for the whole nation that make 
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Shanghai’s local state sector such a vibrant and diverse segment of the state-
owned economy. Based on these understandings, it is pointed out in this chapter 
that the SOBGs’ “modernising” attempts to reconfigure the labour force have been 
subjected to the Party-state’s enduring dilemma: choosing between economic 
efficiency and political stability.  
Chapter 4 – Methodology  
The methodological design of this thesis is explained and justified in this chapter. 
Beginning with a discussion on the role and value of social science inquiries, the 
chapter introduces abductive reasoning for justifying the reflexive rationale of this 
study. The exploratory manner of this research is conceptualised as a “casing” 
process, whereby the findings from successive cases can be effective tools for 
generating meaningful social theories, rather than merely providing interesting 
stories. Next, regarding the epistemological search for an analytical framework 
under uncertain conditions without any a priori construct as the founding basis, 
Kochan’s “strategic choice” (1984) is adopted as a preliminary framework for 
guiding the pilot study. Based on the findings from the pilot study, this chapter also 
demonstrates why the focus of this research shifted to an inquiry into the CCP’s 
governing ways and flexible controlling approaches to the SOBGs’ labour 
management. The refined fieldwork solution as well as a detailed template of the 
case studies are also presented at the end of this chapter.  
Chapter 5 & 6 – Case studies 
Two SOBG cases, ElectriCo and TexCo, are covered in these two empirical chapters. 
In accordance with the layout of the case study templates, the empirical findings 
are narrated in relation to three key aspects of labour management changes: 1) 
workforce restructuring; 2) employment relations; and 3) market-oriented 
management. ElectriCo represents an incremental transforming history of 
Shanghai’s local state-owned industry - profitable state assets have been 
intentionally integrated in the form of a business group, where decisions on labour 
management are systematically made through the group’s hierarchical HR-
oriented managing system. Meanwhile, TexCo, the subsequent selected case after 
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ElectriCo, was chosen after reflexive thinking about the latter. This entity is the 
result of the local CCP’s radical decentralising policies for Shanghai’s once 
enormous state-owned textile industry. The group’s labour managing 
arrangements entail a mixture of formal and informal ways of negotiations. The 
aim is to highlight the significance of the two groups’ evolving trajectories in their 
shaping of the present labour managing patterns. In addition, different market 
conditions, skill-sets of workforces and technological factors are creating 
divergence in the two groups’ rationales underpinning their style of labour 
management. Nevertheless, CCP apparatuses’ ubiquitous and sovereign influences 
in organising labour management are apparent in both cases.  
Chapter 7 – Discussion and theoretical reflections 
The findings from the case studies are discussed in this chapter. By beginning with 
the ontological thinking regarding the “hierarchy-network” nature of SOBGs, this 
chapter sets out to analyse the firm-level CCP apparatuses’ flexible controlling 
approaches within the groups. The party’s influences on labour management 
organising are conceptualised as having four types of roles: as “Enforcer” and 
“Regulator” on the matters in relation to employment relation reshaping; and as 
“Manager” and “Facilitator” with regards to the selection of a new cohort of skilful 
core workforces. Synthesising the findings from the two cases has shed light on 
the ways in which the various top-down decision making behaviours enacted by 
the Party apparatuses have been utilised so as to be sufficiently flexible for 
responding effectively to labour and business considerations, thereby maintaining 
the central authority’s strong grip on power. Ontologically regarding SOBGs as the 
CCP’s reforming solutions, the chapter further develops discussions on the party’s 
dilemma in the course of ongoing reforms, as well as its dual agenda of improving 
efficiency of the state sector while maintaining labour harmony without risking 
open labour-management collisions. The chapter also develops a couple of 
theoretical reflections. When comparing the paths of the IR system making in the 
post-war European context, I contend that these SOBGs’ transforming history can 
be seen as a “compressed” version of labour its management. The CCP, as the 
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groups’ ultimate decision maker, has to constantly find out ways to adapt to 
various contingencies brought forth by market and technological changes.  
Chapter 8 - Conclusions 
In this, the final chapter, I conclude with the contributions that this thesis has 
made.  
A shared body of literature: I believe I have provided a more holistic 
understanding  regarding governance in China and historical research on the CCP 
into the study of China’s labour management, which previously has been absent. 
China’s authoritarian unitarism: Little evidence suggests the Party-state will 
deliver a new deal to China’s workforces. In other words, industrial unitarism will 
continue to be dominant in China’s workplaces. What is more, the party’s 
pragmatism is continuing to make it possible to marry managerial techniques and 
rhetoric with its authoritarian rule over labour management.  
Reflections on “managing labour” as a new norm: In the wake of declining 
collective labour politics globally, managerialism appears to be prevailing, with 
the reinforcement of pragmatic trends in mainstream politics as well as with 
regards to new technological developments. I argue that China’s experience of 
labour management should not be merely treated as a China-based pattern, but 
also as one of the variants of capitalism at the global level.   
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Chapter 2 In search of “labour management” – a 
literature review 
In this chapter, I review the body of literature that explores Chinese labour 
management in general, and then point out the gap to be filled by this research. As 
a specific focus, I explore discussions concerned with China’s changing labour 
market and its link to the development of society. 
First, different terms that emerge throughout the existing body of literature are 
reviewed. The extant literature has shed light on labour management 
development in China from a variety of perspectives, but these discussions are 
quite narrow because they are limited to the different researchers’ disciplinary 
backgrounds. The aim of sorting out the terminology is not only to address 
confusion regarding research objects in literature, but also supports the goal of 
this research, which is to consider labour management from a longitudinal 
perspective to reveal changing social relations in work organisations. Then, I move 
to introduce the different levels of analysis and the paradigmatic divergence in the 
literature. It has been argued that shifts in the research focus in the literature can 
be interpreted as paradigmatic shifts, because of the transition from a planned 
economy to “market socialism”. Next, prior observations on the context of 
industrial relations reform are reviewed to see how researchers examine future 
paths of industrialism, new institutions and the state’s purpose and role in shaping 
labour management in workplaces. Finally, when reviewing the extant literature 
on labour management in state sector, I target local SOEs, an area, an area that has 
received little prior attention, to illustrate why it is important to conduct firm-level 
inquiries in this context.  
At the end of this chapter, I explain why longitudinal observations, rather than 
cross-sectional ones, would be desirable in future. In addition, I contend that 
discussions on “labour management” in China should be an inter-disciplinary, if 
they are to reveal the process of institution forming and complex social relations 
within various forms of social and institutional settings on a comprehensive basis.  
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2.1 Origin of the debate 
There is a large collection of academic works engaging with changes in labour 
relations. According to Cooke’s review (2009) on the literature from 1998 to 2003, 
the themes that have been discussed are as follows. 
1) Industrial relations, SOE reform and labour market reform. This 
research has mainly focused on the role of trade unions and management with a 
backdrop of dynamic changes of employment relations in SOEs. In recent years, 
discussion on this issue has brought new aspects, such as the influx of the “new 
working class” (see Shen, 2006) as a result of the urban labour market being 
opened up to the rural labour force, and the risk of their potential challenges to 
the “old urban labour force”. 
2) Training and development, organisational learning, leadership and 
management development. The objective of these works is to look at how 
Chinese workforces have shifted into being “human capital” in a climate of 
management competence and entrepreneurship (Cooke, 2009, p. 11). Some of the 
most influential studies are those that have contributed findings on generational 
changes to work values (Ralston et al., 1999). 
3) Traditional aspects of HR practices. In addressing what “Chinese HRM” 
is, these studies have examined particular HR practices, such as recruitment, 
training and reward, in wide range of ownership categories.  A variety of 
theoretical perspectives have been engaged with, including cultural and social 
capital, organisational psychology and human capital theory.    
4) HR practices in joint ventures and multi-national corporations (MNC). 
Articles concerning these issues especially focus on the relationships between 
parent firms and their subsidiaries, or cooperating partnerships and how HRM 
policies are integrated in the context of globalisation. 
5) Organisational behaviour. Rather than considering the relations 
between firms, these studies rely more on empirical inquiries derived from 
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workplace level. In general, researchers analysing organisational behaviours 
mainly use quantitative approaches to establish the extent to which, the cultural 
or institutional residuals of the pre-reform period keep influencing labour 
management practices in emergent market institutionalised work organisations. 
Lacking a shared body of literature on general theories, researchers have 
extensively discussed post-reform changes on various matters, including IR 
policies, HRM practices, industrial/employment relations, labour process control, 
organisational behaviour and the Party-state's labour politics. The issues 
discussed by researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds often overlap 
and the terms, such as personnel management and HR, are often interchangeably 




Researchers have used a variety of terms during different periods of China’s 
reforming history. Sometime the terms “personnel administration”, “industrial 
relations”, “labour relations”, and even “human resource management” were used 
interchangeably, not only according to the fast-changing context of economic 
development, for they also been deployed with different emphasises (Goodall and 
Warner, 1997).  
In some cases, such as inquiries taking place in “working units” (Danwei), the 
“personnel administration” has been drawn upon to describe the changes to the 
reward system (Takahara, 1992), or the introduction of performance appraisal 
systems (Zhu and Dowling, 1994). In the early period of market reform, “industrial 
relations” used to be a main subject utilised to illustrate the changing decision-
making inside the state-owned factories. Lots of researchers in that period were 
comparing Chinese reform with their counterparts in other former communist 
states, which were conducting reforms at the same time. The major topic of the 
debates was whether China’s reforming path would be a unique pattern of socialist 
industrialism or become another example of East Asian styled labour management.  
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Discussions about Chinese HRM were also salient in the 1980s, when a growing 
number of SOEs started to import western approaches in management, whereby 
many were restructured as joint ventures with foreign owners. At that time, some 
researchers claimed that HRM analysis was appropriate, when in reality PM was 
still the dominant feature in labour relations (Goodall and Warner, 1997). 
Transferring SOEs into joint ventures symbolised two facts: first, China’s 
acceptance of the market environment and the second, hybrid forms of economic 
entities would play an important role in China’s economic reform. Thus, 
researchers’ enthusiasm for probing joint ventures was underpinned by their 
anticipation that would be clashes, that might lead to convergence, of 
oriental/western, traditional/new, or political/market ways, brought about by 
reform by the central authorities. That is, given this context, HRM was either 
regarded as a symbol of a “new way” or an alternative to the traditional 
institutions nurtured by the communist regime. It became inevitable that HRM 
researchers would consider that institutional legacies might make China’s new 
way of management substantially divergent to any particular form that would be 
categorised as a kind of “HRM”, which has been solidly defined based on western  
contexts, in particular, that of the USA. Rather than illustrate what Chinese HRM is 
and disentangle the confusions of PM/IR/HRM, management researchers, such as 
Goodall and Warner (ibid), have tended to simply contrast of American-defined 
HRM and China’s old system, which has thus failed to provide an in depth view of 
the latter’s social and political settlement in relation to labour arrangements.  
In this research, the concept of “labour management” is treated as a broader 
notion that entails most of the discussions mentioned above. In the following 
chapters of this thesis, I will address the importance of recognising the Party-
state’s influence (the “who is managing labour?” question) for understanding the 
changes taking place at the organisational level. Given the absence of in-depth 
insight into the Party’s controlling approaches, the use of the term “labour 
management” could provide an effective lens for scrutinising the complex nature 
of China’s labour changes. There are two aspects to highlight when considering 
this perspective in China: 1) concerning the institutional perspective, it allows for 
a coherent understanding of the relation between the personnel administration 
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and the old systems in state sector. It is essential for this research to understand 
that the continuous historical process must not be neglected and that the presence 
of “labour” and “management” will reflect the historical facts of changing social 
relations 2) it helps to reveal the institutional nature of the reform, which current 
“HRM” perspectives are unable to do, because they merely focused on economic-
oriented reformation in organisations driven by business interests.  
2.1.2 Existing epistemological perspectives 
Observers of the early period of China’s opening-up reform shared similar 
interests with those focusing on post-communist changes taking place in the 
former East-bloc countries. In general, there have been two approaches to 
examining China’s overall changes regarding post-reform industrial relations.   
 “Culturalist” 
In the “culturalist” authors’ eyes, the “uniqueness” of the Chinese management 
culture is rooted in the Confucian tradition. Warner suggests studies of Chinese 
cultural value in management as the “meta-paradigm” in his proposed typology. 
With a background of growing significance of foreign direct investment and 
emergent joint-ventures, these researchers believe that the development of 
Chinese work organisations depends heavily on indigenous cultural values.  
 Three general sub-paradigmatic dimensions can be identified from this body of 
work: global, “glocal” and cultural. Firstly, under the “global” sub-paradigm, 
researchers presume the western “standard framework” is adaptable to Chinese 
data (see Jaussaud and Liu, 2011). Such a methodology has been widely used by 
management researchers for comparing Chinese/western HR practices at the 
within firm-level and in relation single issues of management practices that could 
be improved by western theories. Secondly, taking account of the notion of linking 
globalise and localise, “glocal” researchers have analysed Chinese labour 
management in the manner of “plus or minus”, in order to shed light on a 
contextualist perspective of adapting “normal” labour management or HR theory 
to particular cultural settings. Thirdly, in relation to the “cultural” paradigm, 
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researchers have adopted Hofstede and bond’s approach (1988) of probing a 
culture’s impact on the managing ways, which is to quantify individuals’ values in 
the workplace and to illustrate national culture as independent variables for 
defining organisational culture.  
“Institutionalist”  
Emphasising China’s unique historical path regarding labour management, some 
scholars have attempted to shed light on the institutional nature of China’s 
management reform. Shifts from the communist to post-communist period might 
suggest a “paradigmatic shift” due to the incompatibility between the two systems 
(Boisot and Child, 1996). Nevertheless, the reform is still regarded as a continuous 
process of modernisation. Thus, for writers with institutional views, their 
objective is to develop frameworks so that the factors driving a nation’s path in 
terms of changing regulations and policies can be identified, thereby allowing for 
predictions regarding the future of modernisation. China’s reform of the state-
owned sector and marketisation are often conceptualised as parts of the nation’s 
layout of “Four Modernisations” by the authorities, whereby it is hoped that 
industry, agriculture, science and technology will be modernised. The state 
planning agenda rapidly evolved. Originating the year 1964, former premier Zhou 
Enlai proposed the first “Four Modernisations” plan at the Peoples Council, aiming 
to “making China a powerful socialist nation by the end of 20th century”. Then. in 
1979, Year One of Deng Xiaoping’s reform, it was refined by him to include the goal 
of increasing per capita GNP to $1000 by the year 2000, so as to “make people’s 
quality of life fairly well-off” (“Xiao Kang”). Much new content has since been 
included in this Government propaganda driven modernisation, and the latest 
version was proposed by premier Li Keqiang in 2013 in relation to an information-
based society being the new objective to be achieved.  
As such, institutionalist researchers have been interested in exploring China’s 
contextual features in regard to modernisation. Similar to culturalists, many 
institutional researchers have raised the question as to whether China will accord 
with western experience of stepping into the phase of marketisation. With a C-
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space framework, Boisot and Child (1996) tried to illustrate China’s 
modernisation as a path towards network capitalism. Rather than being perceived 
as evolving from the absolutist phase to nation-state-driven bureaus with 
centralised bureaucracies and then to a rationally codified market, for these 
authors, China’s modernisation of the business system has been as a result of 
industrial governance with the new faces of decentralisation and marketisation. 
They also questioned that whether a market order with fully codified and diffused 
transactions represents the end of modernisation. Based on China’s experience of 
networked transactions, it could be argued that such an uncodified system is a 
variant of capitalism, instead of representing an intermediate phase between a 
communist hierarchy and market economy.  
In another paper, Boisot (1996) continued to promote his theoretical argument of 
“network capitalism” in explaining paradigmatic shifts of labour theories of value. 
Through examining different practical approaches taken by the Chinese and 
Vietnamese authorities, Boisot found that the two countries’ pre-reform precepts 
of labour theories heavily influenced their managing ways, which have been 
described as being strongly interpersonal oriented. Other researchers have also 
called for “self-confidence” of Asian management researchers in terms of 
developing context specific theory. However, there is evidence that only three 
main topics have received sufficient attention in the discussion of Chinese 
contextualisation, these are market transition, network capitalism and guanxi. 
Intellectual efforts in seeking “Chinese characteristic” seem to be inevitably back 
the trail of global HRM discussions, as well as many similar observations in other 
nation states. As Warner (2012a) concluded, the inquiries on “Chinese 
management” turn out to be a “sub-paradigm” of HRM study. 
Furthermore, Warner (ibid) pointed to another problem of this body of literature, 
whereby institutionalist researchers tend to look into specific areas, such as 
industrial relations, the labour market, human capital and HRM. As for research 
on a wider scale, studies on Chinese HRM have not effectively integrated economic 
and sociological perspectives. Moreover, only a few have involved taking historical 
background and economical settings as significant components of their analysis. 
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On the one hand, most work accepted by management science journals still 
strongly focuses on conventional managerial topics, whilst on the other hand, 
research with a real institutional perspective, which does not merely treat wider 
social concerns as background narratives, is left to mandarin-language 
sociological journals. Areas in sociological discussions, such as class, status and 
power, shed light on urban industrial conflicts; from the period of large-scale state 
sector restructuring to contemporary times, with the topics discussed ranging 
from the laying-off of state workers in the early 1990s to the very recent 
phenomenon of “mass incidents” (officially called industrial action). Also, there is 
another school of writers of HRM using psychological constructs, who mainly 
focus on organisational behaviour with “Chinese characteristics”. 
In spite of the insufficient connections between those works with an institutional 
perspective, some of them are still insightful in shedding light on the changing face 
of governmental intervention in the economic transition. Taking a longitudinal 
view of actors’ changing role, those researchers have contributed considerable 
achievements in illustrating the state’s emergent new faces and management 
approaches through observing the transitioning state sector or newly emergent 
joint-ventures (for example, Ding, Fields and Akhtar, 1997; Goodall and Warner, 
1997; Bjorkman and Lu, 2001). The question about what new roles the state plays 
in the market economy has been well answered by much existing research (See 
Taylor, Chang and Li, 2003; Smyth, 2005; Cooke, 2011). However, this empirical 
research has only focused on the early waves of SOEs restructuring. As Cooke 
points out, the state’s role outside the state sector has been paid less attention. In 
her research on the role of business schools and other educational institutes in 
making Chinese HRM, she strove to extend this discussion to the non-state local 
and organisational levels. It was found that a developmental state like China would 
influence HRM practices through flexible institutional actors instead of pre-reform 
governmental agents who directly control or supervise. That is, China’s new 
practices of labour management are generated from negotiations and cooperation 
between the central authority and localities, rather than being the result of 
governmental intervention through direct policy implementation. Being 
sufficiently autonomous, local governments and corporations often resist 
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demands from the centre. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Party-state keeps 
seeking new approaches to maintaining its control over firm-level labour 
management.  Cooke terms the diversity of HRM practices in Chinese companies 
as being managerial “isomorphism”.  
2.2 What comes next? – debates on China’s post-reform IR paths 
Discussions on which path China will go down to develop a new system of 
industrial relations were once warmly debated at the beginning stage of the 
reform. Along with the withdrawal of the state’s direct influence in industrial 
relations, new legislation on workplace regulation and new approaches to 
adopting market mechanism sparked questions, such as how has the government 
shifted its role from the general employer to labour market creator and the guild 
of new institutions (Zhu and Campbell, 1996), or arbitrator and regulator, in new 
labour relations system (Zhu, 1995; Ng and Warner, 1998). Consensus has been 
generally made regarding the state’s role transition, but contentions still continue 
on two issues, which are, the nature of China’s new industrial relations system and 
what actors’ roles in such new institutions are, in particular, what are the new 
faces of managers and trade unions (Taylor, Chang and Li, 2003). Also, concerns 
in relation to the nation’s future path have also been of interest to many writers, 
intrigued to see whether and how the state would develop its unique pattern of an 
industrial relations system. 
When investigating industrial relations systems, it is important first to understand 
that a separation exists between the owners of production and the labour force 
that engage in the production process in exchange for a wage. In the workplace, 
several workplace-based issues can be examined, such as the organisational 
structure, operation of the labour process and employment relations. For a 
broader view, observations at the state or institutional level would allow for 
mapping out the relations between the societal-level of institutions. (Taylor et al., 
2003, p. 3) In sum, deploying an historical framework to make inquiries in relation 
to an industrial relations system would help provide understanding as to how an 
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industrial society is shaped by the making of social relations through the means of 
production.  
As to Chinese industrial relations, whilst there are a substantial number of works 
across a a wide range of disciplinary fields, focusing on such matters as legal 
changes to trade unions, the changing labour market and the replacement of old 
regime with western managing approaches, there have been very few that have 
probed China’s developing industrialism at the macro-level. Most writers 
contributing to this issue tend to narrow down the discussion within the range of 
their own disciplinary background, because China’s developing pace has been too 
rapid to grasp the image of a society. As a consequence, it has proved extremely 
difficult to produce a general theory that can explain macro-issues, termed 
“China’s developing model” or the “Chinese pattern”.  
However, there still needs to be discussion on the macro-level understanding of 
labour-management relations in China. No matter which development phase 
China is witnessing, a broad image is still required to characterise the forms of 
social relations embedded in the industrial relations system, such that essential 
societal changes, rather than merely matters to do with single economical or legal 
practices, can be identified and examined. In what follows, the main two 
theoretical discussions regarding China’s general industrial relations trajectory 
are introduced.   
 
2.2.1 Neo-traditionalism  
In Walder’s work, “Communist Neo-traditionalism” (1986), he proposed a 
structural sociological framework for summarising the pre-reform systems of 
industrial relations. From interviews undertaken inside the state-owned factories 
in 1980s, Walder pointed to the importance of working units, Danwei, in China’s 
communist industrial regime. Not only as a workplace, but also as a cell attached 
with workers’ housing and social welfare, Danwei is organised and planned by the 
state, thereby being regarded as an ideal access point to address the question: 
“how is Chinese communist society managed and organised?”. Workers’ life is 
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highly dependent on their workplace, both economically and politically. Based on 
research on Danwei, the communist enterprises are described as social 
institutions and the labour force is a factor of production, the cost of which does 
not restrain demand for it (ibid, p. 29). 
After justifying a completely different economic logic between communist and 
western industrial systems, Walder also pointed to fundamental differences 
between his perspective of “neo-traditionalism” and totalitarianism and also, the 
differences with pluralistic corporatism as follows. 
• First, compared with totalitarianism, “neo-traditionalism” emphasises 
more the influence of positive incentives in earning compliance, rather 
than tight surveillance and political control that are used in the former. 
Through systematically rewarding decent jobs and special material 
distributions, the state garners political loyalty from the working class. 
• The second point diverging with totalitarianism is that whilst the neo-
traditional state does attempt to inject ideological standards of 
behaviour into society, stable social relations also need to be 
established to make sure of adherence to the ideology. Thus, personal 
ties are treated favourably in neo-traditional society, in contrast to the 
hostile attitude towards them under totalitarianism. 
• Thirdly, the priority of communist institutions is to implement political 
control, rather than catering for the needs “real” political factions or 
interest groups. In addition to ideological language and behaviour, 
communist institutions also create social structure itself. 
To some extent, both totalitarianism and “group-pluralism” imply certain forms of 
ideal types represented by two ends of a continuum, in which the former 
symbolises a “tyrannical society”, whilst the latter pertains to a “democratic 
society”. Walder tried to claim the uniqueness of communist industrial society, in 
particular, highlighting its divergent path leading industrialism, with its 
potentially unique success lying in the trajectory of “neo-traditionalisation”.  
Walder found that there are underlying “latent rules” in Chinese communist 
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labour-management relations, which manifest themselves hierarchically in the 
system, rather than taking the form of ideological egalitarianism.  
2.2.2 Disorganised despotism  
Ching-Kwan Lee’s study (1999) on industrial enterprises in the Guangzhou region, 
the major powerhouse of China’s labour-intensive production in the post-reform 
era, shed light on another picture of industrial relations in the country’s 
transitioning period. Lee found that the state workers were trapped in a 
“transition gap” between two systems – the diminishing “from cradle to grave” 
system of welfare distribution, and the shaping but not yet mature socialised 
safety net for all workforces. As a result, state workers, whether they kept or lost 
their jobs in state enterprises, faced tremendous vulnerability in the wake of 
China’s market socialism.  
In the meantime, the economy became increasingly diversified with the 
emergence of various form of non-state economic entities. Both socialist 
paternalism within Chinese workplaces and workers’ collective voice, granted by 
socialist ideology, have been flatten by emerging capitalism in south China. On the 
one hand, workplaces are dictated to a by prerogative discourse of managerialism 
– managers’ power was legitimised in the rational pursuit of market efficiency (for 
the sake of both the business interests of transitioning as well as sustaining the 
workplaces’ responsibilities of social welfare). On the other hand, the collective 
interests of labour have become fragmented due to state repression as well as 
open opportunities in labour market. Lee conceptualised such fundamental 
changes to China’s workplaces as “factory regimes” dictated by “disorganised 
despotism”. By bringing more information regarding the emerging norms as a 
result of China’s market reform at the intersections of centuries, Lee’s 
conceptualisation has brought new insights into China’s transitioning industrial 
relations as whole. It has offered a new opportunity to scrutinise how the Party-




With such “disorganised despotism”, state workers were simultaneously punished 
by the state’s failure to institutionalise a socialised safety net and the retreat of 
enterprise paternalism. Commodification of enterprises literally meant an 
elimination of welfare and workers being left to their own devices beyond a 
monthly medical allowance. In this regard, Lee suggested that private-owned 
enterprises are no different from state ones. Moreover, such commodification also 
meant the weaker, less efficient state enterprises were subject to the inevitable 
fate of being closed or disposed of. Many of them were so impoverished that they 
were in severe need of centralised insurance funds, but they were also the least 
capable of making contributions to local revenue. The more inefficient the 
enterprise, the greater the pressure to commodify welfare, thereby putting an 
even greater economic squeeze on workers' dwindling pay-cheques.  
In addition, Lee predicted that large-scale SOEs would still be able to maintain 
their capability to deliver high wages and more efficient state-led interventions to 
preserve CCP institutions. In particular, those large, capital-intensive firms that 
aimed for a future of sophisticated technologies would have been both willing and 
had the capacity of retaining the Danwei form of benefit provision and job mobility. 
She also suggested that the market-based labour regime could co-exist with 
Danwei institutions within the same region. With the absence of effective voice 
representing an channel alternative to the Party’s official unions (ACFTU 
apparatuses), disorganised despotism could have become even more pronounced 
with those emerging market-based economic entities when compared to SOEs. 
The only factor restraining such a managerial prerogative seems to have been 
workers’ increasing choices of making a living due to greater labour mobility and 
access to the market economy. A good example of this, as suggested in Lee’s later 
works, was the labour shortage problems in China’ labour-intensive powerhouse 
regions meant that people could vote with their feet.   
2.2.3 Convergence  
China’s state sector transition sparks many debates on the possibility of 
converging with the managing ways of other countries. The issue of convergence 
entails three aspects: industrial relations structure, employment practices and 
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social insurance. Many business writers assume the trend of convergent with 
western patterns, while there is also empirical research revealing China’s 
divergent path from other transitional economies (for example, there is evidence 
that China is diverging from the Vietnamese experience of market reform, 
according to Chan, [1995]). It is also interesting to see whether emergent Chinese 
labour management is adopting Japanese management techniques, or converging 
with other Chinese speaking countries so as to make a potentially universal 
“Confucius management” system (Warner, 2009). These arguments in relation 
convergence are based upon China’s pragmatism towards reform, which has 
involved directing workplaces to adopt any approach useful for helping SOEs 
adapt to the emergent environment.  On the one hand, the central policy makers 
have attempted to move away from the nation’s past  the state as the supreme 
employer by implementing a new contracting system (Warner, 1996), with wage 
systems turning to being more performance oriented. On the other hand, 
dismissals of long-standing managerial personnel remained at a low level and the 
reward system kept old features from the pre-reform era, including higher 
security for aged workers and equality-oriented personnel arrangements (Goodall 
and Warner, 1997).  
Chan explained that these partial marketised changes indicate that Chinese state 
enterprises can be developed into being an organisational-oriented system. What 
is contrary to “organisation-oriented” is “efficiency-oriented”. These two ideal 
types were defined by Dore (1974) when comparing the managing features of 
British and Japanese work organisations. Regarding “efficiency-oriented”, Dore 
conceptualised it as the type of contract-bound labour relations that have a high 
level of insecurity and lack of commitment from each party. The relation between 
employees and management is assumed as always in the status of conflict, rather 
than sharing interests and having a sense of loyalty. As for “organisational 
oriented”, the labour contract is expected to represent a stability of labour 
relations. Skill level is not the only criterion involved in the concerns of the 
personnel arrangement, but also other personal status aspects, such as working 
years, age or family background. In relation to the wage and reward system, 
workplaces with a high level of committed loyalty often have a fixed wage bill, 
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which makes managers careful to “divide the cake” fairly so as to preventing any 
risk of damaging the paternalistic relations.  
Within the context of China, managers’ rising power in labour management was 
once regarded as a signal that it was restoring its pre-cultural-revolution 
managing style, whereby workers’ job security was concerned as important in 
fulfilling the state’s plan. Additionally, before the 1990s, even though the 
enterprises were asked to adapt to being more “efficiency-oriented”, managers did 
not dare to threaten senior posts in consideration of senior staff’s prestige among 
workers. Another feature of the “organisation oriented” unit was that most of SOEs 
retained their own enterprise unions, branches of the supreme Party-dominated 
trade union (White, 1987), which resonated with Japanese enterprises. In fact, 
before the state accelerated its progress in phasing out “iron rice bowl”, many 
management trainees were sent to study in Japan, rather than the western world. 
In 1994, when Premier Žhu Rongji’ s government carried out the “downsizing” 
policy and “reforming deadline” in SOEs2, a great deal of these were still adopting 
or learning the Japanese school of management in attempts to improve 
organisational efficiency (Vogel, 2011). However, radical policies pertaining to 
reforming the state-sector by the Party leadership meant an answer to the “where 
to go next” question became imperative.  
2.2.4 Academic reflections on the new labour legislation  
Since 1994, the new labour law declares that employees can form a contract with 
employers in relation to agreements on labour remuneration, working hours, 
insurance and safety. Workplace unions were also granted rights to act as 
bargaining agents. Replacing permanently guaranteed employment, the labour 
contract then became widely adopted in almost all the workplaces in the country. 
Since then, the state started formerly to quit the role as general employer and 
instead, national laws that are implemented by local governments regulate 
employment conditions. The new system is constituted by two contracting 
systems: individual contract and collective contract. According to Ng and Warner 
                                                      
2 See Chapter 3, discussing about Zhu’s radical state sector reform. 
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(1998), the principle of the collective contract is based on the notion of equality 
and unanimity through any consultation. What is more, it was particularly 
stressed by the Ministry of Labour that the contract making process shall be a 
process of “collective consultation”, rather than “collective bargaining” (Warner 
and Sek‐Hong, 1999, pp. 303–304). 
Key researchers of China’s emergent industrial relations system have come to a 
consensus that this “collective consultation” system has been vastly different to 
the western notion of collective bargaining (Wu, 2012). In the “benchmarking” 
interpretation in western classic literature, collective bargaining is described as 
pluralistic coalitions of sectional interests (Kerr, 1977; Dunlop, 1993). For 
Flanders (1968), the nature of collective bargaining is a regulation making process 
between the labour force and employer. The collective contract generated from 
collective bargaining will not only solve the labour exchanging issue between 
individual workers and employers, but more generally, will ensure that the labour 
force acts as one of the parties to bargain for all conditions included in the 
contracts, other than price of labour. Before Flanders, Dunlop (1993) had already 
raised similar arguments that the three actors in industrial relations, namely, the 
labour force, employers and government, create a web of rules, including 
“procedural rules” and “substantive rules”, to address conflict in the external 
environment. Both Dunlop and Flanders have explained the pluralistic nature of 
collective bargaining, under which it is assumed that separate interests or even 
conflicts are the normal conditions of collective bargaining. Despite there being an 
upgraded theoretical version in the 1980s (see Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986), 
which saw collective bargaining as a middle-ground decision making process, 
there has been virtually no shift in the pluralistic discourses in the pertinent 
literature3.  
                                                      
3 In Kochan and his colleagues’ “strategic choice model”, not as much focus is put on macro-
level industrial relations as Dunlop. Instead, the analysis concentrates on actors’ behaviours 
of choice at the firm-level.  The institutional structure of firm-level labour relations is defined 
with three levels: macro, middle ground and micro-level, where collective bargaining is 




Nevertheless, there are still radical voices who doubt the existence of this 
pluralism. As Fox (1973) pointed out, it is a massive mistake of Flanders consider 
collective contracts as “collective individual contracts”. First, there is fundamental 
difference in purpose between individual bargaining and collective bargaining: the 
former is for acquiring jobs, while the latter is a process with political meaning, 
which aims to bargain for employment conditions and a better working 
environment. Thus, it is important to note that collective bargaining is not merely 
an economic process focusing on labour trading, for it is also a political process. 
Second, the result of collective bargaining could possibly be failure to make 
agreement and hence, could lead to industrial action. To some extent, collective 
bargaining represents the continuing changing equation of power inside a work 
organisation. According to Clegg’s conclusion (1976), collective bargaining offers 
a form of workers’ participation in management and should be central to the 
activities of unionism.    
Undoubtedly, the image of collective bargaining in western literature is far 
different from Chinese “collective consultation”. Brown (2006, pp. 40–44) has 
listed differences in five aspects: 
1) Purposes and bargaining or consulting coverage; 
2) The nature of trade unions; 
3) Bargaining or consulting subjects; 
4) Responsibilities of bargaining or consulting representatives; 
5) Performance and procedures of collective contracts. 
Besides all these, Wu (2012, p. 4) further pointed out that the a divergence from 
western experience lies in the fundamental difference in role of the state.  
Whilst collective bargaining can be to some extent influenced by the state, the 
ultimate decisions are still made through labour-employer interactions (Mabry, 
1965). However, collective bargaining is controlled by the state, and this is the 
consensus of the key researchers. Regardless of employers or trade unions, the 
agencies taking part in collective consultation are unable independently to 
represent their interests. Rather, the bargaining or consulting processes subject to 
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state’s directions and subjects, such as wages and employment conditions, are 
constrained by local regulations. As a result, the emergence of the Chinese version 
of collective bargaining system has manifested itself as top-down administration, 
rather than labour-employer conflict.  
The nature of the “state-driven” collective consultation system has been realised 
by many researchers. In Ng and Warner’s review of western literature (1998), he 
noted that emerging economies during the post-war period, such as Japan and 
South East Asian countries, had sparked debates on the neo-unitarist perspective 
of collective bargaining. Also, the paradigmatic shift of western theories of 
industrial relations from the late 1960s to the early 1970s offered researchers an 
historical opportunity to re-examine union-based industrial negotiations, by 
considering them as both “adversarial” and “collectivist” in relation to the different 
parties’ interests  (Harbison & Coleman 1951, cited by Warner & Ng 1998, p. 301). 
To some extent, the convergence between west and east on the matter of IR 
represents a growing managerial concern to consider individual performance as 
the determining factor of payment and reward, thereby replacing the old 
“collectivistic IR model” (Storey, 2007). Some observers believe that such a new 
“neo-unitarist” model can be an extending ethos of capitalism, which is beyond the 
“we-they” notion. As part of this type of IR model, China’s emergent “collective 
bargaining” is obviously highly unitary rather than pluralistic, but at the same time, 
the contract is collectively negotiated in a decentralised process at the basic 
workplace level (Ng and Warner, 1998, p. 302).  However, Warner and Ng 
especially emphasise that what has appeared in China has not meant the rise of 
British style “voluntarist” multi-unionism. For, the procedural norms are still 
generated by the state agencies, mainly between the Ministry of Labour and 
ACFTU, and their local subordinating agencies have little power to change those 
agreements from central sources and can only slightly adjust them in order to 
meet with local regulations.  
However, disagreements still exist concerning the state’s purpose for initiating 
this series of new policies. According to Warner and his colleagues’, with the 
breaking up of the Danwei system and emerging forms of economic entities, the 
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state has lost its dominant position in work organisations and so, manages to 
maintain its influence in the economy by actively promoting collective bargaining. 
Consequently, the purpose of implementing collective consultation system does 
not appear to be the state’s determination to make a “replica” of the western model 
(Warner and Sek‐Hong, 1999, p. 306). Through making norms from the centre, 
then conducting these to contingent agencies workplaces, the new institution 
provides the state an effective lever for controlling firm-level regulation making. 
Another reason is, as argued, out of political concern, is that the Party-state’s 
withdrawal from the shop floor might leave an institutional vacuum from which 
“syndicalist” movement could arise (ibid). In general, Warner offered an image of 
there being an official rationale behind promoting a collective consultation system, 
whereby the state aims to hold continuous control of workplace regulation making 
through new approaches. 
In contrast to Warner’s argument, Clarke considered the state’s purpose is to 
create legitimate room for labour-management conflict and moreover, to 
institutionalise the involvement of trade unions. Whilst he agreed with Warner 
that the collective consultation system is not based on negotiated regulation of 
labour relations (Clarke, Lee and Li, 2004, p. 250), Clarke was still optimistic about 
Chinese trade unions’ potentially active role in future. This new institution might 
turn out to be formalistic in terms of its implementation at the local and workplace 
levels, but at least the collective consultation represents the first step towards 
trade unions playing a part in the state function of juridical regulation of labour 
relations (ibid p.251). Despite Warner and Clarke having shed light on the nature 
of China’s emergent IR transformation and both of them being in agreement on the 
features of “state-driven” arrangements, a few questions remain unanswered 
other than those pertaining to the state’s reasons for initiating transformation: 1) 
What is the specific practice that the state put in action so as to achieve its purpose? 
2) As the “state-driven” model works in a way of top-down, how do the “tops” and 
“downs” interact with each other? 3) What is the state’s strategy regarding 
interaction with local governments and contingent trade unions?  
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To answer these questions, further inquiry has to address two issues. Firstly, to 
what extent is there an independent mechanism of voice representation involved 
in shaping transformation in workplaces? Many researchers have pointed out that 
Chinese trade unions are absent from representing workers’ interests, which is 
the basic condition of voice representation within a tripartite system. Instead of 
being driven by the workforce, the restructuring of labour relations in China took 
place through the state’s effort of institutionalising collective representation and 
industry-wide bargaining, which was carried out in the form of the western model 
of labour-management cooperation. Staying away from some western countries’ 
path of making the post-war social contract for labour, China’s Party-led regime 
has never permitted workers’ representation to become antagonistic against 
management.  
Secondly, the CCP and its agencies’ deepening involvement in the SOEs’ 
transformation has not only blurred the boundary between ownership types, for 
it also made it increasingly difficult to explain the nature of the labour 
management hierarchy under state control. Labour regulation making has been 
taking place in a climate of increasingly complex relations between professional 
management and the Party elites brought about by the Party state’s changing 
central-local relationship. As the CCP’s bastions of forging strong national prestige 
of industry as well as being the local CCP authority’s main sources of revenue, 
China’s local SOEs have become nexuses of complex power relations between a 
variety of players created by the enduring process of state-led transformation. 
Such complexity generates a challenge for researchers to identify an appropriate 
conceptual framework to analyse the vivid social and political changes that have 
been continuously affecting labour relations in China. 
In Wu’s (2009) work on China’s “index-oriented” system of collective consultation, 
he attempts to continue this series of discussions. On the one hand, he sheds doubt 
on Clarke’s view on the state’s vision of creating a western-like collective 
bargaining system that is driven by conflict. He points out that current collective 
contracts still lack constraining forces for their inoperable terms, so such an 
argument is thought as (ibid, p.6). On the other hand, he also criticises Warner’s 
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notion of the collective consultation system as being too simple for concluding that 
the state continually seeks direct control of the regulation making procedure. The 
growing complexity of conflict between employers and labour forces in recent 
years has made the state realise that a new institutionalised solution, which is 
adaptable to any potentially emerging form of conflict is needed. In the first decade 
of 21st century, there were two significant changes made to the collective 
consultation system. The first time was in 2004, when the Department of 
Collective Contracts was established for dealing with increasingly deteriorating 
labour relations in almost every sector. Decades of marketisation have rapidly 
brought a mixed economy with different forms of conflict. In 2007, for the second 
time, ACFTU promoted policies of regional and trade collective consultation in 
order to relieve the mass industrial actions that emerged as a result of the 
recession.  Wu interpreted these policy changes as being that the state’s purpose 
was to find a flexible framework that would be consistent with the central 
mentality of controllable and gradual reform. 
In fact, neither Warner nor Clarke has scrutinised changes in the collective 
consultation system that was place after the 1990s, when it started to be operated 
in target-oriented and target management ways. After deploying qualitative 
inquiries in provincial-level localities, Wu (2009) expressed his concern that such 
approaches would possibly turn out to be formalistic, thereby leading to the 
creation of unworkable contracts between labour and management.  
2.3 “Brave new world” of capitalism – perspectives from labour 
sociology   
With the backdrop of China’s export-driven industrialisation, international labour 
scholars have attempted to build up a public sociology of labour for explaining the 
nation’s new working class formation. They criticised the paucity of labour studies 
on the agenda of Chinese sociological research, due to the politically sensitive 
nature of the labour issues. Instead of interpreting labour issues through a non-
colliding lens, as many Chinese scholars have done, these Marxian sociologists 
have been more concerned with structural and institutional matters, such as the 
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role of the state, the regulation mechanisms and the social reproduction of labour. 
Many empirical inquiring efforts of this genre of sociological research were 
extensively influenced by Michael Burawoy’s public sociology, which actively 
engages with class inequality issues through participatory methods. The primary 
objective of “Chinese public sociology”, as Ching-Kwan Lee argued, is to explore 
the experience of the working classes in new social-political settlements.  
Those labour sociologists identified two segments of the Chinese working class 
that are at the forefront of struggling against political powerlessness and at the 
heart of labour unrest: the migrant workers (nongmingong) in the emerging 
export-driven coastal cities; and the unemployed state workers and pensioners in 
the “rustbelt” regions or downsized state industries. Regarding the first segment, 
The research has mostly been based on ethnographical inquiries in the emerging 
industrial cities in South China, which are regarded as the main engine of China’s 
“World Factory” role (Chan and Ngai, 2009). As Chan and Ngai summarised (ibid, 
p.291), on the one hand, the large scale immigration of young workforces from 
rural regions has been a proletarianisation process driven by the dissolving of the 
urban-rural divide. On the other hand, such a process created the spatial pre-
condition of making a working class. Apart from the proletarianising perspective, 
labour sociologists were also searching for the essence of the burgeoning new 
working class’s collective experience. According to the labour historian E. P. 
Thompson’s analysis of the making of English working class (2002), “class 
happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), 
feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as 
against other men whose interests are different from (and opposed to) theirs” 
(2002, p.9). With assumptions of similar life history and the spatial combination, 
“interest-based” and “class-oriented” collective actions were arguably expected to 
happen frequently in China’s future labour relations (Chan & Ngai 2009, p.289).  
As for the other segment of workforce, the formers state workforce or “old 
workers“, as was referred by Shen, this type of worker arguably falls in with the 
Polanyian explanation of proletarianisation, which is conceptualised as a process 
whereby workforces are marginalised in the wake of large-scale marketisation at 
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the national level. According to Shen’s theoretical explanation, there was no 
seemingly distinct ideological consciousness found among the “old working class” 
before the marketising reform initiated - as China’s socialist working class was 
uniformly defined as the “masters of New China” (zhurenweng) in both ideological 
and material ways. The SOE reform also triggered the shaping of a sense of 
community and class consciousness in terms of being the socialist nation’s 
“masters”. In other words, such consciousness was shaped based on workers’ 
“nostalgia” or collective memory in relation to the Maoist era, rather than as a 
response to the changes in wage system that could lead to risks to their own 
economic interests. This could explain why many rust-belt workers resolutely 
resisted managers’ plans to deploy a market-oriented transition. Looking back to 
western labour sociology, Burawoy and Lukacs (1992) offered similar theories 
based on Eastern European workers’ resistance against state-led marketisation. 
That is, the ideological discourses from the “Radiant Past” would spark the 
emergence of the new class and the community, rather than the shop floor, would 
be the place for breeding such a process.  
This genre of labour sociological writing has offered a timely critical perspective 
of scrutinising China’s reconfiguration of the labour force in the age of great 
economic transition. It has brought academic attention to China’s increasing 
amount of labour disputes and unrests, advocating a participatory, reflexive type 
of sociology that aims to demonstrate the shaping of new working classes - or in 
Shen’s words, “bringing class back into analysis”. Such consciousness of capturing 
the experiences of various types of workers, has directed labour research in China 
towards areas that used to be neglected, such as gender studies, immigration and 
microscopic observations of labour movements. However, as much critique on the 
agenda and approaches of public sociology has purported, the a priori constructs 
adopted in that research is not only questionable, for it is also inaccessible for 
questioning by the wider audience of professional sociology.  Consequently, there 
has been a lack of critical discussion on those labour sociologists’ a priori 
arguments regarding China’s overall picture of working class reproduction. Hence, 
there has been a tendency either to generate macroscopic theory in relation to 
China’s new working class and labour managing regime or a focus on the newly 
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forged identities, such as being female or migrant labour, based on contingent 
social settings. In sum, as political and social settlements have been rapidly 
changing in China, it is now increasingly difficult to generalise a Chinese labour 
managing model through the lens of public sociology.  
2.4 Paradigm shifts in the management research approach   
Looking back to previous work carried out by researchers on Chinese labour 
management, it is hard to find literature that can give a definitive understanding 
the phenomenon constitutes. China’s farewell to the planned economy did not lead 
the country’s industries to follow the path of western experience, but rather, an 
uncertain one with a strict industrial governance and regulation process (Boisot 
and Child, 1996). Observations that have attempted to shed light on the new face 
of labour management, can be found across a wide range of disciplinary 
backgrounds. However, as a whole body of literature, it is highly fragmented, 
because the discussions were made at different analytical levels. The question as 
to what the future path of labour management in the state sector will be, is often 
responded to from different disciplinary approaches: observing the early stage of 
Deng’s reform, writers with an industrial relations background focus on China’s 
path towards industrialism. As to the state’s blueprint for establishing a “modern 
corporate system”, management writers have hoped to illustrate an emerging 
“Chinese managing way” or Chinese HRM, by including observations on general 
social-political changes and reforms to the industrial relation system in their 
institutional analysis. What is more, inquiries looking at the new working class 
have also sparked debates on China’s new unionism under the new external 
environment of the global economy in terms of the responses by the state and 
management.  
It should be noted, the body of literature has been pre-dominantly HRM-oriented, 
as managerial power in China’s transitioning organisations has been seemingly 
unchallengeable. Research from a political or institutionalist perspective has been 
on a course of gradual retreat from the management school writing since the mid-
1990s. After Boist and Child’s speculation on China’s “network capitalism”, the 
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main-stream management school writers (see Meyer, 2006) have called for 
“braver” attempts to explore China’s indigenous theory of management – in other 
words, to open up a sub-paradigm based on the insights of local cultural and 
historical settings. Since then, HRM literature has evolved as researchers started 
avidly to follow China’s rapidly changing pro-market policies and social-economic 
settlements, leading to the consequent dominance of HRM writings in the body of 
literature. Taking emerging capitalist forms of economic organisations as units of 
analysis, the HRM researchers were more interested in Chinese firms’ paths and 
methods in introducing HRM-oriented ideas and practices. Some of them have 
focused on HRM’s roles in the shaping of China’s emerging multi-national 
corporations (see Warner and Nankervis, 2012; Nankervis et al., 2013), whilst  
others have kept a watchful eye on small and medium sized SOEs’ responses to 
those new managerial norms in their trajectory of transformation (see 
Cunningham and Rowley, 2007). Discussions have been prone to highlight the 
underpinning importance of cultural and historical roots in Chinese society in 
shaping “Chinese HRM” (see Bell, 2010; Pan, Rowney and Peterson, 2012). This 
has also triggered the debate around the “uniqueness” of Confucian culture – 
whether it can be an effective contextual factor that make studies on “HRM with 
Chinese characteristics” as a genre differ from the traditional western writing (for 
example, Kragh, 2012).  
According to Warner’s review (2012b), previous research could be seen as 
contributions to a specific area with a diversity of paradigmatic dimensions, in 
which researchers paid attention to different areas. Warner proposed that Kuhn’s 
concept of paradigm in the periodic changes of natural science could be applied to 
deepen insights into such a diversity. As Kuhn argued, the evolving history of 
natural science is a process of periodic “paradigmatic shifts”, rather than a linear 
and continuous process and he further pointed out that, “the scientific community 
is a supremely efficient instrument for maximising the number and precision of 
the problem[s] solved through paradigmatic change” (Warner, 2012b). 
Subsequently, Warner moved on to looking back to early social theorists’ efforts 
at making paradigms in management science. Based on these experiences, he 
revealed the interests shifting over thirty years of China’s reform. At the very 
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beginning of the reform, much attention was paid to the emergent legislation 
aimed at reforming industrial system relations. Subsequently, after the state 
sector survived the impact of market mechanism, there has been growing in 
interest in China’s “people resource management”, rather than continuously 
scrutinising laws and policies in different guises. Compared with Kuhn’s “three-
stages” of scientific development, the current stage of researching Chinese HRM or 
labour management appears to be at “pre-paradigm” phase, in which there is no 
consensus regarding any particular theory. In his conclusion, Warner admitted 
that it is hard to pinpoint what is “Chinese management”, and it could also prove 
fruitful if Kuhn’s use of “paradigms” were extended to the field of Chinese labour 
management. Despite of these misgivings, he pointed out that the potential 
dimensions for inquiry are more or less reflected in most research. A “normal” 
paradigm or a “culturalist” one could be two potential pathways for further 
research.  
 
2.5 Heterogeneity within and across – a lacking area in the literature 
worth paying attention to 
In light of the above, it can be seen that the extant research has contributed 
considerable knowledge on the nature of the state’s role in reforming industrial 
relations. However, the particular ways in which the state and its contingent 
agencies influence or engage in labour relations and regulation making at 
workplaces has received scant attention. Whilst the literature has revealed 
practices of decision making in detail against the background of large-scale SOEs 
transformation, there remains a lack of accurate cognition of this recent decade in 
which governing and controlling measures have significantly shifted towards 
decentralised negotiation, while maintaining centrally enacting laws and 
consultation (Wu, 2012).  
To some extent, I would suggest that this gap exists because of the lack of an 
interdisciplinary perspective on labour management research in the Chinese 
context. In the last decade, the major work appears to have been narrowly focus 
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on single disciplines, using quantitative research methodology, rather than there 
being in-depth inquiry from an historical institutional perspective. Regarding 
SOEs, whilst a few writers have illustrated how the Chinese state sector has 
implicitly participated in the market as well as playing an active role, more 
detailed studies to uncover the anatomy of the power relations and ownership 
categorisation are still needed. On labour management, researchers continue to 
focus on the organisational perspective, instead of engaging in an institutional 
interpretation that probes the institutional changes in social relations shaped by 
the new environment. Topics researched are also limited to issues of HRM, 
including employee commitment, learning organisation or theoretical 
understanding of Chinese HRM. In general, the question left to research further is 
how relevant is the body of labour management/HRM literature published so far 
to the reality of what has been unfolding in the Chinese IR context? (Warner, 2011).  
Despite management school researchers’ observations on the introduction of HRM 
in China, other labour management research into SOEs has been neglected in 
recent years. This is hardly surprising, because the wave of decentralisation and 
SOEs’ fundamental transformation has been so rapid that the snapshots provided 
by researchers having become quickly outdated, thereby failing to capture the 
bigger picture about what has really been going on. However,  the complexity of 
ownership in contemporary China appears to be an urgent emergent issue that 
requires understanding. Former inquiries deployed in the workplaces of joint-
ventures in China were carried out in a period when the boundaries of ownership 
had not yet been made complex by the diverse controlling approaches the state 
later came to adopt. For instance, particularly the in state sector, there has been a 
strong trend within local state entities to put local benefits as the priority, which 
might collide with central demands (Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011, p. 26). 
Heery and Frege (2006) pointed out the drawback of the existing HRM is that it 
has ignored the widening range of new actors that have emerged to play 
significant roles in shaping industrial relations; an argument that is highly 
applicable in the Chinese context (Cooke, 2011, p. 3833). This is particularly the 
case in terms of local governments and SOEs, whereby they have their own agenda 
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for promoting local development and sometimes their roles are not only those of 
subsidiaries of the central authority, but also, competitors or co-operators with 
the central agencies (ibid). Since the decentralisation reform, local governments 
have protected their own revenue sources and controlled local SOEs through 
administrative measures, such as obstructing centrally initiated mergers or 
nominated local officers from becoming managers. As Yang (2004, cited by 
Szamosszegi et al. 2011, p.31) noted, “local governments promoted the 
development of local firms both when it was appropriate and when it was not”. It 
could be the case that specific local practices of labour management have emerged 
from these IR actors, which have been accepted by central policy makers and this 
has led to a convergent managing model and/or the creation of isomorphism 
across the regions.  
Unfortunately, in recent years, few in-depth studies have investigated the 
institutional transition of labour management in local SOEs. Many previous 
observations have revealed specific issues of these enterprises in transition from 
similar perspectives, including laying-off of workers, transitioning trade unions 
and the introduction of western HRM. Some of them have probed how large 
companies have contributed to national growth in the contemporary Chinese 
economy, but far less attention has been paid to labour organising practices. That 
is, little scholarship has been devoted to uncovering the complex conflicts, 
negotiations and/or cooperation between the central authority and the localities.  
Diversity across regions and industrial sectors 
In Lüthje, Luo and Žhang’s typological work (2013), they have pointed out that 
labour management in China is highly fragmented among the workplaces for 
different industrial sectors and ownership types. Various labour standards co-
exist across the country as the employers have quickly adapted to China’s rapidly 
changing institutional framework. Aiming to reveal various forms of “politics of 
production” in their typology-oriented study, they selected workplaces from a 
wide range of ownership types and industries as units of analysis. Rather than 
bringing any a priori constructs, such as the existence of stable IR institutions, 
their work focused on the shaping and transforming history of institutional 
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arrangements and by doing so, the study revealed a picture of multiple paths for 
China’s industrial relations.  
Compared to previous management school and labour sociological inquiries, this 
work has been a ground breaking step in terms of bringing China’s rapidly 
changing legal and social settlements into the analysis. It builds on labour 
sociologists’ theoretical contributions regarding the “old” and “new” regime of 
production, as well as the various forms of labour actions responding to those 
different institutional settings. Moreover, Lüthje and his colleagues also suggested 
that such recognition on diverging regimes of production needs to be broadened 
so as to shed light on other institutional conditions at the local and workplace 
levels. Rather than being limited to the conception of the “rustbelt north” and 
“labour-intensive south”, discussions on regime of production have to be extended 
to more diverse settings, such as models of production, work organisation, 
recruitment policies, performance control, bargaining relations and wage systems. 
They have also pointed out that all these factors are not necessarily determined 
by the ownership and production types. Hence, the conventional notions of the 
segmentation of labour managing patterns, for example, the dichotomy of state-
owned and private-owned (or foreign) enterprises, and “old” and “new” regimes 
of production have to be re-scrutinised.  
Lüthje and colleagues’ typology demonstrates five types of regimes of production  
in terms of assessing the workplaces’ level of strength of control over various 
labour managing matters. It is a refreshing picture on the heterogeneity of labour 
managing regimes within and across regions and industrial sectors. Such an 
approach can be further deepened in terms of revealing the internal diversity 
within particular regions or industrial sectors. Targeting the matter of the nation’s 
general path “after the Iron Rice Bowl”, Lüthje and colleagues did not generate a 
theory other than constructing five different ideal types of regimes of production. 
With regards to the question pertaining to the possibility of Chinese workers’ 
independent voice expression and autonomous role in bargaining, the study 
simply concluded that the Party-state does not have an agenda of offering a new 
deal to Chinese workers. As for the Party-state itself, the source of managerial 
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dominance in all five ideal types, as was assumed in these case studies, these 
authors provided no in-depth analysis of this particular phenomenon.  
There are two kinds of paradoxes in the extant literature. For the studies aiming 
to provide general theory at the national level, researchers have to tackle China’s 
complex, diverse labour managing settlements. It is difficult to generalise a 
uniform model of the IR system or labour managing pattern that has been 
developing in post-reform China. Whilst for those researchers who aim to 
generate microscopic theory within particular “regimes of production”, it is 
challenging to follow China’s rapid pace of legal and national policy changes. As a 
result, their theories would appear to fall into the awkward position of merely 
providing rich narratives on the context of contingent social and institutional 
settlements. Consequently, in the search for the institutional rationale 
underpinning China’s “labour management”, it is necessary to: a) broaden insights 
on China’s heterogeneous settings of production and labour institutions, a task 
that requires more in-depth inquiries to reveal more complex forms of 
institutional and organisational contexts; and b) shed light the nature of the Party-
state’s distant, but sovereign, influence, through the collection of rich qualitative 
data. Also, further research should go beyond management school styled narrating, 
which tends to treat the whole country’s transforming labour institutions as a 
“manageable” phenomenon. Instead, the contested relations and negotiating 
processes between the various actors in labour relations deserve more attention 
so as to provide meaningful analysis at the institutional and societal level. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the existing body of literature on Chinese labour 
management in general. As has been illustrated, on the one hand, this body of work 
is highly fragmented, because researchers have been limited by their own 
disciplinary backgrounds. On the other hand, lack of consensus on the use of terms, 
a poorly understood paradigm shift and rapid change, have meant that no strong 
base for institutional analysis regarding China’s developmental trajectory has 
been established. However, it is still possible to identify the main pathways by 
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considering the institutional changes in social relations in workplaces. To answer 
the question “what is Chinese labour management/HRM?”, “culturalist” writers 
have resorted to quantitative methods in seeking indigenous cultural factors. 
while “institutional” researchers have tended to look at historical contexts so as to 
shed light on the extent the current work organisations are still influenced by the 
past, and to surmise what will be the future path of Chinese labour management. 
Nevertheless, these management school writers still tend investigate specific 
issues pertinent to their own disciplinary backgrounds. Despite the wide ranging 
views in relation to the changing historical context in published articles, 
researchers would appear to have treated background and context merely as a 
narrative part, rather than a necessary component in their analysis (Cooke, 2009). 
Consequently, inquiries aimed at identifying who the actors are and how they 
interact within the emergent industrial system are still desperately needed to 
answer the “where to go next” question for China. In past decades, there have been 
debates on this issue that have focused on the nation’s emergent system and policy 
changes (Warner and Sek-Hong, 1999; Clarke, Lee and Li, 2004; Wu, 2012). 
However, it is necessary to update the knowledge on policies and laws to cover the 
21st century, and what is more, qualitative insights into how the state’s strategy 
and policies are conducted through relations between firm managers and state 
agencies is still a gap to be filled. 
In this research, the interaction that has resulted in both formal and informal 
labour management regulations is to be uncovered through in-depth inquiries 
deployed in local SOEs, which are enterprises that have received scant attention 
in previous studies. This inquiry will lead to two key outcomes: first, how the state 
has resolved the competing roles of national champion of global competence, 
whilst having to make compromises with local governments, who, though 
supporting it, also often resist its will so as to provide local benefits. Secondly, how 
the past reforms have led to a dynamic and complex state sector that is hybrid in 
terms of ownership and managing ways will be elicited. In light of the above, local 
state enterprises could well prove an interesting area to probe in terms whether 
the different actors negotiate, cooperate or bargain with each other. Furthermore, 
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the in-depth investigation into their history and current workplace practices will 
deepen understanding about what the future path of Chinese labour management 





Chapter 3 The ongoing SOE reform: an overview of 
background 
3.1 Reforming China’s central-local relations: 1978-present 
3.1.1 The 1978 “Truth Criteria Controversy”: Set the right path to 
modernisation 
The year 1978 is commonly regarded as a milestone year regarding China’s reform. 
In that year, under the question of what was the direction of future China, 
everyone in the country, timidly, kept watch on the moves coming from the Beijing 
inner circle. In Chinese politics, texts from the central authorities are sacred. Any 
act would not be approved until meeting “zhongyang jingshen” (Central spirit), 
thereby reflecting central policy documents, which contained guideline 
suggestions to primary-level Party branches, rather than mandatory orders. As a 
result of a changed political orientation, China’s open-up reform was initiated, 
thus signifying the abandonment of the Maoist class struggle philosophy. 
The debate was triggered by two prominent factions, open-up reformists, led by 
Deng Xiaoping, and conservative Maoists, with Hua Guofeng at the helm. To keep 
the party regime stable in the aftermath of “cultural revolution”, Hua, the former 
state president, promoted his slogan of the “Two Whatevers”, which stood for “We 
will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and 
unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave”. This stance was 
avidly supported by those who admired Maoist egalitarianism, and were also 
worried that the termination of the “Cultural Revolution” would also terminate 
socialist legacies built up since 1949.  
This general line of these policies was strongly opposed by reformist politicians, 
such as Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and Hu Yaobang. An apparent reason for the 
reformists’ opposition was that the “Two Whatevers”’ meant any vacillating from  
Chairman Mao’s stance would lead to Deng’s eternal expulsion from Beijing’s 
power centre. If Deng’s power had been removed, there could well have been a 
permanent lack of a voice strong enough to counterbalance the conservatives in 
Beijing. With no constraint of ideology, Deng and his staff were pragmatists. After 
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10 years of suppression in the anarchism caused by the “Cultural Revolution”, the 
reformists eagerly anticipated re-establishing their vision of China’s 
modernisation from the early time of the People’s Republic. However, they 
encountered a huge obstacle in the form of the ghost of Chairman Mao. They not 
only needed to wage a power struggle within the Politburo, for they also to win 
the ideological debate so as to gain widespread legitimacy.  
On 10th May 1978, an article titled “Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth” 
was published in the “People’s Daily”, the state propaganda mouthpiece. It claimed 
that the Party’s general line had to be proven in practice for an extensive period of 
time before it would become the truth. “One of the basic principles of scientific 
socialism is that any theory needs to be subjected to being tested in practice.” This 
article triggered a great debate over the legitimacy of the “Two Whatevers”  
(lianggefanshi) in the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in 
December 1978. After a 36-day marathon of the “Central Working Conference”, a 
consensus was made to rehabilitate suppressed Party cadres from the “Cultural 
Revolution”. Accordingly, the “Two Whatevers” was defined as an “extreme leftist 
mistake” that was geared towards continuing Maoist “proletarian struggle”. “The 
1978 Truth Criterion Controversy” paved the way for Deng’s fundamental shift 
towards opening-up reform.  
3.1.2 Marketisation and deregulation: a pragmatic practice 
There were lots of debates on the nature of Chinese economic transition in the last 
century. Apparently, China’s economic boom was accompanied by a tolerated 
widening the interregional gaps. That is, “Let part of the people get rich first” was 
part of Deng’s reformist philosophy, which contributed to the dramatic rise of 
south-east coastal regions.  Some researchers have argued that the rapid pace of 
marketisation in coastal areas has actually intensified, while the others have 
pointed out that the decentralisation policies exempted restrictions on 
interregional resource transfer and hence, rural industrialisation was stimulated. 
Under of the ambiguous slogan of “establishing socialism of Chinese 




Decentralisation would appear to have been at the forefront for central 
government in the initial period of post-Mao reform. After the victory of the 
conservative Maoists in the power struggle, “socialism” and “Maoist” were 
redefined by Deng’s faction. When legitimating the new order after the 11th CCP 
central committee, Deng advocated focusing on the nature of a socialism 
concerned with “emancipating the productive forces” and “improving the 
economy”. In his speech to the 12th CCP central committee, 1982, the slogan of 
“combining the principle truth of Marxism with the Chinese context” was put 
forward and “being realistic” in achieving modernisation.  The central authority’s 
claim after the great shift in 1978 concentrated on reorienting people’s inherent 
Maoist perception. Power was increasingly transferred from central to local, with 
centrally administrated entities being asked to seek their own way of development. 
A series of general lines suggested that reformists’ attempts at deregulation and 
decentralisation were to be implemented as a farewell to the old era of standing 
still and refusing to make progress owing to ideological constraints. In short, 
decentralisation was an ideological declaration rather than concern about 
alleviating burdens on central government. 
3.1.3 Fiscal reform: reshaping central-local relations 
The first notable change made in policy was in relation to fiscal reform. Before the 
reform, local governments had to turn over their revenues to the higher 
authorities, which constituted the Chinese hierarchical pyramid. Through the 
introduction of a contracting system, local governments were authorised to 
possess a certain portion of revenues and to formulate their own spending plans. 
The core principle of this reform was to activate the vitality of the local economy. 
It was the first time that the local governments confronted the market 
environment with fiscal power and their governing performance was closely 
linked with their skills in operating spending. In 1994, a tax-sharing system was 
adopted to realign the central-local relations in tax responsibilities by categorising 
taxation as: “central tax”; “local tax”; and “central-local sharing tax”. This reflected 
central government’s worry about the potential political risk brought by the 
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economic opening-up reform. 4 Local governments then increased their influence 
in investment process. Regarding which, the percentage of capital construction 
investment in local government led enterprises increased from 40.6% to 59.8% 
between 1984 to 1994 (Wei, 2001, p. 11).  
Changes to the central-local budgetary relationship were assumed to be signs of 
the growing power of the localities and declining central power (Chung, 1995). For 
some scholars, this fact suggests that limited power in relation to local 
governments is one of the key factors contributing the success of Chinese economy. 
However, others worried that this signified a risk of state disintegration, as the 
hierarchical fiscal system was one of the crucial elements of a unified Chinese state. 
In Wang Shaoguang’s “A Report on the capacity of the Chinese State”, he conveyed 
his own concern about the situation of “Strong local governments” and “Weak 
central government” 5  (Lee, 2000). Given the situation whereby the 
decentralisation policy had caused so-called “fiscal decline”, the central-local fiscal 
relationship rapidly became an area concerning the country’s future political 
prospects.  
During the period before tax-sharing reform in 1994, central-local fiscal relations 
entered an arbitrary period of budgetary sharing bargaining and the entire 
“decentralisation” process came as a result of the “Fiscal Contracting System” at 
the end of 1980s. According to the enacted contracting system, this not only 
allowed local governments to make their own budget, for it also granted them the 
right to overspend. The centre would also not issue subsidies, if locals reported 
shortages in revenue or over-expenditure. Clearly, this policy was a political signal 
                                                      
4 Zhu Rongji, the former premier in office from 1998 to 2003, conducted a tax-sharing system 
when he was the deputy premier responsible for fiscal and financial reforms. This was seen as 
central government’s attempt to recentralise. Whilst this proved to be effective in relieving 
central government’s financial difficulties from late 1993 to 1994, there has been growing 
criticism of his 1994 fiscal reform for its excessive weakening of local budgetary power, which 
led to local corruption and housing bubbles caused by local governments’ excessive land 
development as an alternative approach to creating local incomes. 
5 See Wang Shaoguang and Hu An'gang, Jiaqiang zhongyang zhengfu zai shichang jingjizhuan 
xing zhong de zhudao zuoyong - guanyu Zhongguo guojia nengli de yanjiu baogao (To 
Strengthen the Leading Role of the Central Government in the Transition to a Market 
Economy: A Research Report on China's State Capacity), 1993, mimeo.  
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of forcing local government to adapt to the new environment after the shifts in 
1979. As Deng’s reform philosophy of “step as big as you can”, this tremendous 
change forced Chinese local governments to abandon the old Soviet-styled fiscal 
system, and to make a symbolic start in relation to power division in the central-
local relationship. As its name implies, negotiations were made between the centre 
and locals to set up agreed ratios in budgetary revenues. After the agricultural 
“Land Contracting system” was seen as an impressive success in 1980, 
“contracting” became the most popular proposal for reforming all other areas. 
Originally, this was proposed to replace the Soviet-style agricultural regime of 
“People’s Communes” by signing up a contract between peasants and village 
committees to farm a particular amount of crops on a piece of given land, which 
became as popular as the terms “reform” and “socialist market economy”. 
However, contracting responsibility for the fiscal system has proved not to be as 
successful as its parallel in agriculture. Losing its control in industrial surpluses, 
the central government suffered as increasing deficit and a see-saw battle with 
local governments in bargaining for revenue shares, in which the centre attempted 
to capture as much as they could from profitable industries for the state treasury. 
This central-local tension was interpreted as a rising trend of “local protectionism” 
in the centre’s official language, and moreover, led to provincial development 
becoming entrapped in unsustainable short-term investment (Wong, 1991). A 
widespread phenomenon was that local governments’ “insider” culture often 
resulted in the centre becoming frustrated in the revenue sharing negotiations. 
Benefiting from non-transparency in budgetary revenues, local governments 
could, on the one hand, conceal their real balance and on the hand, they were able 
to request more subsidies from the centre. 
Before the formal establishment of the “Fiscal Contracting Responsibility System” 
in the late 1980s, central government dominated the whole country’s budget by 
formulating regulations that were vague in terms of their purpose and how they 
were to be implemented, which were adopted throughout the hierarchy of 
branches all over the country. In that period, generally acknowledged as one of 
“decentralisation”, the centre engaged in provincial budget bargaining by issuing 
non-mandatory regulations, called “non-binding directives” or “reference targets”. 
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Local revenue policies varied vastly at that time, as the centre had different 
requirements of the provinces. In fact, diverse provincial regulations have always 
been a mainstay approach the central authority when striving to alter the overall 
economic configuration. In Oksenberg and Tong’s view (1991), by anatomising 
central-provincial relations in the era of “decentralisation”, varied types of 
budgetary systems made up a hybrid fiscal model, rather than a straightforward 
“decentralised one”. Between 1980 and 1982, there was an experimental fiscal 
regime of tax-sharing, which was subsequently formulated as a contracting system 
in the late 1980s. Whilst a highly decentralised regime of “Lump-Sum Transfer” 
was adopted at the same time in the southern coastal provinces, such as 
Guangdong and Fujian. This system allowed for full autonomy of the local budget 
and responsibility in balancing. The more general arrangement before the 
contracting system was “Dividing Revenue”, which was implemented in 15 
provinces from 1980-1982. After that, the contracting system was widely adopted 
in almost all provinces.  
Figure 3-1 Budget Share of National Income: 1978-1989 
 
In Figure 3-1, we can see that total national income increased rapidly from 1978 to 
1989, while the contribution of the consolidated government budget share 
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the dramatic expansion of the non-state sector was one of the apparent reasons 
contributing to the shrinkage in central revenue; the process of marketisation was 
carried forward along with budgetary decentralisation. Moreover, China’s reform 
not only resulted in foreign capital pouring into various sectors, for it also 
permitted local authorities entering previous state monopolised industries. The 
newly emerged competition brought by the market mechanism stimulated the 
realignment of relative prices, which led to profits suffering. Local governments 
taking over did not make industrial production more profitable to the centre; the 
total rate of return to capital fell nearly 3 per cent in large and medium enterprises 
between 1980 and 1985 and a staggering drop of 64.0% to 38.8% was witnessed 
for light industry. Moreover, from 1985 onwards, when the fiscal contracting 
system started to be widely adopted, the decline was even steeper. Specifically, the 
total return on fixed assets fell from 24.3% in 1980 to 22.4% in 1985, while 
between 1985 and 1989, the decline  was from 22.4% to 17.5% (Wong, 1991, p. 
695).  
Central government’s worry about its loss of control over local revenues was 
reflected in their concern regarding the “two ratios”, the budgetary-to-GDP ratio 
and its own share of disposable revenue. In a television speech, Xiang Huaicheng, 
the former deputy Minister of Finance, pointed out China’s lagging behind in the 
“international average” of the two ratios, which were 40 per cent and 60 per cent, 
respectively.6 (ibid) Up to 1993, central government had no agency for collecting 
revenue other than the State Bureau of Customs (SBC), which was in charge of the 
customs duties and the State Administration for Taxation, to which directly 
controlled SOEs were obliged to pay a substantial part of their profits. A significant 
change in the reform of the Tax-Sharing System (TSS) was made in 1993, with the 
creation of three tax categories: central taxes, central-local shared taxes and local 
taxes. (Finance and Economy Small Leading Group of the Central Committee of the 
CCP, 1994) The Central Tax Bureau was established to collect and control central 
tax revenue by its branches set up all around the country. In addition, the shared 
                                                      
6 Xiang pointed out that in most countries, the budgetary-to-GDP ratio was above 40 per cent 
and central government’s share of disposable revenue exceeded 60 per cent. 
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tax was substantially expanded in size, including VAT (split as 75 per cent for the 
centre, 25 per cent for the locals), resource tax and securities trading stamp tax. 
On the other hand, the compromise that the central government made was to 
adopt a new system of “tax repayment” so as to win support from local 
governments, whilst it was still able to ensure that the centre received 70 per cent 
of any increase in consumption tax and 52.5 per cent of VAT increases.7  
Not surprisingly, the implementation of “serving meals to different diners from 
different pots” immediately led to frustration in the provinces and the local 
authorities set collecting local revenue as their priority. In 1995, the central 
revenue collection only increased for 12 per cent, much less than the growth of 
local revenues, which was 29.2 per cent. The People’s Daily, the Party-owned 
media, warned that if central government was not able to achieve its revenue 
targets for VAT and consumption tax due to poor performance by local industry 
their tax repayment would not be delivered. Another fact that made central 
government belligerent, was that by the end of 1992, the EBF (extra-budgetary 
funds) had dramatically surged by 1100%, of which the amount was nearly 97.7% 
of the budgetary fund. In the official budget statement in 1996, the figures of 
central and local revenues were not given and instead, the poor fiscal performance 
of that year was presented in a euphemistic narration: 
“…at present, difficulties and potential risks still exist in the state finances. The 
deficit in the central budget remains high, and the objective of reducing the 
deficit set in the Ninth Five-Year Plan will be difficult to achieve. Huge debts 
have been incurred in the central budget. Losses in taxation are still serious, 
Cases such as arbitrary tax reduction or exemption, tax evasion, tax fraud, 
refusal to pay taxes and taxes being in arrears frequently occur... The 
unauthorised establishment of funds and the collection of arbitrary charges 
are still common. The tax base is being seriously eroded by extra-budgetary 
charges. The diversion of state financial resources has not been checked, and 
                                                      
7 The repayment system worked with two components, the shortfall of revenue amount that 
a province suffered under the new system compared with retained revenue in 1993, which 
was under the formula: PBR-LT-0.25*VAT (PBR is the province’s base retained revenue, LT is 
the province’s local tax revenue in 1993, and VAT is the VAT provincial revenue). The second 
component was 30 per cent of the total sum of increased central revenue from VAT and 
consumption tax from that province. 
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the issue of income distribution has not been straightened out...” (Zhang, 1999, 
pp. 135–136)  
The government sought measures to drag EBF back under its control, including 
raising the centre’s share of the securities trading stamp tax, establishing funds to 
use financial resources outside the government’s budgetary plan and abolishing 
tax exemption for enterprises with foreign investment. Moreover, from 1997 
onwards, EBFs started to be diverted to budgetary revenues. As the Rules on 
Tightening Management of Extra-budgetary Funds stated in 1996, the 
management of income and expenditure was to be separated, whereby the EBFs 
would be included in the budget, while spending would be managed by the 
administrative agencies that collected the funds.  
In 2003, a decade since the adoption of tax-sharing reform, the budgetary-to-GDP 
ratio had risen from 12.6 per cent to 18.6 per cent and central government’s share 
of disposable revenue grew from 39 per cent in 1993 to 54.6 per cent in 2003. This 
reform was considered as being down to the centre’s willingness to draw the fiscal 
relation with locals back to the conventional centralised pattern (ibid).  As worries 
regarding political disintegration grew, Zhu Rongji, the deputy Prime Minister, 
warned in 1993, “If the central revenue keeps declining, we will face our own 
collapse in 2000” (The 21th century Financial Report, 2004). The rising “crisis” 
was also explained as being a result of eroding the previously state monopolised 
sectors (Wong, 1991; Zhang, 1999). Even though there was controversy regarding 
the extent to which the falling state-owned sector affected the economy (As Wong 
has argued, the contracting system before 1994 was toxic and the deteriorating 
state sector was the victim of market reforms. While in Žhang’s opinion, SOE 
failure was the main cause of local revenue decline, rather than growing local 
autonomy), a consensus was arrived at, one accepting that the decentralisation 
and marketisation in the 1980s left a considerable impact, which resulted in 
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It is hard to give a precise answer to the question as to how big the Chinese state 
sector is. Contemporary observers have interpreted the Chinese economy as “the 
miracle of Chinese state capitalism”, while others, who focus on the marketisation 
reforms in China, point to the fast expansion of the private sector and the 
shrinkage of the state’s control. However, ironically, China’s “state-owned sector” 
is a contested concept, with the phrase has been used to analyse different contexts, 
disciplinary fields and economic entities. Since the reforms of ownership and the 
enterprise system proceeded at a dramatically rapid pace, difficulties emerged in 
categorisation of economic entities.  
In official statistical data, state-owned enterprises are defined as the category that 
are totally state-funded. Corporations with mixed ownership, controlled by SOEs, 
government and public organisations, are excluded from this category. So, it is 
hard to estimate the contribution to GDP made by the enterprises, such as share-
holding cooperative enterprises, joint-operation enterprises and limited liability 
corporations. The government sometimes uses the term of “state-owned and 
state-holding”, including the categories of “state-owned enterprise”, “of which the 
majority share belongs to SOEs, government or public organisations” and “the 
other SOEs”, for which the control is less direct. The latter can be vaguely defined 
as those firms with state owned shares representing less than 50% of the total.  
In the China Statistical Yearbook for 2010 (CSY-2010), the China National Bureau 
of Statistics (CNBS) provided information on the state’s participation in “the other 
categories of enterprises”, but the specified list of enterprises in which state has a 
direct or indirect share was not given. According to an OECD report on the Chinese 
state sector (2009), state-owned non-tradable shares accounted for one-fifth of all 
shares that SOEs hold, which implies that the latter control considerable shares in 
shareholding enterprises. In addition, as the report further pointed out, SOEs are 
the ultimate owners of shareholding firms and limited liability corporations. Even 
though there has never been a separate category of “directly state funded”, 
according to the government, most firms are only partially owned by the SOEs or 
their subsidiaries, with the central authority being the majority shareholder.  
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Chinese SOEs are defined as enterprises for which all assets are owned by the state 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2002). Key areas in the state interests, such as 
military industries, power supply and petroleum industries, are strictly state-
controlled in the form of centrally-owned SOEs, which are managed by four 
governmental organisations, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC); China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), 
and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), supervising state-owned 
financial institutions (OECD, 2009, p. 8). Moreover, central governmental 
ministries are also involved in the supervision of centrally-owned SOEs, including 
the: Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. These enterprises are of crucial importance in the Party’s strategy of 
making a “socialist market economy” (ibid). 
The private sector includes the entities invested in or controlled by people who 
hire workers for profit-making activities. The development of a domestic stock 
exchange and the surging number of firms in China have produced the illusion that 
pure private ownership is thriving. Officially reported, the non-state sector in fact, 
not only consists of pure domestic private ownership or direct foreign investment, 
for it also includes mixed entities of those SOEs that are partly involved in owning 
or managing themselves.  
3.2 The making of modern enterprise institutions 
SOE reform has witnessed a rough path. Owing to a gradual approach being 
adopted by the CCP, this reform has lagged behind other economic reforms in 
China in guaranteeing change that could keep up with other reforms to the 
financial system, labour market and social welfare.  
The early research on SOE reform was focused on rethinking the drawbacks of the 
traditional enterprise system. As the state-centred system became challenged, the 
hottest issue discussed was how to reshape the relationship between the state and 
enterprises. A consensus made in early 1980s was that the latter should seek to 
become autonomous entities, rather than subordinates of the central 
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administration. However, rather than making clear the matter of ownership, the 
real purpose in the early time of reform was reviving the state-sector economy, 
which has been badly hit by the Cultural Revolution in 1970s. Whilst autonomy 
within enterprises increased and the management was much more independent, 
the ownership and corporate structure was not touched by the reforms during 
that period. 
During the second stage, the late 1980s, the discussion turned to the managerial 
measures that were transforming enterprises into autonomous producers, who 
took responsibility for profits and losses as well as exercising self-restraint. There 
were two prominent patterns identified in relation to process of institutional 
creation. The first was the "enterprise contracting system", through which the 
government maintained, SOEs being run under contracts defining responsibility, 
rights and profits. The basic principle of making contracts is to keep separation 
between control and ownership. Moreover, workers' incomes and welfare depend 
on the enterprises' performance. Some researchers regard the contracting system 
as a creative achievement in making “socialism with Chinese characteristics". The 
other pattern was the share-holding system. This requires non-intervention from 
the state administration, which thus means the proposition of forming a capital 
market. This reflected the continuously increasing voice for marketisation at that 
time.  
3.2.1 From ownership debate to “letting-go” 
Since 1993, the divestiture of small SOEs has been undertaken to reduce state 
control. The objective of this has been to relieve the burden of local government, 
while making it competent in a market environment. To avoid loss-making as well 
as small and medium-sized SOEs becoming burdens of the state, a variety of 
modalities were used to put SOEs beyond the state’s responsibility. Whilst the 
state claimed that enterprises were free to choose the form they wished to transfer 
into, creating share-holding co-operative enterprises was the dominant practice. 
For, the real intention behind this move towards improved performance was to 
maintain the existing "insider" management. 
55 
 
From 1996 onwards, these conversions went rapidly and by 1998, almost 80% of 
small SOEs had been transferred into one of these two forms. Central government 
did not set clear rules on the method of transferring, so local governments were 
left free to choose their own procedures. Consequently, diverse criteria were made 
across provinces, according to the different financial conditions. Some local 
governments tended to place more emphasis on attracting foreign and private 
investment, rather than depending on central government, while the developed 
areas, like Shanghai, attempted to reorganise enterprises whilst keeping the 
"insider" structures of SOEs. Such a method requires considerable financial 
support from the local government.  
In 1998, a series of adverse effects of divestiture started to emerge, in particular, 
many small SOEs suffered profound asset stripping. Central government started 
to notice that its pragmatic non-interventionism to local SOEs reform had resulted 
in local governments being excessively unrestrained, leading to abuse by SOEs 
managers, which included forced sales of enterprise shares to workers or forced 
loans by workers to management, and the closure of loss-making factories without 
a labour dialogue. In addition, local governments wrote off the debts of re-
organising enterprises in order to make them attractive to foreign investment. 
Whilst a small number of SOEs quickly delivered a positive shift in performance, 
many others struggled to survive due to insufficient government support and their 
incapability in attaining the bank loan standards. In response to these impacts 
caused by overheating divestiture, central government demanded local 
governments to slow down the pace and deploy more care when divesting small 
SOEs. However, the pace of change remained fast. 
Not only was the divestiture in small SOEs ferociously pursued, for the "letting-go" 
proceeded at pace for medium SOEs. In 1999, the National People's Congress 
started to endorse transforming medium local SOEs. According to the command, 
most of enterprises would be converted into joint stock co-operatives or contract 
management firms, and the entire process was expected to be accomplished in the 
next 5-year plan. Even though the new policy avoided mentioning about 
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privatisation, it enabled employees to own enterprises' shares belonging to state 
assets.  
3.2.2 Split-share reform and state assets capitalisation  
When China established its own stock exchange in 1990, the share structure was 
split. The tradable shares included those of foreign invested entities as well as the 
first wave of privatised individuals and units, whilst the shares of state-owned 
assets were subjected to non-tradable. By the end of 2004, the market value of 
non-tradable shares predominated, standing at 1.62 trillion yuan in the A-shares 
market, in which the total value was 2.45 trillion yuan. Tradable shares’ relative 
weak occupancy indicated a gradual strategy in relation to opening up the capital 
market. Notably, the establishment of the stock exchange has always been 
officially termed as “building a financial institution”, rather than mentioning 
“capital”, which helped to mask the fact that it was supporting the building a 
market economy that was embedded within a socialist regime. 
Split share reform took place in 2005, which was not only seen as a symbol of 
establishing a more open stock exchange market, for this also led to tremendous 
changes for SOEs in terms of having to introduce a modern enterprise system. 
Enabling investors to cash in non-tradable shares of a company encouraged more 
private equity investment, which stimulated firms to shift their developing 
strategy by further accepting market regulations. Held by insiders and supervised 
by SASAC, the non-tradable shares used to be issued as a tool for raising capital to 
improve their balances and to relieve losses during transition. The shareholders 
were mainly the founders of the companies, business partners or their own 
employees. Since they were not tradable, the existing shareholders would never 
know the real share value, so they would not go public owing to the possibly of the 
shares being undervalue and hence, losing money. Consequently, the existing 
shareholders have had to seek other ways to make a profit by using their power to 
expand their holdings. One typical practice was lending considerable amounts of 
money to parent or affiliated companies and then forcing them to engage in an 
assets transaction. The implementation of the split share reform led to the SSE 
Composite Index surging from 998 points to 6,100 points in 18 months, the 
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unleashing the potential energy of non-tradable shares onto the capital market, 
whilst at the same time the process of SOE reform for the more advanced 
industries involved the founding of a stock sharing system, i.e. the state was 
engaging in these enterprises’ reform through a capital market approach. From 
this it can be seen that a two-tier approach to market reform was being pursued. 
In terms of official expression on concluding the enterprise reforms of the past 
decades, the period after 2003 was described as concentrating on “speeding up 
the construction of large and extra-large scale SOEs” to “make them become 
qualified players in international competition”. Management divesture from 
government administration was an initial step to achieving the “modern 
enterprise system” and the transition to a shareholding system led to the SASAC 
becoming the concentrated management unit of state-owned assets. Before the 
establishment of SASAC in 2003, the power and different functions for the reform 
were scattered across various governmental branches. The 16th CCP National 
Congress called for the unification of the powers of managing properties, human 
resources and developing strategies as well as establishing a new state assets 
management system with the central and local governments’ role as that of 
sponsors. Treated as state-owned assets, the new regime pooled SOEs’ resources 
to forge highly capitalised large companies, which engaged in financing the 
informal economy to generate grey profits in the period of “letting go”, such as 
restaurants, property letting etc.  
According to Li Rongrong, the former chief director of SASAC, by the end of 2004, 
85% of middle and small-scaled SOEs had “finished restructuring” (China News, 
2005), whereby the pillar state industries been replaced by over 1,000 newly-
gone-public state-shareholding enterprises.  Central government hailed the 
shrinkage of state-owned sector as a significant achievement in transforming 
production units to modern enterprises, whereby over 40 million SOE staff and 
workers had been cut. Since 2005, the keynote policy of “making an economy of 
hybrid ownership” has been becoming apparent, with the adoption of a 
shareholding system widely spreading in middle and small-scaled enterprises. 
This was the first time that the government had released statement setting clear 
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goals regarding the shaping of the pattern of economic development since Deng’s 
“crossing a river by feeling his way over the stones” speech.  
China’s privatisation has witnessed a series of experimental attempts to test how 
a “socialist market economy could work”. For over three decades, even though the 
nation has made one of the most impressive economical miracles in 20th century, 
the results of enterprise reform still remain controversial. The major reason is that 
the prices and potential effects of this confined state capitalism remain uncertain. 
The Economist (2011)  analysed the current pattern of Chinese enterprises after 
thirty years of reform and reported that: Except for the highly central-controlled 
enterprises, the other forms of companies are under the shadow of the state in a 
variety of ways. This article listed three types of successful enterprises which are 
the outcomes of shareholding reforms: joint ventures, private companies with 
some state influence and companies backed by publicly owned investment funds. 
Without direct power of supervision and decision in relation to personnel, the 
latter two types were favoured by friendly policies and government supported 
private equities, venture-capital funds or even direct investment from local 
governments. While the real private sector has always been subjected to 
interference the SASAC led state capitalist system. Thus, the Chinese privatisation 
process could be described as one through which the government has sought 
subtle ways to extend its control rather than letting go. 
3.2.3 The local state-owned enterprises 
The central-local relations in China's political system  
There is confusion in categorising the types of Chinese SOEs in much of the 
western literature. Local SOEs, the majority of China's state sector, are jointly 
governed by local SASACs and local governments, while "central" ones are directly 
under control of the central SASAC. In recent years, central SOEs have attracted a 
growing number of researchers, who have wanted to find explanations as to why 
China has had growing monopoly at the same time as active overseas investment. 
Regarding this attractiveness, these centrally governed enterprises are often 
mistakenly interpreted as representatives of China's reforming state sector.  
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Such an institutional arrangement has resulted from the CCP's guideline of 
"Grasping big and letting small go" as well as its subsequent bureaucratic 
adjustment that led to the birth of SASAC. After the financial crisis in 1997, the rate 
of profit in China’s state sector drastically dropped. Central government initiated 
a series of restructuring agendas across industries. The major strategic industries, 
such as power supply, telecommunication, aviation and postal service were 
restructured into being large-scale corporations, in which executive managers and 
members of board room are nominated through the political process. In general, 
with a tight hold of political power since their creation, central SOEs were 
anticipated to perform the dual tasks of boosting growth and preventing capital 
loss in strategic sectors. Both of these two tasks matter for the CCP's ruling 
legitimisation.  
Meanwhile, at the local level, local governments and local SASACs replicated these 
approaches by restructuring the key sector mentioned above. Not only were the 
Party-state's corporatised assets important for local level development, for these 
enterprises also proved to significant tax contributors to local governments. After 
the implementation of the 1994 tax-sharing system, central subsidies were only 
guaranteed for those local entities jointly owned by central government and the 
localities. There were two concerns regarding such institutional arrangement 
changes: firstly, during the pre-1994 period of the "grasping big and letting small 
go" policy, there was a growing worry of central government that there appeared 
to be a potential interest alliance between local government and local SOEs, which 
could possibly take advantage of liberalised local power so as to claim central 
subsidies for local SOEs by lying about their real profits. Also, because of the 
decreased central power over the supervision of local SOEs, lying about their 
performance was so prevalent that the central revenue from the localities 
witnessed a sharp decrease in the early 1990s. To gain back central government's 
control of the localities, Premier Zhu Rongji unveiled his tax-sharing system in 
1994, in which a fixed amount of central revenue from the localities was 
guaranteed. Resulting from this, in terms of revenue, there was no room for a 
potential antagonistic government-enterprise alliance against the central power.  
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Secondly, given the fact that local power no longer had full dominance over profits 
generated from local state-owned entities, the development of local SOEs was not 
merely the sole issue relate to local governments' own interests, for rather, the 
new fiscal institutions enabled the central power to penetrate local-level decision 
making. In practice, such approaches ranged from jointly owning public-service 
units under a local SOE’s name being guided by local governments on regulating 
joint-equity enterprises (central revenue was accrued tax from joint-equity 
enterprises, which commonly manifested themselves as subsidiaries of local SOEs) 
to investing in joint ventures established by local SOEs, etc.  
New approaches to local government control in the era of reform (LGFP)  
Since the implementation of tax-sharing system, there has been growing criticism 
over Zhu Rongji's daring reform of "fiscal federalism". One of the most popular 
critical arguments is that the CCP radically separated central/local revenues prior 
to setting a fixed administrative boundary between the two levels of government. 
This led to actual shrinkage of the local revenue source, while demands for local 
expenditure increased.  
Taking the year 2004, for instance, local revenues accounted for 45% of the total 
revenue and 72% of expenditure was made by local governments. Regarding 
education spending, local governments spent approximately fourteen times more 
that the central government, whilst on social welfare, this figure was nearly seven 
times and on agricultural subsidies it was ten. In the recent fast booming decades, 
most of demand for spending on infrastructure has been met by local governments. 
Moreover, the localities have mimicked central government’s fiscal "non-
interventionism", thus leading to the situation of the taxation power diminishing 
in a downward spiral. As a result, local governments at their lowest  levels, given 
their weaker capacity to collect taxes, have been subject to heavier burdens of 
expenditure than those higher up the chain of power. In general, the demand for 
local development spending has been surging, while income from taxation has not 
been sufficient to support this demand, because most of the revenue from the 
localities has been going to Beijing.  
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In light of this, during past few years, local governments have had to depend highly 
on different kinds of financial arrangements. Set up to enable them to circumvent 
the prohibition borrowing, their investment has been to great extent financed by 
land sales and bank financing. Many of their activities have even been invisible due 
to the lack of regulatory mechanisms and transparency. China's bond market, 
boosted by countless shadow lenders and banking bodies, pursued the task of 
raising funds for local government. In the financially stable regions, such as large 
cities like Shanghai or Guangzhou, Local Government Financing Platforms (LGFPs) 
have been organised in a more formal manner. These include large state-owned 
corporations set up to finance infrastructure construction and urban development, 
which is why lots of them are called "construction companies". In addition, they 
manage the troubled assets of badly performing local SOEs, representing local 
governments as borrowers so as to maintain those SOEs' capital chains by market-
based means, rather than relying on government bail-outs.  
To sum up, the growing problem of China's local debt is as a result of the rise of 
shadow banks and invisible financing platforms, which help local governments to 
deal with poor revenue streams partly caused by the prohibition of their fiscal 
power. These LGFPs, no matter whether formal or informal, have proved to be 
necessary for helping local SOEs to relieve their financial difficulties during 
transition. Particularly in well-developed regions, like Shanghai, large scale 
financing platforms performing as state-owned corporations have been successful 
examples of "alleviating the burden of state assets by leveraging the capital 
market". However, the possibility of replicating such a solution in the rest of China 
is questionable, as the LGFPs in financially unstable regions rely heavily on land 
sales and the demand for infrastructure construction.  
Piloting role of deepening reform to Shanghai’s local-state sector  
Shanghai's latest moves regarding SOE reform are targeted on promoting a capital 
operating platform in the state sector. SASAC's earlier guidelines proposed 
distancing the state's power from enterprise management, whilst at the same time 
making the capital operation centralised. According to decisions made by the 
Party committee and municipal government in July 2014, two corporatised 
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financing platforms, Shanghai Guosheng Group (GSG) and Shanghai International 
Group Venture Capital Co, Ltd. (SIG), were to become the leading capital operators 
of Shanghai's local SOEs. This is reportedly the first step of the CCP's new wave of 
reforming SOEs, which is aimed at developing "mixed ownership" in the state 
sector. The success of Shanghai's pioneering experience in restructuring local 
state assets is being eagerly anticipated by Beijing's central authority, as it hopes 
to be able to replicate it across the country, thus making it the Xi Jinping 
administration's roadmap for state sector reform.  Consequently, it would appear 
that the utilisation of state-owned capital platforms will be the CCP's main 
operating method, which will bring "mixed ownership" out of the ideological 
discourse.  
Is China on the path of Temasek? This is the emerging question intriguing many 
observers. We can find lots of similarities between China's "mixed ownership 
proposal" and Singaporean pattern, ranging from establishing state-owned capital 
holding corporations to market-based corporate governance. The other question 
is what is SASAC's position in such a proposed framework? If SASAC remains, does 
that mean its' power will be strengthened to being an administrative body 
governing the giant capital holding corporations?  
As for the possible impact at the local level, these reforming attempts, to a large 
extent, are aimed at tackling China's phenomenal local debt. Local SOEs in many 
regions are rather inefficient and stagnated compared with their counterparts in 
the financially well-performing city of Shanghai. In converting direct SOE control 
from the central authority to the leveraging of capital operation, it can be argued 
that this wave of SOE reform represents “Grasping big, letting small go" being 
exercised through financial means. This would appear to mean that China's 
"national team" of SOEs could no longer be guaranteed a future, for poorly-
performing ones would be subject to the process of capital platforming and hence, 
most likely go to the wall, taken over or merged. Corporations, like GSG or SIG, 
might sell state assets that exhibit unsatisfactory quality.  
No matter whether China copies the Temasek pattern or not, there will no doubt 
be a potential impact on workers. With the strengthened power of capital 
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operation in China's SOE reform, will the CCP redefine the state workforce in this 
updated version of state capitalism? There are few signs indicating that China 
would allow for regulated antagonistic industrial relations in place of top-down 
ones controlled by the Party's governing bodies. Given such an emerging discourse 
of capital impacting on the communist authoritarian regime, it will be interesting 
to see how the CCP decides to alter its own rhetoric as well as approaches so as to 
maintain its control over the rapidly changing local state sector in the near future.  
3.3 “Modernising the labour force”: from “workers” to “human 
resource” 
Employment relations in China have been closely related to the rapidly changing 
institutional context. The end of Cultural Revolution in 1976 left significant 
challenges for Chinese leaders in determining which path to follow. As part of the 
economic reform after the late 1970s aimed at replacing the “low productive”, 
“inefficient”, state sector, the new employment relations and personnel system not 
only meant the rolling back of the direct state’s control overlabour force and the 
shaping of a labour market, for it also signified enterprises’ autonomy and the 
government’s determination to end the planned state economy 8 . Thus, the 
changes took place in personnel system and employment strategy could be seen 
as being representative of the political trend. 
Before the reforms and the implementation of open policy, the personnel system 
was strictly under the control of the state’s administrative configuration of local 
governmental branches. According to the occupational categorisation of the 
authentic socialist doctrine, the labour force were separately administrated by 
two ministries, the Ministry of Labour, which was in charge of the industrial labour 
force and other manual workers, whilst the Ministry of Personnel was responsible 
for white-collars and office clerks. The scale of total demand and supply was 
carefully planned, and the position that the state allocated for each individual was 
one of life-long job security. Even though staff were low paid, employers had to 
                                                      
8 See Gallagher (2004), on how China’s labour practices reflect the state’s underlying vision of 
a gradual reforming process without political transformation.   
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offer housing, health care, children’s education, transportation and pensions; even 
employment to spouses. In general, the state was run as a supreme employer, who 
took responsibility as a “nanny” (Cooke, 2005). 
The first wave of reform initiated in the 1980s and early 1990s attempted to keep 
the socialist administrative traditions along with introduction of modern 
enterprise management. However, a latter round of reform in mid-1990s led to 
mass laying-off of workers, with enterprises having to transform themselves into 
being more efficiency-oriented and performance-linked. In 1997, the Prime 
Minister Zhu Rongji proposed giving state-owned enterprises three years to sort 
themselves out no matter what approach was undertaken, which meant that 
sacking millions of low-skilled workers who were unqualified in the labour market 
was acceptable (The Economist, 1998). At the same time, state banks were also 
given three years to deal with their bad loans in order to make ready for 
commercial-purposed lending. The state-allocated housing system was cancelled 
one year after that,  had constituted an essential element of socialist job security. 
Mr Zhu once stated that one-third of the current number of SOE employees would 
be sufficient to keep the enterprises performing well (Zhu, Kissinger and Schmidt, 
2015). One year after the most radical privatisation policies were carried out in 
1997, the numbers of the labour force in the SOEs and public sector had 
dramatically dropped by almost twenty times more than through the previous 
year’s reductions. For the first time, Chinese economic reform appeared to be 
radical and undisguised in terms of carrying out privatisation, which was not only 












 Figure 3-2 Changing numbers of urban non-private employees, 1992-2000 
 
After eliminating the low skilled “iron rice bowl” workforce, the SOEs introduced 
a new HR policy to increase productivity so as to meet the standards of a “modern 
enterprise system”. Firstly, a contract system was implemented as a legitimate 
approach to watering down the “life-long” working mentality. It both offered 
freedom of choice for firms and employees in entering and terminating the 
working relationship. Through the personnel legislation in the 1992 and 1994 
Labour Reform, which was also called the “Three Systems Reform”, the contract 
system was legitimised along with a performance-related reward system and 
contributory social security (Warner, 2004). Secondly, the payment system was 
adjusted to make differentials regarding skill requirements. Under the new policy, 
wage levels were fixed according to the budget, with this being dependent upon 
an enterprise’s performance. That is, a firm could only increase wages if their 
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This change was aimed at stimulating employee commitment and involvement in 
their workplace as well as encouraging them to retrain themselves so as to keep 
up with new skill demands. Thirdly, many enterprises have been focusing on 
developing human resource management. However, most employee training is 
still initiated by the state sector. Foreign direct investment and successful 
experience of establishing joint ventures to inject the blood of western 
management into SOEs have inspired Chinese policy makers to follow their way.9 
That is, now the SOEs are encouraging their young professional employees to take 
up training as they expect them to develop their management careers (see 
Hoffman, 2006). As a mean of getting enterprises to engage in worldwide 
competition, well-designed career prospects packages are offered to attract 
college graduates from the labour market.  
However, regarding most small and medium-sized enterprises, they have made 
few attempts at deploying long-term training projects. Instead, with limited 
resources and government support, their managers aim at short-term profit 
making with little prospect of development being offered to the labour force, who 
then react by delivering a high level of turnover. This is one of the major effects in 
labour relations caused by central government’s “letting go” policy. That is, large 
SOEs have been restructured by being able injecting sufficient governmental 
support, while smaller ones have remained in the unregulated private sector. With 
the weakening power of the traditional “workers’ congress” in enterprises, the 
privatisation in 1990s unleashed untameable new disciplines, such as tighter 
budget control and job insecurity (Taylor, 2002). Moreover, high turnover has 
made it hard for trade unions to engage in these enterprises owing to the lack of a 
collective bargaining consciousness. 10 
                                                      
9 See Warner (1987), discussing how the term “scientific management” is used to imply the 
application of Western style management and managerial skills. 
10 Trade unionism in privatisation will be discussed in a later part of the thesis. The power of 
the trade union has not only shrunk in small and medium-sized enterprises, but also in large 
and well-performed SOEs. Even though the contract system literally clarifies the equal 
employee/management relations, voice representation still suffers under the professional 
obedience required by HRM. 
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As for those who were “eliminated”, since the government was controlling the 
gradual reforming process carefully, the term “laid-off” (xiagang) was used in 
terms of describing the price of transforming, rather than as “unemployment”. 
This is based on the socialist notion that the state, playing the role of supreme 
employer, is obliged to maintain full employment (see Gallagher, 2009). According 
to an official explanation, being “laid-off”, is a social phenomenon that happens 
when the state is unable to allocate posts to the surplus labour force, which is 
emphasised as being “inevitable” during the “modern” transformation of SOEs11.  
Even though the substitution of the new labour force for the old was strictly 
controlled by the Party- state so that sudden privatisation would not lead state-
sector worker unrest, the “laying-off” policy still triggered grievances about what 
was perceived as the “state’s betrayal”. There are still a large number of E-
petitions advocating higher pensions for unemployed state workers. In one of 
them (Petition No.24925, 2012), the appeal is that “Only the state should bear the 
price of reform, not our fellow workers who tamely followed the Party, and 
devoted their whole life to the Party…Even redeployment for over 50 years old 
workers will be very difficult,  so hereby we request the government to offer more 
allowance to those who need help!”. The government has always been cautious 
when dealing with the redeployment of laid-off state workers. When the “policy-
mandated policy” was first adopted in 1997, enterprises were required put 
priority into spending the incomes from Land Use Rights transfer for redeploying 
workers and were ordered to pay off immediately all the loans from workers that 
were used to help the enterprises survive transition (The State Council, 1993). 
Skill training was offered according to the new demands emerging in relation to 
job vacancies. On the one hand, the enterprises technically transformed 
themselves to being more adaptive to a “modern” labour market, whilst on the 
other, the managers tried to control the size of the newly recruited labour force in 
order to leave sufficient posts for retrained old workers. For the successful ones, 
                                                      
11 See the 1998 directive document, jointly issued by the CCP central committee and the 
State Council, addressing the issues of SOE laid-off workers’ minimum standard of life and 




this process of substitution happened gradually with full government support, 
with their being persuaded to take old worker early retirement in exchange for an 
attractive severance package. However,  others were suddenly “laid-off” in 
accordance with the radical central government guideline on “picking up the pace 
to establish a modern enterprise system” as this was perceived as being the only 
way to achieve “a big loop” of SOE performance (Jin, 2011).  
From 1996 to 2001, the accumulative total number of laid-off workers was nearly 
25 million and the reported figure, admittedly by a different metric, was 14 million 
in 200212. From 2001 onwards, the policy of the “converging two rails” was carried 
out in order to terminate the split unemployment system, making non-state-
institutional job loss and being “laid-off” integrated under a new unified institution. 
An important reason why redeployment gradually stopped being the main focus 
of “modernising” the labour market was because the influx of migrant workers 
was having a significant impact on the structure of labour force. Due to their 
advantages in terms of age and well-trained job skills, migrant workers began 
constantly to squeeze unemployed state workers out of the low-end labour market. 
Without connection to the past working unit (“Danwei”) and lack of opportunities 
to be transformed so as to be able to adapt to the labour market, jobless “old labour” 
became the “forgotten generation”. Public concern transferred to proper 
treatment and working conditions for rural migrant “new labour” (Shen, 2006). 
This led to the low-end labour market becoming segmented. Shen (ibid) revealed 
two distinguished contexts of working class shaping between the “old” state 
workers and “new” migrant workers: “New labour” is the newly-transformed 
industrial workers from rural population, whose working class consciousness, 
following the classical “Marxian model”, was shaped through the process of 
transferring from a rural region into the urban labour market. On the other hand, 
“old labour” was expelled from the socialist factory regime in which high job 
security was granted, thus having to be job seekers. As Yuan analysed, in terms of 
class consciousness, these two types of labour force have been much differentiated: 
for “new labour”, the consciousness was directly rooted in their sudden exposure 
                                                      
12 National Statistical Book from 1996-2007 
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to capitalised labour relations; being subjected to the intensively controlled 
production and institutional human resource management, which was used to 
regulate the labour force. While regarding the state-sector “old labour”, a 
“proletarianisation” model would appear to be more apt for providing 
understanding of their vulnerable role, because a strong sense of class and 
representation were absent in the socialist factory regime until the labour market 
substitution of new workers for old.  
The staff in the civil service and public sectors were also affected by the policy shift 
towards achieving “modernisation”, although not as radically as what happened 
to the state-sector workers. The “civil servants” are normally those who are hired 
to work as administrative clerks. Unlike in other post-communist countries, which 
had witnessed civil servants working under the socialist regime suffering from job 
loss due to the political shockwaves, the Chinese civil service sector has retained 
its stability and has kept offering attractive working opportunities to well-
educated young job seekers. Socially regarded as admirable and decent, civil 
service jobs, not only provide opportunities to step into officialdom (“shitu” or 
“guanchang”), for they also offer considerable material rewards from “grey 
incomes” (Cooke, 2005). Moreover, given that comparatively higher security than 
other jobs available in the labour market is offered, jobs in civil service are often 
seen as the continuity of “iron rice bowl” mentality. Whilst the wage is not always 
satisfied for many newly-hired employees who are less senior, high reputation and 
stable working conditions are attractive enough to university graduates who seek 
prestigious social status more than affluent material rewards.  
The personnel system in the civil service is always stable, because of government’s 
handling of reform needed to ensure that the Party administration was immune 
from the impact of the rapidly reformed economy. Despite there having been 
several reforms undertaken in relation to personnel after the communist regime 
was founded in 1949, only the latest two were aimed at cutting down the number 
of administrative branches and offices. Also, directed by Mr Zhu, the radical 
reformist prime minister, his ambition of institution restructuring to the 
personnel system of the civil service was pursued. By the end of 1999, with their 
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working units being axed, over 3 million civil servants faced being laid-off. As The 
Economist analysed (1998, p. 83), along with millions of workers subjected to laid-
off in the SOEs, this wave of reform appeared to be a signal of the government’s 
determined battle against bloated bureaucracy and corruption.  
Laid-off staff were required to acquire new jobs within three years, during which 
time their old working unit would maintain their wages and welfare as well as 
offering assistance packages, including guidance and necessary skill training 
(Solinger, 2009, p. 452). Not being transferred to the other organisations, as had 
happened before in the 1950s to 1960s, they were encouraged to seek new careers 
in SOEs. The financial assistance was even more remunerative, if the laid-off staff 
accepted working in a poor area or started a new business (ibid).  
New elements of human resources management were introduced in the civil 
service. One of the apparent changes was recruitment being opened up to the 
public, rather than only university graduates and young people for nepotistic 
reasons being engaged. Moreover, the entry requirement has been raised through 
the addition of an examination system, an important tradition for selecting 
political elites in other sectors, which the civil service had hitherto not been 
subject to. 13 This was because it was perceived that the general public would 
accept that entry into the service was no longer subject to nepotism, a long term 
view that was widely held and that a meritocratic system was being introduced 
(see Chen et al., 2015; Zhang, 2015). The other important change was that both 
new recruits and old staff in post were required to accept compulsory training. A 
series of training courses was provided, ranging from finance to accounting, law, 
taxation, IT skills and to foreign languages. Emphasising the role shift of 
governmental functions from “functional control” to “social administration” and 
“public service” (Zhang, Jia and Gu, 2012), the government started to realise that 
                                                      
13 Even before the People’s Republic of China, when Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of 
Nationalists, introduced American pattern of tripartite political system, he proposed a unique 
Chinese variant, which was a “constitution of five powers”. The power of supervising the 
examination was one of the additional two and the other was “the power of impeachment”.    
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its old cadres had been lagging behind in updating the knowledge, such that they 
were not qualified for “modernising” the civil service (ibid). 
Another considerable change took place in the public sector (shiye danwei). 
Funded by the fixed governmental expenditure and controlled by the state, China’s 
public sector was mainly those organisations or institutions providing public 
goods and services covering culture, education and health. Unlike the state sector 
and civil service in which the radical policies were quickly adopted, the public 
sector lagged behind in terms of the progress of personnel reform. The number of 
employees has remained stable since the beginning of reform. Given that public 
institutions are the government’s main measure for controlling the employment 
of intellectuals and professional talents, any radical attempt to restructure 
employment relation in public sector, would have been deemed as being too risky. 
Thus, both the number of public sectors employees and their wages have been 
steadily growing in the past two decades.  
As a slow reforming sector of employment and hence, not being particularly 
attractive to researchers, there is scant literature pertaining to it. However, there 
is much public concern in the higher educational institutions, for as Cooke (2005) 
pointed out, high political sensitivity has led the government to consider it as a 
priority for reform rather than other sub-sectors. Also, there are a growing 
number of reports claiming that the quality of Chinese universities is lagging 
behind world’s top tier, owing to a rigid personnel system that has been 
constraining academic improvement. When Beijing University released its draft 
plan for reform in 2003, as Cooke contended (ibid), it appeared  to signal how this 
flagship university would be radically changed, with the implication being that this 
agenda would rolled out across the HE sector, The main aspects identified for 
changing were as follows: 
• Enhance inter-grade mobility; 
• Institute a “last-number” system to eliminate individuals or study groups 
with poor performance; 
• Introduce competition from the external market; 
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• Restrict the university’s own graduates from being directly recruited;  
• Set up a panel of professors to judge post appointments and job title 
promotion. 
All of the above were aimed at enhancing staff performance and to encourage 
competition, but they have drawn criticism for squeezing the opportunities of 
junior academics14. The senior posts were proposed to be permanent, while the 
junior ones were not, so that meant junior and middle ranked staff not only had to 
work with high insecurity, for it also provided them with little or no voice in the 
decision making process. 
In general, the personnel reforms in all these sectors share similar features: 
downsizing, performance evaluation, competitive promotion, increasing post 
security and the introduction of contracting systems. Along with opening up to the 
external labour market, HRM was widely adopted to attract talents in 
transforming enterprises and to ensure that working units became “modern”. 
However, the government faced the go-or-stay dilemma of the staff in the old posts. 
In an editorial of People’s Daily, the Party’s mouthpiece, it was claimed that 
“keeping stability is as important as introducing ‘fresh blood’ into the personnel 
system” (People’s Daily, 2000). The unskilled state-sector workers were 
eliminated, while the intellectuals in the higher education system were given 
stable posts in the reform, thus demonstrating how the Party-state strove to 
execute reform through a balanced stick and carrot approach, so as to avoid 




                                                      
14 The issue has drawn extensive attentions from both press and academia. For example, see 
The Paper article published on 09.11.2016 – “The Depressed Teachers” (in Chinese, “大学“失
意”青年教师记：有的未升副教授被炒，有的拼命代课”); see Tian and her colleagues’ 
empirical study (2016) on the “publish-or-perish” culture in Chinese universities. Also see Lian 
Si’s 2012 bestseller publication “Worker Bees” (in Chinese, “工蜂”), in which the author 
sheds his insider view on Chinese junior scholars’ life experiences. 
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Chapter 4 “Casing”cases – the rationale and layout of 
methodological design 
4.1 Extended case study method 
4.1.1 Why a case study? What do cases do? 
Compared to other research approaches, a case study offers much more openness 
for unexpected stories, which thus provides opportunities to unveil complex social 
realities, such as interactions and relationships. “Cases” are not “samples”, which 
are assumed to reflect causality lying in grand reality, but rather, can be defined 
as entities with certain widely accepted boundaries, such as organisations and 
nation-states or “parallel and contrasting event sequences” (Abbott, 1992). Thus, 
what needs to be revealed from the chosen cases should be facts about how SOEs 
and their LM changes relate to factors embedded in the social and historical 
changes of Party-led China, i.e. what has been driving the evolution of its industrial 
relations. Such concerns are usually excluded from sampling-oriented research 
since there are fixed presumptions about narrowed units of analysis and also, 
quantitative narratives reject any form of deviancy and contingencies from 
narratives in order to keep the “representativeness” of the sample. Consequently, 
case-oriented research will open the gate of depth and richness of the empirical 
world, in the current endeavour in the context of contemporary China, where the 
transformations of corporates and labour management are never isolated realities, 
but rather, the results of social and political changes. In sum, the research method 
for unpacking such complexity requires opportunities for “out of box” and possibly 
“merging paradigms”, which are not what sampling-oriented methods can offer.  
Much prior case study research on management issues in China has been carried 
out under a positivist stance and hence, has resulted in descriptions of cases as 
examples of causality15. Despite the complex nature of China’s context having been 
stressed prior to their analysis and a case study method being adopted, the 
                                                      
15 According to Liang and her colleagues survey of Chinese human resource management 
research in China (2010), quantitative empirical researches dominate the body of literature as 
54% of the studies adopted the quantitative research method. 
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richness of the “stories” has remained dormant under illustrations of the relations 
between variables. This is especially so in the literature discussing the nature of 
“China’s HRM” or that seeking to answer what are the “indigenous features of 
China’s HRM”. Researchers have drawn upon western models to establish 
hypotheses only to conclude that, unsurprisingly, China is a deviant case. Such a 
deductive approach has proven its effectiveness in offering HRM researchers 
chances to examine the results of applying western HRM practices in Chinese 
workplaces, and has also been helpful in expanding universal HRM theories by 
involving those "Chinese factors" in existing analytical frameworks. For a non-
academic, business-related audience, it might be helpful in terms of providing 
practical business solutions as "Chinese HRM" theories treat management in China 
as a variant of universal capitalist-led managerialism. However, without 
qualitative understanding of the decision making mechanism in those workplaces, 
the positivist studies could be accused of failing to grasp in full the social and 
political meaning of the new managing measures that exist in Chinese industry. 
Even management scholars themselves have acknowledged the limitation: the 
number of “variables” is always increasing and thus, hypothesis-led research turns 
out to be either explaining trivial facts, or generating “incomplete or incompatible 
theories” (Warner, 2012b, p. 3959). 
For social scientists who do seek to unveil complexity, what has been neglected 
from the  research described above matters. As Abbott argued in his notes (1992, 
p. 53) for case study researchers, cases should be regarded as “agents”, which let 
researchers pay attention to contingencies in narratives, rather than being a “one-
step” decision process hiding all the particularities in parameters of calculation. 
Mitchell also  pointed out that it is not necessary for social researchers to put their 
focus on giving answers about “representativeness” with “statistical inference”. A 
fundamental error made by many previous case study researchers, including 
many social scientists, is attempting to explore China’s “uniqueness” by asking 
questions like “how can we know this case is typical?” or “how many sub-
categories exist?” and “how do we select cases for generalising their impacts to 
current Chinese managing ways?” As Mitchell wrote (1983, p. 188), the question 
about representativeness “betrays a confusion between the procedures 
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appropriate in making inferences from statistical data and those appropriate to 
the study of an idiosyncratic combination of elements or events which constitute 
a ‘case’” (Mitchell, 1983, p. 194). If one observed from a 1990s SOE that there was 
mass power abuse among middle-level managers. then the “average” SOE would 
represent power abuse and corruption in management, which demonstrates how 
it is erroneous to use statistical inference for building a hypothesis based on 
sampling logic. 
4.1.2 Building a theoretical framework with abductive reasoning 
In light of the above, asking questions about cases’ representativeness will result 
in falling into the trap of unwittingly borrowing statistical inference, thereby 
losing each case’s unique dynamic with regards to illuminating processes.  Whilst 
there is no consensus about the solution for clarifying such an ambiguity in the 
social science community, most researchers agree that theories made from case 
studies should be built upon through abductive reasoning rather than induction. 
In other words, it can never be known at the outset what “good” cases with strong 
generalizability can be obtained. Also, we cannot know how many cases do we 
need to have until the very end of research. Case study is arguably a refining 
process of constantly producing good assumptions and a priori constructs for 
further cases and such abductive reasoning starts from building a framework of 
conceptions based upon pre-existing theories. 
One tradition of sociological methodology, is that reflexivity has been widely 
recognised as the basis of a participating method16. For as Burawoy stressed (2009, 
p. 20), “reflexive science deploys multiple dialogues to reach explanations of 
empirical phenomena”. Such dialogues, made between observers and the 
                                                      
16 In Talcot Parsons’s sociology, reflexivity refers to the capacity of social actors in modern 
societies to be able to give accounts of their actions (Lash, 2003). The term was further 
developed by Anthony Giddens, who argues that one of the main characteristics of late 
modernity is a heightened importance of reflexivity in this sense, both at the individual and 
the societal level (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). In the sense of reflexive sociology, 
reflexivity is understood as strategic agenda (Bourdieu, 1990); it is seen as a tool to demystify 




empirical world, are based on previous dialogues to create new expansions on 
local contexts, and embedded within a further dialogue to explain more about how 
local processes are influenced by external factors. Different to the positivist 
approach, the objectivity of reflexive science is not expanded through accurate 
mapping, but rather, through the growth of knowledge. Inheriting the Weberian 
tradition of methodology, Burawoy and many other “Berkeley” scholars borrowed 
pre-existing theories to support proposed universal narratives in their own 
experiences of ethnography. 
Based on universal theories, Burawoy proposed a perspective of case study 
research (1998) that focuses on how local conditions are determined by external 
forces. Regarding this study, given that the existing knowledge about China’s 
Party-related corporate entities has suggested the existence of the invisible but 
powerful hand of the Party, it could be assumed that there is an overall mechanism 
at large controlling and shaping how those enterprises are governed. Thus, in 
terms of explaining the link between particular work organisations as cases and 
their embedded social-political environment, Burawoy’s insight is applicable in 
this research. Despite Burawoy not giving a clear answer on the basis of 
generalisation, it is clear that abductive logic is essential in the generalising 
process to understand societal conceptions at the macro level, whilst at the same 
time giving meaning to each observed case. Guided by a priori model, the empirical 
knowledge we learn from particular cases is expected to, in turn, shape a reflexive 
view in relation to the model. 
The predicaments at the beginning of case studies in this research remain 
unsolved with Burawoy’s version of an extended case study: what kind of case do 
we need to start and how many further cases do we need? How do I know the case 
I have chosen is typical for addressing the questions about local SOEs and their LM? 
If a model regarding a grand sociological explanation of contemporary China was 
adopted prior to the empirical inquiry in this study, similar to what Berkerley 
scholars did when they used their neo-Marxist and globalisation perspectives as 
preliminary frameworks for their own ethnographies, the ultimate goal of this 
study would be merely supplementing existing theories. Since such a reflexive 
77 
 
process would keep directing researchers to look back to the a priori model, the 
preliminary framework would become a reflexive trap limiting them within a 
specific paradigm.  
The conceptual framework needed in this research for initiating the case study 
should: 1) align with the research questions, which pertain to issues about the 
rule making process; and 2) limit the constructs and conceptions at the medium-
range. Also, this framework should be used as the basis for guiding the focus of 
abduction, rather than solidly suggesting a certain conceptual model. 
Consequently, it is inappropriate to regard the preliminary framework as the 
foundation for ultimately constructing theories or bringing representativeness, 
but rather as guidance so as to make good assumptions (Mitchell, 1983).  In this 
continuous learning process, what case study researchers should pay attention 
to is whether the emerging phenomena from earlier cases would be echoed by 
further case studies. 
4.1.3 Seeking a preliminary framework for China’s context 
Using abductive reasoning to develop an IR theoretical framework for China’s 
context is not easy, not only because Chinese society is now highly complex and 
heterogenous, but also scholars’ varied foci across disciplines have created 
isolated paradigms. Such splintered voices, whilst they sometimes are in 
agreement, by failing to work in a collaborative way have been unable to reach a 
consensus on the changing reality regarding labour management as a result of the 
social-political transformation of the state. Even in relation to the state sector, the 
Party-state’s economic stronghold, understanding the social and political meaning 
the hybrid status resulting SOEs’ managerial fusion of the communist legacy and 
western ways has been neglected. When political scientists have attempted to 
explore the underlying pattern of the CCP led governance and its meaning for 
China’ modernisation, labour management researchers have failed to borrow this 
kind of wisdom into their own analytical framework, thus leaving a tremendous 
gap between the understandings of how the Party-state works and knowledge 
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about specific firm-level managing approaches adopted by Party-state led 
enterprises. 
Since the very essence of abductive reasoning is to create “good” assumptions or 
a priori constructs in order to guide inquiry with paradigmatic integration, the 
conceptual framework, in which the inquiring foci are to be rooted, needs to be 
built on the grounds that: 1) it will be ontologically integrated with the aim of the 
study and 2) the framework will have a high degree of flexibility in explaining 
potential variants and conflicts observed from the inquiry. As has been discussed 
in the literature review, most existing theories about China’s PA/IR/ER/LM or 
HRM have either simply provided a snapshot of social reality during certain 
reforming stages of the nation’s contemporary history, thus failing to account for 
chronical changes, or were constrained by empirical limitations owing to the 
search for unattainable generalisability in the Chinese. It could be argued that both 
of these limitations are as a result of the imbalanced development over three 
decades, which has created, according to Sun Liping’s insight (2004), a “fractured 
society”17, in which phenomena might not be necessarily support an “all China” 
generalisation. In order to avoid such an over-generalising trap, the conceptual 
framework needed in this study should support the presumption of the 
importance of dynamic relationships between various actors in forming the 
current IR of the state sector, especially in relation to the Party-state’s role, which 
was either totally neglected or merely accepted as a fact, but never clearly 
explained In addition, this framework should be used as a guide to direct the focus 
rather than being an actual pre-existing theory prepared for testing; otherwise 
this method design would lose its reflexive dynamic and become one that 
resembles a hypothesis-based study from the very beginning. However, the 
conceptual framework does serve as a “mould” of an actual preliminary theory 
with an accepted paradigm after empirical investigation. The intention is that this 
will subsequently be used as a guide for further empirical focusing as well as the 
setting of hypotheses. 
                                                      
17 Sun cautions that whilst a number of parallel realities have emerged from social-political 
reform, this does not mean that China has become a pluralist society  
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Dunlop’s model (1958) of industrial relations systems  
Dunlop’s publication in 1958, “Industrial Relations Systems”, was a major 
development in IR research, which helped to make industrial relations a discipline 
in its own right. Divested from other disciplines, such as politics, economy, 
sociology and psychology, industrial relations it was argued, pertained to the 
study of the establishment and administration of rules. Beyond the original 
horizon of collective bargaining, Dunlop offered a “system” model illustrating 
industrial relations facts that enable researchers to bring theoretical and 
analytical methods beyond the original historical and descriptive methods (Blain 
and Gennard, 1970). Influenced by structural functionalist sociologists, such as 
Parsons and Smelser, Dunlop argued that industrial relations could be seen as a 
type of social system, equivalent to the sub-system of the economy. Together with 
the sub-system of politics, industrial relations and the economy are viewed as 
distinctive sub-systems that comprise the total social system.  
Dunlop’s classic modeling attracts me for two reasons. First, the focus of this 
perspective is on illuminating the nature of industrial relations as systematic rule-
making processes. Explained as an independent social system, the conceptual 
framework entails a pluralist system consisting of three independent actors: the 
state, management and workforces. It holds that representatives of actors and 
patterns of rule-making diversify in different ways across countries, such that 
different IR models are comparable through examining the differences in labour-
management relations. When undertaking this, there are three major factors to be 
considered: 
1) Economic, technological or social-political environment;  
2) Characteristics and interactions of the actors; 
3) Rules generated from these interactions that govern the employment 
relationship. 
Dunlop’s theory has a long history of being misunderstood as the ultimate 
conceptual model for interpreting all kinds of IR in the capitalist world, by both 
his followers and critics. It should be acknowledged that its most significant 
contributions are epistemological and methodological. Despite it appearing to be 
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increasingly difficult to explain emerging phenomena within this framework, it is 
still widely accepted that IR in an industrial nation is formed in a pluralistic 
manner. During the decades after it was proposed, this framework served as 
backbone of many theories in explaining the social-political process of IR forming 
in various industrial nations. Only after the rise of neo-liberalism since 1980s, 
along with shrinking power of trade unions in western countries and their shifting 
political agenda, did the predictability of Dunlop’s model become questionable. 
However, right back to the very beginning, the theory was proposed as a 
framework of research focus, rather than an explanatory one for covering all 
possible IR patterns in market economies. 
Back to the start point of abduction in China’s context, even though the real face of 
SOEs’ labour management is still veiled under the realities of hybrid institutions, 
there is still the basic knowledge that the governance of the Party-regime is at the 
core of forming IR in the state sector as well as the country’s urban labour market. 
China’s changing nature of a market economy, not only contrasts with pre-existing 
knowledge regarding a Leninist state, for it also makes it difficult to make 
comparisons with IR systems in any other industrial countries. However, at least 
regarding two aspects, Dunlop’s model can be set as the entry point for the current 
research: 1) a perspective that includes the state and its relations with other 
parties; and 2) concerns about the rule-making process. Empirically, this 
framework leads to the interest in identifying who is involved in decision making 
and how rules are made in shaping the current workplaces of local SOEs in 
Shanghai.   
A modified framework 
Next, the analytical framework of this study requires a scope that enables 
investigation of the dynamic of interactions between those actors. Dunlop’s 
system approach does consider the fact that actors in IR relations are agents 
influenced by the external environment, and that the process of rule creation is 
also governed by economical, technological and institutional factors. However, 
such a system approach has been criticised for omitting behavioural variables, 
such as motivations, perceptions and attitudes (Bain and Clegg, 1974). Dunlop’s 
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notion of “system”, which was closely linked to the Parsonian analysis of the social 
system in 1950s America, was also questioned, because he suggested that a stable 
industrial relations system is integrated by the common ideology held by actors, 
such that it can be engineered to avoid conflicts and instability.  
In China’s context, it is obvious that the CCP’s ideological influence is predominant 
regarding various aspects of industrial relations, but it is inappropriate to perceive 
a uniform pattern of the party-state’s control (Lüthje, Luo and Zhang, 2013). In 
doing so, this would mean falling into the trap of repeating the CCP’s official 
rhetoric it governs through an all embracing uniform system. Instead, an analytical 
framework is required that allows for the illumination of the dynamics of the 
complex relationship between the state, management and labour, one which will 
also help generate meaningful theories about the party-state’s path of industrial 
relations. In light of these matters, it is necessary to look beyond the system 
approach in terms of analysing collisions and cooperation in labour-management 
relations. In addition, the framework should be open to the possibility that there 
is a trend towards a pluralistic relationship in workplaces. In terms of providing a 
non-all-embracing, but critical theory, Alan Fox’s unitary/pluralistic frames of 
reference (Fox, 1973, cited by Ackers, 2014, p. 8) can help to de-mystify power 
relations in the workplace. Since split interests have seemingly emerged in the 
wake of vibrant changes in China’s state sector, it is necessary to scrutinise what 
kinds of goals the state-owned organisations are pursuing. Is there a common 
competitive goal that management and labour are jointly pursuing? Are there 
certain forms of formal or informal voices representation shaping and are 
collisions accepted? Or if management prerogative turns out to dominate the IR 
system without addressing any issues regarding’s labour voice, then how is such 
a form of unitarism possible? As Fox18 (1974, cited by Hill and Thurley, 1974, 
p.149) argued,  
“sociology as a discipline confers its greatest strength when it helps us, 
at least to some limited degree, to reduce our dependence on the 
                                                      
18 Quoted by Hill, S. and Thurley, K., 1974. Sociology and industrial relations. British Journal of 




blinkers of our own social reconditioning and thereby to escape from 
the self-fulfilling prophecies of what is, must be.” 
With this principle, firm-level managing practices and the party-state’s policies 
should be reviewed “out of the box” by probing wider so as to shed more light on 
the complex nature of CCP-led corporate governance. Also, the case analysis 
should focus on the meanings of those managerial behaviours in the particular 
market and institutional settings. In light of these concerns, I contend that the 
analytical framework needs to include the following propositions. Based on the a 
priori constructs in the existing literature, these propositions that help to anchor 
the issues of interest in the empirical inquiry, are to be tested and the outcomes 
will then be discussed. 
Proposition 1: Firm-level CCP organs or managing personnel with a party background, 
avidly adjust their labour managing strategies in responding to the emerging market 
and technological environment. Hence, this necessitates including market and 
technological factors in the framework 
Proposition 2: The underlying relationship regarding the roles at firm-level is far more 
complex than in a conventional corporate bureaucratic system or traditional 
communist organisational hierarchy. That is, the CCP exerts its political influence on 
managers and union leaders through multiple means. 
Proposition 3: The firms’ staffing strategies are determined outside the boundaries of 
individual firms. At the same time, corporate governance arrangements have 
substantial influences on the CCP’s political agenda for labour management.   
4.2 Analytical framework (strategic choice and why) 
To bring these propositions into the analysis, Kochan and colleagues’ strategy 
choice approach (see Kochan, McKersie and Cappelli, 1984) is deemed an 
appropriate framework for helping to conceptualise the complex dynamics of CCP-
driven labour management. Unlike other writings from the orthodox school of 
industrial relations, Kochan’s approach treats industrial relations as a field 
comprising a variety of social and institutional components beyond corporate 
domains. Also, unlike many writings that adopt a comparative approach, this 
framework is not limited merely to exploring how management in different 
institutional settings reacts to the overall environmental changes. Instead, Kochan 
sees the strategic choices made by organisations (either competitive strategies or 
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other practices responding to industrial relation policies) as “systems of 
interlocking and mutually reinforcing elements” (Locke, Kochan and Piore, 1995, 
p. xxiii). Consequently, it is important to unpack how decision makers (managers, 
or other kinds of roles embedded in various political and social settings) shape 
their “choices” and also to shed light on the linkages between these competitive 
production practices in different industries or segments. In addition, the strategic 
choice framework considers the impact of corporate governing arrangements on 
overall employment policies and practices. Under this lens, it is conceived that no 
managerial decision is made outside of the political and institutional settings. For 
example, in many countries where competitive behaviours are constrained by 
centralised institutions and strong pro-labour state policies, competitive decisions 
are bound to be made with more concerns regarding labour-management 
cooperation and commitment, which will inevitably influence decisions and 
practices made at the state level. Such a perspective provides the opportunity to 
obtain an in-depth view on how managerial arrangements reflect the state’s 
ideology with regards to the industrial relations setting. It also allows for the 
examination of managing practices and policies as components of a grand 
institutional system of labour management, rather than considering them in 
isolation. 
  
4.2.1 The framework of strategic choice  
Kochan exemplifies three level of analysis that a study on an IR system with 
strategic choice approach needs to develop (See Error! Reference source not 
found.). The first tier is the study of “explanatory forces”, which entails 
scrutinising institutional factors, such as particular types of national and industrial 
governing institutions, regarding their structures and operating mechanisms. 
Based on this contextual information, the researcher should examine what kinds 
of strategies firms (or other types of economic entities) deploy. The author gave 
two contrasting examples based on American experience: 1) a cost-driven mass 
production strategy based on low-skilled, low-paid workers and adversarial 
labour-management relations; or 2) long-term strategies driven by innovation and 
product quality, aiming to form a high-skilled, well-paid workforce that is oriented 
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towards cooperation rather than confrontation with management. Firm strategies 
can be even more diverse depending on the degrees of centralisation and 
institutionalisation of collective bargaining, and researchers are supposed to 
reveal rich detail through the forming of strategies employing a longitudinal 
approach. In general, the primary analytical foci regarding this “explanatory force” 
are a) competitiveness or mass production oriented strategies and b) adversarial 
or cooperative labour-management relations.  
The next tier of inquiry focuses on the particular industrial relations or human 
resource practices deployed in firms, which include: 1) issues of staffing, 
employment security and job mobility; 2) pay arrangements; 3) skill formations, 
training and social welfare benefits; and 4) work organisation and employee 
participation. It should be noted, Kochan (1995, p. xxvi) admitted that these four 
types may not comprehensively cover all kinds of employment practices, but 
rather, it is anticipated that they will serve as a window on employment relations 
in most countries. Moreover, the enquiry should be aimed at revealing the 
relations between actors and the shaping of these practices at various levels. This 
approach also serves to provide a window on diversity within and across different 
firms, industries, regions and countries. 
Finally, the economic and social performance of these practices are the last tier to 
address in a strategic choice study. These outcomes should not only be viewed as 
consequences of particular firms in terms of business performance and 
employment strategies, for they also need to be considered in terms of reflection 
or potential sources of change in the industrial relations setting at the societal 
level. In this regard, the chosen framework is sufficiently flexible to uncover the 
linkage between firm practices and outer-firm institutions, thereby shedding light 
on the nature of party-driven labour management. Moreover, case study research 
within state-owned organisations as found in China, should be designed to probe 
beyond the conventional role setting of industrial relations (state, manager and 
labour force). Despite there seemingly being a well-organised framework of 
employment relationships at the state level in China’s context (tripartite system), 
all the players are party-attached agents who represent various kinds of Party 
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interests. Hence, to understand what kind of party-controlled mechanisms make 
it possible to balance diverse interests within SOBGs, it is necessary to scrutinise 
the strategic choices made by CCP organs at the firm-level. Only a good 
understanding on what the party thinks and how its decisions are executed, can 
lead to the acquisition of meaningful explanations regarding particular labour 
managing matters. 
Figure 4-1 Illustration of strategic choice framework 
 
(Note: excerpted from Bamber, G.J. and Lansbury, R.D. eds., 1993, p. 23. International 
Comparative Industrial Relations: A Study of Industrialised Market Economies. Allen and Unwin., 
adapted with small changes)   
4.2.2 Propositional inquiring plan and case study template (before the pilot 
study) 
In the original plan of inquiry, an extended case study procedure entailing 3 or 4 
cases was proposed. Each case was supposed to uncover contingent labour 
managing strategies that SOBG managers (or cadres with managing or 
administrative jobs) made in response to different market settings and ownership 
structures. The investigation was to start by gathering background documentary 
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data at local the SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council, or Guoziwei), the governing body of Shanghai’s 
local state-owned enterprises.  That is, in order to target the initial case of this 
extended case study, a wide range of information regarding the corporations’ 
corporate structure, market strategies and performance would be needed during 
the time of research, which was located with the SASAC. After this stage, the case 
selecting and case study inquiries would proceed based on the findings and 
questions generated from the previous ones, until the extending process reached  
a “saturated status”, when no questions of interest are unanswered, in this case, in 
relation to building a typology of labour management.   
The proposed objective of typology building was based on the existing theories in 
relation to the diverging “regimes of production” in post-reform China. With a 
perspective of western-based labour sociology, Chinese workplaces have now 
become contested terrains between labour and management, exhibiting various 
forms (Lüthje, Luo and Zhang, 2013). Some profound differences in the regime of 
production across regions and ownership types have already been discussed, such 
as the divergence between the country’s northern state-owned heavy industrial 
areas and the export-oriented, heavily private and foreign dominated south  (see 
Lee, 2007). Lüthje and colleagues (2013) further looked into such divergence by 
including more within-organisational factors, such as models of production, 
management systems and ways of performance control. Through in-depth 
empirical inquiry within enterprises, he developed a complex typology and 
pointed out that uniformities beyond the conventional boundaries of regions and 
industrial sectors exist, such as a weak labour voice in a tripartite system and 
disseminated human resource practices.   
It is necessary to broaden this type of analysis to scrutinise other factors and to 
examine the potential divergence within regions and institutions. In addition, 
longitudinal data related to the shaping of policies and practices should be valued, 
since it is crucial not only to draw descriptive conclusions as to what kinds of 
divergence there are, but also what they mean. In light of these concerns, the 
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original case study I proposed included three aspects of policies and practices 
adopted within organisations:  
a) Party’s control over management: this aspect of the inquiry was 
supposed to look at firm-level party organs’ behaviour for 
influencing particular managing matters. What were their responses 
to “Grasping Big and Letting Small Go” and what kind of new roles are 
party officials and apparatuses are playing in the aftermath of the 
“iron rice bowl” breaking? 
b) Staffing strategy: what kinds of staffing strategy the state-owned 
corporations have adopted – recruiting large numbers of low-skilled, 
temporary workers or a long-term strategy focusing on cooperation 
and commitment. 
c) Types of workforces: whether the workers in those state-owned 
corporations are associated under certain voice representing 
institutions, such as a firm-level ACFTU or other forms of formal or 
informal alternatives. The inquiry was also designed to investigate 
whether workers are willing to devote themselves to a long-term 
career in their current workplaces or prefer short stay temporary 
jobs.  
In sum, for the original plan the aim was to explore China’s segmentation of 
diverses labour managing regimes by investigating the dynamic within Shanghai’s 
local state sector. It was hoped that a new typological theory would be generated 
through this procedure of extended case study research and moreover, provide 
understanding with regards to what such divergence within the local state sector 
means for the country’s industrial relations system shaping. 
4.3 Fieldwork: from the pilot to research visits 
Starting in September, 2013, the fieldwork initially took place for piloting 
purposes at SASAC, the semi-governing body of all state-owned assets and 
corporations in Shanghai region. Following the pilot research, I revised my 
research plan and spent two months visiting two selected state-owned business 
groups (SOBGs) to conduct case studies. A combination of research techniques 
were used to illustrate the pictures of the labour managing regimes of the two 
selected cases. In July 2015, I spent one more month on a return visit to SASAC and 
the two groups. Throughout this fieldwork experience, there have been 235 
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official documents collected; 23 interviews conducted with various types of cadre 
leaders and managers in two SOBGs; and also two participatory observing 
inquiries conducted in the group’s HRM-related departments. 
4.3.1 Pilot study 
There were two objectives of the pilot study. Firstly, it was hoped that the 
experience of visiting SASAC would provide sufficient contextual knowledge to 
help me formulate the case study template. Based on the broad aspects I proposed 
above, the detailed criteria for investigation were listed prior to visiting SASAC. 
Also, the plan was to test whether these three general aspects of practices could 
accurately reflect the reality of SOBGs’ strategic choices. Secondly, the aim was to 
refine the extended case selecting plan from the pilot study outcomes. The initial 
idea was to select a purportedly “successful” example of corporation, which was 
supposed to be operating in highly market-oriented ways under Party control. 
Then, the subsequent cases would be selected in accordance to the questions 
generated from the examining process of the first case study. In general, the pilot 
research taking place at SASAC and the first corporation was geared towards 
defining subsequent process of further case study research. In particular, it was 
hoped that the diverse dynamic of the labour managing system found in further 
cases would present itself in the same format as for the first case. 
However, the documenting work that took place in SASAC revealed a more 
complex picture of those SOBGs, way beyond my expectation. In terms of the 
groups’ way of organising, apart from the Party governing apparatuses being 
widely deployed among the groups’ member organisations as expected, they have 
various degrees of managerial power determined by what kinds of ownership 
relationship they have with group headquarters. Given such complexity in the 
corporate structure, extensive differentiation emerged within the groups 
regarding various labour managing aspects: workforce formation, staffing 
strategies and labour-management relations. At the same time, the groups are 
strongly integrated entities in the sense of the Party’s rhetoric of strengthening 
local state-owned industries with market means. Such complexities meant that it 
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was difficult to determine whether those groups are a highly organised managing 
hierarchy or a loosely linked network within which local state-owned enterprises 
are governed by the CCP through less formal approaches. It also became apparent 
that understanding the Party apparatuses’ roles in relation to labour managing 
matters was going to be challenge. A further problem emerge regarding the 
justification of the selection of the unit of analysis in the original plan. That is, 
without a clear understanding of the institutions beyond the boundaries of these 
enterprises, the differentiated pattern sin terms of ways managing could not be 
comprehended.  
4.3.2 Refined research plan and case study template 
To demonstrate the shaping of SOBGs’ strategic choices on labour management, 
the refined plan of case study research is aimed at reflecting three key aspects of 
issues of these transforming process: 1) the groups’ practices when redeploying 
or resettling inefficient old workforces; 2) the groups’ CCP-led labour relations 
reshaping; and 3) market-oriented labour managing practices driven by party 
governance (see Figure 4-2). Based on consideration of these aspects, the case 
study template entails 12 detailed criteria (see Figure 4-3) for investigation - the 
in-depth case studies are designed to reveal what kinds of approaches the firm-
level CCPs adopted to tackle these issues. The templates for each case are designed 










Figure 4-2 Illustration of refined framework of strategic choice 
 







































Controls with HR elements
Trade union control
None
Note: The cells in the template 
will be filled in with these 
coloured tiles in order to 
demonstrate different types of 




In the original plan, the party’s influence over labour managing matters was only 
conceptualised as a spectrum ranging from weak to strong. However, the post-
pilot plan was altered so as to investigate the nature of the Party’s governance of 
the local state sector and the conceptualisation of the controlling methods needed 
to be refined so as to encompass the complexity. Based on my SASAC visiting 
experience as well as the SOBGs’ reports for political purposes, I have proposed 
five conceptualised forms of control adopted by the group CCPs in the template 
(shown as coloured tiles in Figure 4-3):  
a) Directly controlled with legal regulations or party guidelines - This type of 
control is typically the “hard” control that is directly operated by party 
apparatuses. Policies and guidelines are often issued from the central level of the 
CCP and cascaded downwards by the same types of party organs at various levels. 
Described as “mini-centrality” (xiao zhongyang) by SASAC officials19, the way that 
party apparatuses are equipped at SOBGs mirrors many other party-related 
organisations with administrative or public service functions. Thus, these groups 
are no exception to the CCP’s top-down approach of governance - the party 
apparatuses at group level receive directives according to their professional 
functions (or “tiao-xian”, meaning “line-up” in party-state’s terminology) and they 
are supposed to carry them out in the SOBGs with an administrative approach. 
Regarding these SOBGs’ labour issues, this type of “hard” control is mainly applied 
to the issues of reshaping employment relations, including the controlling process 
and contents of bargaining.  
b) Informal negotiation and bargaining - This type of control does not involve 
any written rules or regulation. These approaches are often adopted during 
disputed relations between employers and “resettled” workers. Managers and 
personnel managing cadres are often guided to use coercive or persuasive 
                                                      
19 In a pilot interview with Ms. S, the senior researcher of Shanghai SASAC research division, 
the term “xiaozhongyang” was specifically used when the topic was moved on SASAC’s 
difficulty in controlling some of groups – “Groups have their own Party committees and 
ACFTU apparatuses – just like a well-functioned ‘mini-centrality’ (xiaozhongyao), so of course 
they are entitled to prioritise their own interests (in strategy making).” This implies group-




approaches to settle any possible form of open labour-management collision. 
During the early period of SOE reform, it was a political task to “resettle 
appropriately”20 inefficient workforces for managers and party cadres in the wake 
of ownership transition. As an experienced grass-roots cadre who was in charge 
of the “resettling” (or “fenliu”) 21  task in late 1990s recalled, the fundamental 
objective was to “remove the labour burden”22 for enterprises, whilst at the same 
time ensuring “workers were not hurt economically and emotionally” 23 . The 
process involved a huge amount of work of informally negotiating with workers 
as well as the redeploying agencies, for the sake of avoiding a large-scale outburst 
of labour grievance. Today, the top-level party apparatuses have retreated from 
dealing with labour issues leftover from the groups’ past of enforced downsizing, 
but there are still organised institutions existing within SOBGs that are tasked with 
resolving “resettled” workers’ complaints and occasional organised petitions by 
using similar old methods.  
c) CCP’s internal consultation and consultation - Some labour managing 
changes in core workforces and cadres are determined by the leading cadres’ 
closed-door consultation. Dictated by the group CCPs’ political concerns regarding 
personnel formulation, this type of control is often operated through the Party’s 
governing platforms, such as the Party academies, cadres’ meetings and 
communicating sessions. In most cases, this kind of decision making only takes the 
form of a consulting role on labour managing matters, but they often provide a 
supplemental opinion on managerial matters in the member enterprises. However, 
                                                      
20 Addressed in the SASAC bulletin (28-04-2013) calling for strengthened party’s role in 
maintaining harmonious relationship between labour and management (“加强和改进国企党
建，提高科学化水平”).   
21 The measure was also interpreted as “position transferring” (see Won, 2004, p. 74), 
through which workers are removed from posts with an agreed deal of severance package 
that based on the duration of labour tenure.  
22  Excerpted from Shanghai SASAC’s 2007 reviewing report on Shanghai’s SOE reforms (“专题
报告：2007 年国资国企改革回顾”, p83), in which “getting rid of historical burden of 
labour” was addressed as a premise of strengthening SOBGs’ competitiveness in the 
emerging markets.  
23 Excerpted from the Shanghai local CCP committee’s 2009 directive paper regarding the 




there is still a wide range of businesses requiring “scrutinised by leading cadres’ 
collective wisdom” (jiti-baguan)24. Especially on the groups’ workforce selecting 
issues, whereby the selection procedures have to be examined under the Party’s 
standard of “dual virtues” (being adept in both professional skills and political 
awareness).  
d) HR-driven means of management - HR-oriented concepts and practices are 
widely adopted among SOBGs. To build up organised bureaucratic control over 
workers’ efficiency and capabilities, professional HRM departments are 
established at various levels. However, the visiting experience at SASAC has 
confirmed my assumption about the SOEs’ HRM that instead of a uniform trend 
towards market-oriented means of management, the administration in the groups 
under SASAC had undermined various contingent conditions that motivated 
leading cadres to promote HRM ideas. As party-promoted projects, the managers 
working in HR-related posts can be either inside or outside party-state governance. 
At SASAC, it was also found that the forming of HR-oriented managing structures 
also varies across workplaces - some of them can be dated back to the 1980s when 
there were attempts to form joint ventures with foreign partners and HRM 
techniques were introduced as advanced managing ideas. For some of the others, 
it was more a nudging effect of being encouraged by counterparts in the state 
sector than a spontaneous move to make changes to labour managing ways.  
Without sufficient scrutiny of the inside organising process of SOBGs’ HRM in the 
state sector as yet, one can only speculate whether the party-led labour 
management was generally amenable to becoming HR-oriented. In the following 
case studies, “HRM” will be only observed as various managing practices with 
“HRM elements”, since it would be a fundamental error to assume the outcomes of 
Party politics would assume a similar model to that of western HRM. 
e) ACFTU dominant control – From the pilot study, it was found that ACFTU 
organisations are still active players in SOBGs’ labour managing transitions. Whilst 
there is no evidence suggesting that the party-controlled union organisations play 
                                                      




any kind of independent voice in representing the workforce, its importance is still 
worth noting given the organisations’ reported involvement on a wide range of 
issues, such as building up the party-state’s collective consulting system at the 
firm-levels and having a say in agency workers’ rights. Another notable sign of 
ACFTU’s possible non-negative role in the groups’ formation of labour managing 
strategies is its frequent presence in various scenarios of negotiations. According 
to the groups’ reports sent to SASAC, ACFTU organisations are often consulted on 
managerial issues, such as workers’ participation and technical talent selection. 
Hence, it is appropriate to consider whether ACFTU possesses any substantial 
form of power in the controlling groups’ labour managing strategies.  
From the pilot study it also emerged that labour managing changes for different 
types of workers are separately reported to SASAC. For instance, the extensively 
used term “HRM” is often solely applied in the reports regarding the groups’ high-
skilled workforces. In the reports that contain general information about the 
groups, managing practices related to the workers who work in high-end business 
sectors are often reported in a manner that could be construed as showcasing 
advanced HRM techniques, while the reports regarding other types of workers 
tend to be centred on ACFTU’s repetitive political rhetoric of strengthening the 
CCP’s bond with the labour force. In light of these phenomena, it is worth 
speculating that the group CCPs differentiate their labour managing strategies 
across the various types of workforces. Here in this template, I have proposed a 
stratified overview of the SOBGs’ workforces as shown in the columns of the 
template table, for which the group CCP adopts varying controlling strategies on 
an extensive range of issues. 1) For the senior cadres, this category of workers 
includes all kinds of senior party leaders who are in secured posts of 
administration or management. 2) Regarding the middle-range managing and 
technical personnel, these are the emerging managing and technical elites that 
SOBGs are now heavily relying on with the expectation of expanding into high-end 
markets. It is unclear to what extent these long-term workforces are attached to 
the groups’ party governing system and thus, it is planned in the case study 
research to explore the terms used by the SOBGs’ managing rhetoric, such as “high-
tech talents” and “pioneering talents”. 3) For labour market workers, this category 
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is considered as the ordinary workforces that SOBGs recruit from the labour 
market. They can be either given short-term or long-term jobs depending on how 
the groups value particular skills or other non-performance related traits. 4) 
Regarding agency workers- being politically discouraged since the new labour 
legislation, it is reported that the overall number of agency workers in Shanghai’s 
local state sector has dropped drastically. For the few that remain in their jobs, it 
will be interesting to find out what kind of methods the group CCPs adopt to make 
them fit in with the groups’ business strategies.  
4.3.3 “Casing” process and research visits 
“Casing” and case selection  
Instead of the original plan that the study would contain 3 or 4 cases for 
developing a typological theory, the fieldwork ultimately ended up covering two 
cases. The first case was still the same one chosen for the pilot study, ElectriCo, a 
state-owned business group producing and selling mechanical and electric 
equipment. The forming of the ElectriCo group was the outcome from CCP 
planning and top-down control over management. After over twenty years of 
transformation, it has now become a highly market-oriented business group that 
aims to break into the international market of power generating equipment. The 
next chapter will demonstrate the ways that ElectriCo’s party apparatuses plan 
and deploy an HR-oriented labour managing system all over the group hierarchy. 
It is a case suggesting that the CCP has taken an incremental path of transition that 
has led to the local state-owned industry becoming organised into a corporate-
based framework, in which the party apparatuses play an active role in 
introducing and deploying HR-based practices. In addition, it was found in this 




The next step of “casing”25 is based on the reflexive thinking engaged with for the 
first case. I raised two questions at the end of my first case study inquiry. As 
demonstrated in the case study chapter, HR-oriented labour managing practices 
are prevalent across the group hierarchy, except regarding a handful of issues 
relating to the groups’ cadre personnel arrangements. However, the Party has 
been the driving force in such a shift in the orientation of labour management. 
Thus, the first concern was whether there was a case suggesting that the group-
based CCP only permits HR-oriented approaches being deployed in a limited way 
and most of labour managing issues are still informally determined by the CCP’s 
political logic. If such a case existed, then the interest would lie in what kind of 
transitioning path it had undergone that had resulted in such a form of labour 
managing regime. Since ElectriCo’s CCP has spontaneously chosen a market-
oriented strategy to ensure that the group is efficient in the new market and 
technological environment, how could this potential case be able to survive 
through the years of economic reforms?  
Based on these reflexive questions, the next stage of the “casing” procedure was 
focused on targeting the second case in accordance with the following criteria:  
a) This case shall be a corporation that has undergone a twisting path of transition. 
In contrast to ElectriCo’s “incremental model”, it must provide an alternative 
narrative of transitioning history. It would be interesting to find a case where pro-
business strategies are passively “infused”, rather than a spontaneous process of 
“opting to” deploy what? so as to replace the old party-driven personnel 
management. 
b) HR-oriented practices of labour management should be somewhat constrained 
in this case. The goals of deploying these practices are complicated through their 
being conflated with political concerns. 
                                                      
25 For Ragin (1992, p. 217), “casing” refers to a research tactic conducted in sequent manner, 
which enables researchers to “sift through empirical evidence to define cases and thus bring 
a measure of closure to vaguely formulated theoretical concepts or ideas”.  
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c) Compared to ElectriCo’s overall pro-business labour relations setting, this case 
needs to provide a more complex picture of dynamics between the different 
parties. The CCP’s flexible approaches of creating peace in the re-shaping of labour 
relations are expected to be revealed through this case.  
By consulting with SASAC officials, TexCo gained my attraction as a plausible 
candidate for the second case study. The group inherited the assets and key 
managing personnel of the original Shang Textile Bureau; the administrative body 
of Shanghai’s local state-owned textile industry in the pre-reform era. The 
corporation has some undergone radical changes in its labour management in 
history - in early 1990s, it has suffered a huge amount of labour force loss due to 
the state’s enforced downsizing policy. Shrinking from a local state industry that 
used to be staffed with over 500,000 state workers to the nowadays business 
group with only 20,000 contracted employees, this group is purportedly “a reset 
project of starting up Shanghai’s textile industry” by removing the old Bureau’s 
“historical burden” of unresolved cases of labour dispute26. It would be interesting 
to see how TexCo CCP’s attempts to, on the one hand, break into the emerging 
textile product market through market-oriented labour managing approaches, 
whilst on the other, negotiating with its past of “iron rice bowls”.  
Multiple use of qualitative research methods  
Stage 1. Documentation 
Background information, such as workforce structure, business circumstances 
and business strategies, were mainly gathered through searching the archive at 
the groups’ headquarters.  These documents included strategy bulletins, 
regulation handbooks and training handouts.  There are a few aspects of 
information to be noted in the further gathering: 
• The business groups’ main businesses and its strategic orientation 
regarding market expansion; 
                                                      
26 Quoted from an interview with Ms. S, a SASAC official who worked in the administrative 
body’s research unit.  
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•  Transforming history of the workforce structure;  
• How have these groups been altering labour managing schemes in 
response to the new market environment? 
235 official documents in total were collected from research visits, including 96 
from SASAC and 139 from the two visited groups. Due to these groups’ less 
organised manner of collecting and reporting statistics, different types of 
documents often reveal inconsistent narratives of these groups’ background 
information. Consequently, I also maintained contact with the groups after the 
formal research visits for the supplying of further documents and facts checks.  
Information inconsistency was widely found among groups’ official reports. 
Imbued with the Party-state’s official terminology, statistics are often either 
deliberately or carelessly wrongly reported. A good example of this can be found 
in both groups’ labour managing themed reports from 2011 to 2015, where the 
total number of workers in their key business sectors are interchangeably used as 
the groups’ overall population statistics. To tackle such difficulties, the later data 
analysis involved much work on tracing back the real meaning of these confusing 
documents. As a result, the background information that is ultimately reported in 
both case studies is the outcome of an enduring process of verifying such 
contradictory reports throughout the study visiting period as well as during the 
subsequent data analysis.  
Stage 2. Interviews 
A selection of leading cadres, HR managers and union officials were interviewed 
with a semi-structured format. The interviews were started by asking about their 
range of responsibilities, then moved on to questions regarding the groups’ 
strategic decisions on labour management. As the template addresses, questions 
about strategic choices comprise three main aspects: 1) labour force re-
configuration; 2) labour relations reshaping; and 3) internal mobility and 
selection. Given many of them had had prolong experience working in the 
industries and related party organs, the interviews were aimed at exploring their 
opinions on the historical changes in labour management. These interviews also 
shed light on how diverse the views of different professionals inside the CCP are. 
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Moreover, the interviews covered the issue of how the party organs reached a 
compromise when they found themselves with opposing stances on the groups’ 
strategy. A detailed list of interviewees can be found in Appendix 4. 
Stage 3. Participatory observation 
The participatory observations took place at the HRM units of both groups. The 
aim of using this method was to profile a HR-based project in each case, which was 
in its deployment process when I became involved. In doing so, it was hoped an in-
depth view would be executed on how the different parties were reacting and 
responding to the proposed new practices. In both case study visits27, I requested 
participation in one of the projects led by these groups’ HRM units. My identity as 
a participant was classified as an “external specialist”, with which I was allowed to 
get access to all kinds of materials (slides for training use, planning schedule, 
interview scripts, etc.), as well as various forms of meetings and discussing 
sessions (group meetings, focus groups with workers and cadres and the party 
academy gathering for tracking the progress of the implementation of those 
projects). I was occasionally asked about my opinions, but little heed was taken 
regarding my responses.  
At ElectriCo, the first case study, I was involved in a highly organised project. The 
group’s HRM department was carrying out research about the feasibility of 
deploying a “competency model”, an HRM-based evaluating system, at all levels of 
the group. It was part of the department’s given task of exploring new managing 
practices for supporting the group’s new strategy of developing emerging “smart” 
industries. The basic idea of this “competency model” was to design a method of 
measuring the workers’ merit and to give an evaluation on the most suitable types 
of job that workers are competent with. The part of the research work I spent most 
of my time participating in and observing, was seeking a solution to evaluating the 
group’ leading cadres. It was a key stage in the whole project - in the HRM 
department’s plan, data collected from those cadres would be used as a reference 
                                                      
27 The research visits to each case contain four short visits targeting for semi-structured 
interviews, and one long visit for participatory-observations lasting for three weeks. 
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to develop an index that would ultimately be applied to all workforces in the group. 
By referencing the traits of the group’s existing cadre leaders, the department 
hoped that they could rely on quantified means to select potential candidates for 
the future cadre leaders from the mass workers.  
In TexCo, on the other hand, there was no very organised manner of developing 
HRM-oriented solutions. Even though there were similar projects listed in the 
group’s agenda, there had never been substantial moves towards implementing 
them. After I explained my intentions and research aims, I was also given access 
to the group’s “ongoing” project of a “competency model” despite the fact that it 
was nothing but a shell project. However, the unsuccessful plan of replicating my 
observing experience in ElectriCo surprisingly granted me chances to get access 
to the HRM units in the groups’ core businesses. These extra workplace visits shed 
some new light on how HRM-oriented practices are facilitated and overseen by the 
party apparatuses. The reality that TexCo’s HRM-oriented practices are only 
treated as piloting projects with limited deployment in the group’s strategic 
business sectors, was revealed from my research visits and interviews at these 




Chapter 5 Case study: “ElectriCo” 
5.1 History of the transformation 
The history of the electromechanical s manufacturing industry can be dated back 
to the late 19th century, just after the imperial dynasty of Qing was forced to open 
its gates and allow western trading business. Increasing needs of modern 
infrastructure drove manual workshops in China’s coastal regions to being 
transformed into industrialised factories. However, without sufficient properly 
educated engineers and technicians, those early pioneers of China’s modern 
industry could hardly develop into being strong. Consequently, many suppliers 
were purchased by western companies, mainly providing repairing and 
maintaining services for foreign-made industrial products. 
In the wake of the Qing empire’s “self-strengthening movement” or “westernising 
movement”, which sought to learn and introduce advanced western science and 
technology in order to forge self-reliant industries, thus enabling the empire’s 
military power to be strengthened against the western powers, the first wave of 
state-run machinery manufacturing factories appeared. Owned by indigenous 
aristocrats, while managed by western experts, those factories and companies 
were imperial China’s windows on the world, from which it hoped to absorb and 
learn advanced industrial knowledge as quickly as possible so as to wash away the 
prior shame of successive military failures. Initiated from deploying large scale 
production of machine tools, by the end of 19th century, the state-driven attempts 
at “self-strengthening” had led to a comparably small-scale, but complete self-
reliant supply chain, in Shanghai, serving various types of production, ranging 
from spare and accessory parts to shipbuilding.  
Following this, with ongoing political volatility, the industry struggled to survive 
from war as well as the challenges from foreign counterparts. When the imperial 
rule collapsed and the newly found nationalist republic failed to govern stably, 
state support to industrial development was lacking during the first three decades 
of 20th century. However, since 1910s, it was witnessed that private-invested 
102 
 
manufacturing business flourished in Shanghai with surging demand for domestic 
products, which was to a large extent due to the major western powers’ distraction 
from activities in the far east owing to World War I. Also, this rise of “nationalist 
industries” (minzu gongye) was later enormously supported by the widespread 
political agenda of nationalism and anti-imperialism, which advocated the public 
to stop buying products imported from hostile powers, especially the Japanese 
Empire. Leading figures of “the nationalist industry” were mainly senior workers 
or specialists, who had obtained work experience in the workplaces established 
under the banner of previous Qing’s “self-strengthening movement”, which 
guaranteed that the technological legacy of the prior state-driven industrial plan 
was preserved and further developed in nationalist China’s enlarging private 
sector.  
After the CCP took power in 1949, the new Shanghai authorities embarked on 
taking charge of the “socialist transformation” of the nation’s industrial 
powerhouse. By the late 1950s, with the political movement of “joint private-state 
cooperation”, major industrial producers in the city were coercively transformed 
into being mixed-owned corporations, having to follow the guidelines issued from 
the newly formed planning Bureaus. Gradually taking control of production, the 
CCP reintegrated the pre-revolutionary “nationalist capitals” into several planned 
sectors of production, so as to forge a planned economy based upon Shanghai’s 
existing industrial infrastructure. This series of industrial restructuring, driven by 
the communist political process, generated nationalised factories producing 
steam turbines, power generators and boilers, which were backbone of the future 
state-owned corporation of ElectriCo.  
Entering the age of planned industry, ElectriCo’s predecessors gained prestige by 
being chosen as the central government’s focus for strengthening industry. Like 
many counterparts in the early history of the PRC, workplaces in the Shanghai 
Electromechanical Bureau updated its production lines and technology by relying 
on industrial support from the Soviet Union and other its Eastern European 
satellite states. Soon, those state-restructured plants and enterprises were able to 
produce basic electromechanical devices by copying the Stalinist model of 
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production and management style. Being the showcase in terms of demonstrating 
the communist state’s strong ability to develop industry, the Shanghai 
Electromechanical Bureau was fully supported by the central government with 
high quality personnel and resources. At the same time, it was required by the 
party to deliver remarkable industrial achievements, thus showing the newly 
formed state’s industrial muscle. Other than creating the socialist ideology of 
building strong industry to strengthen social wellbeing, the CCP’s restructuring 
plan in Shanghai was expected to become the entire nation’s model of developing 
socialist industry, which would demonstrate the superiority of this historical 
modernising pilot in the form of a showcase to rest of the world. Also, for the same 
reason, Shanghai’s state-led electromechanical industry was regarded by the CCP 
as the milestone for forging a self-reliant industry. When the Soviet Union 
withdrew its experts and joint projects with China owing to the two countries’ 
deteriorating relations in the 1960s, several industrial achievements made by the 
Shanghai electromechanical Bureau were highlighted as source of national pride 
as they showed that China had the ability to develop industries without any 



















In 1985, the “big five” enterprises of the industry, including the machine tool plant, 
the boiler factory, the steam turbine factory, the diesel engine plant and the tool 
factory were merged as a limited liability company, the ElectriCo associates 
company. The new company also included one local administrative body of power 
inspection as well as two research facilities owned by the local government. Over 
the next ten years, the managerial personnel in the Associates Corporation 
gradually took power in the Bureau. This corporatising process ultimately 
resulted in the dismantling of the Bureau in 1995 – political and administrative 
organs in the former Bureau were incorporated into the Associates Corporation. 
Since then, the top level of ElectriCo hierarchy no longer dominates the day-to-day 
management matters in the member enterprises, such as marketing, procurement, 
and pricing, for such powers were decentralised to the enterprises’ managers. 
However, the CCP apparatus at headquarters still holds the power of appointment 
and removal of cadre personnel in the subordinates.  
In the wake of the forming of SASAC in 2004, the Associates Corporation 
integrated its profitable assets into one new holding company, including 13 of its 
major enterprises, which was listed on the Hong Kong stock market. The 
Associates Corporation was also renamed as the “ElectriCo headquarters” in this 
restructuring process. Under the “mixed ownership” model of state industry, 
ElectriCo’s CCP hoped to distance themselves further from the enterprise 
operations, whilst at the same time strengthening their control over the capital 
operations and strategic orientation of the businesses. To operationalise this 









5.2 Corporate structure  
Wholly owned by SASAC, the ElectriCo headquarters functions as a semi-
administrative body with many cadre personnel, who worked in the former 
Bureau, having remained in their posts. Whilst mostly now possessing various 
types of professional qualifications, these leading cadres controlling methods over 
the subordinates’ managing matters are still somewhat political. Instead of 
directly intervening in day-to-day management, the leading cadres of 
headquarters still have substantial influence over management by setting tasks for 
the managing cadres at the subordinates (or “grass-roots” level in the CCP 
governing terminology). In terms of their role in the ownership structure, the 
leading managing cadres of headquarters also have a dominant say in the major 
five ElectriCo member firms’ board rooms (see the headquarters shareholding 
distribution in the chart 5.3). In their words, the founding of the group in 2004 
enabled the CCP to shape a new model of SOE management by “controlling 
personnel” and “controlling capital”. 
 
The five branches that are directly subordinated to headquarters are the results 
of the group’s selection and integration of profitable or strategically important 
assets, which used to be affiliated to the original Association Corporation with 
various ownership types. All now listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, these 
quality assets are defined as the group’s “profit centres” in ElectriCo’s post-2004 
developing strategy. This is especially so for the ElectriCo holding company, the 
largest one of these five branches, which consists eight business corporations that 
are specialised in eight types of the groups’ main businesses. OK? Along with such 
a high degree of asset concentration, the holding company is also where the 
group’s professional managers are located.  
 
Besides these highly market-oriented entities, there are also many non-business 
workplaces in ElectriCo’s hierarchy, including non-profit-making working units 
and functional entities previously subordinated to the Bureau of industry. With 
corporatised management and new names, these workplaces remain in the group 
for the purpose of maintaining the former Bureau’s responsibilities in the national 
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public services. One of the major administrative functions of ElectriCo group is to 
assess and award state-accredited ranks and titles to technical cadres. Inherited 
from the old Bureau, such power enables the member enterprises to pick qualified 
workers from their own institutes for the corporate research and development 
department. By the end of 2015, it was reported that ElectriCo comprises 286 
subsidiary corporations with various non-private ownership types, seven national 
level research facilities and another 23 provincial/municipal, 5 “doctoral studios” 
and 6 “post-graduate studios”, which are state-certificated high education 
institutions that are authorised to award degrees.  







With five major electromechanical  engineering enterprises integrated at the very 
beginning of the restructuring process, ElectriCo has set a very clear strategic goal 
- to become China’s state-owned flagship of the electromechanical  engineering 
market. They also have long aimed to become a global player since the 1995, when 
ElectriCo’s headquarters was formed and replaced the original Bureau. In order to 
concentrate efficient electromechanical production in Shanghai, small-sized 
inefficient enterprises have largely been excluded from the Bureau’s line-up of 
“grasping-big” enterprises when the business group was established in 200428. 
Overall, the group has taken an incremental path to restructuring and expanding 
since the official dismissal of the Bureau and the founding of ElectriCo’s 
headquarters. In the local government’s scheme of industrial development, the 
groups is now undertaking the task of becoming the city’s leading corporation in 
clean energy industry and high-end electromechanical  products manufacturing.  
Today, ElectriCo is reportedly running four major types of manufacturing 
businesses: power generating equipment, electrical engineering products, new 
energy equipment and service businesses. Strategically planned by the group’s 
headquarters, the subordinating enterprises and factories have been integrated 
into nine industrial corporations that specialise in particular types of production. 
From 2011 to 2015, ElectriCo underwent a relatively stable period of growth in all 
the main sectors. With a plan to solidify and further expand its traditional pillar 
production, the group aims to break into new market sector, such as wind farm 
devices and energy saving solutions for buildings. Such “cutting-edge” industries 
were set to be the areas where the group put their emphasis during the period of 
implementing the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan”.  
                                                      
28 To integrate similar types of production into the new institution, many enterprises were 
transferred to being under other industrial Bureaus’ administration in the early period of 
restructuring. This kind of organisational adjustment was ongoing until the Bureau was 
officially dissolved in 1995.  
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5.3.1 Strategic plan  
The group categorises it businesses into four sectors: thermal power plant 
developing and manufacturing, electromechanical engineering products, new 
energy equipment developing and manufacturing and service businesses. Each 
sector involves different business corporations and plants, but in terms of 
strategic decision making and accounting all these businesses are integrated at 
ElectriCo holding company according to their given categories.  
Figure 5-4 ElectriCo's revenues from major businesses, 2011-2015 
 
5.3.1a Thermal power sector 
Integrated with the main state-owned thermal power device manufacturers in the 
city, the group’s “efficient and clean energy” division contributes one-third of the 
group’s total revenue. Since the founding of the group, ElectriCo has continuously 
been one of the leading thermal power generating manufacturers in the domestic 
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turbines and auxiliary power units as well as power transmission and distribution 
equipment (PTD).  
As the traditional production of Shanghai electromechanical industry had iconic 
significance, the assigned objective for the thermal power division during the 
“Twelfth Five-Year Plan” was to “continue to solidify the profitability” of the 
conventional productions and moreover, to break into overseas markets, such as 
Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia. Rather than simply aiming to increase 
overseas sales of its thermal power products, the group was seeking to shift its 
business model from “traditional-style product selling” to a “service-oriented 
selling of power solutions”. In addition, through upgrading PTD production, the 
division was assigned the development of smart grid technologies. By integrating 
this new technology with the group’s clean energy products (developed and 
produced in other divisions), it is hoped that a powerful line-up of service-centred 
businesses providing energy solutions (or “smart businesses”) will be shaped, and 
become the group’s main engine of long-term profits.  
5.3.1b Electromechanical engineering products 
The group’s production of electromechanical engineering products is another 
major source of revenue. The size of revenues of this sector has only undergone 
slight fluctuation during the period of the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” (see Figure 5-4). 
As the transformed form of another of Shanghai’s old iconic industries, this 
division of ElectriCo is expected to maintain the group’s dominant position in the 
domestic market, whilst at the same time being tasked with role of being the main 
protagonist in the shift towards manufacturing systems engineering equipment.  
The products of this business category include elevators, refrigeration 
compressors, machine tools, printing and packaging devices, basic mechanical 
components, automation equipment, rail transit equipment and ship crank axles. 
Among these, the companies producing “consumption-oriented” products 
(elevator and refrigeration compressors) were required to maintain their long-
standing domination in the domestic market, or to “continue to be big and strong” 
(zuodazuoqiang). In the meantime, the production that will potentially become the 
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key parts of the future businesses, such as mechanical parts and automation, were 
designated to be the group’s “key sectors”, in which the group would preferentially 
invest and assign its most skilled personnel (or “zuozhuanzuojing”, meaning being 
specialised, and being quality-oriented rather than quantity driven). There was 
also a sector of production being driven away for not complying with the group’s 
overall strategy. That is, in 2014, after years of attempts to cease the profits loss 
of this production sector, the group ultimately decided to sell off the business 
group, thereby clearing painting and packaging devices from its line-up of 
products.  
5.3.1c New energy sector 
The new energy sector mainly comprises three types of production: nuclear power, 
wind farm technology and waste management. These businesses are where 
ElectriCo mainly invests for strategically adjusting the group’s main business 
focus in future. The three newly founded corporations specialising in these 
business types are the group’ direct answer to this transitioning goal. Only 
established for two years, ElectriCo’s nuclear energy corporation has already 
become one of the leading nuclear reactor suppliers in the domestic market. 
Before the founding of the corporation, ElectriCo actually had a long history of 
producing nuclear plant equipment and parts, which were produced by small or 
medium sized plants. The new business corporation is expected to integrate 
resources, ranging from manufacturing to marketing, within one core business 
organisation. Since the founding, the corporation has avidly sought to break into 
the overseas market - it has been involved in the construction of a few nuclear 
power plants in Pakistan, Iran and Bangladesh. By 2015, it had received orders 
worth 15.42 billion RMB. Apart from the aim of further expanding, the founding of 
the business group also signifies the group’s decision to shift business model of 
the industry. In 2012 and 2013, the nuclear business underwent a severe 
shrinkage in the aftermath of Fukushima nuclear disaster. As a consequence, all of 
China’s nuclear energy plants and device suppliers were forced to suspend 
operations and the state ceased licensing new nuclear projects. After the 
restarting of the business as well as the founding of the business corporation in 
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2014, ElectriCo formulated its new strategy of nuclear energy business, namely, 
“Three-Management”- focused - “quality management (control)”, “project 
management” and “field management” This was aimed at shaping a new form of 
service-oriented nuclear business by benchmarking western standards of safety 
and operation.  
Another of ElectriCo’s strategic key businesses, the wind farm business, has also 
been organised into a specialised business corporation. Initially developed as 
ElectriCo’s wind energy LLC, a joint venture partnered with another local wind 
farm suppliers, ElectriCo’s production in this area expanded rapidly after its 
formation in 2006. Today, ElectriCo dominates the industry, with 60% of China’s 
total installed capacity of offshore wind farms. During the period of the “Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan”, ElectriCo started to seek technological improvement through 
investing in a new joint venture, which involved partnering with one of the leading 
European engineering MNCs. The group’s current major concern lies in the rapidly 
shrinking profit margin of the wind farm products (discussed in subsection 5.3.2), 
and it is hoped that the business will soon break into the high-end market with 
new smart controlling technology.  
5.3.1d Service business sector  
ElectriCo’s service business includes the supporting services of a variety of it 
products as well as supporting logistic and financial services. Compared to other 
business sectors, the service business sector is rather a joint name for the 
revenues from a wide range of unconnected supporting services than a well 
organised sector. Nonetheless, the total revenue of all these businesses has been 
rapidly increasing in terms of their proportion of total revenue, from 17.5% in 
2011 to 23.58% in 2015. Such growth has largely been attributed to the group’s 
business-corporation-centred managing approach, which integrates supporting 
services with production at the Holding company level.  
The current majority of the sector’s total revenue comes from the supporting 
services of ElectriCo’s power plant business in the overseas market, including 
examining and maintenance, e-commerce and consulting. The group now aims to 
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shift the service businesses’ roles from being supportive to the main 
manufacturing businesses to being the core part of the “solution-oriented” 
businesses in future. It is hoped that this transition in service businesses will 
accelerate the group’s progress in becoming an integrated system developer and 
supplier with global competitiveness. 
Figure 5-5 Year-on-year growth rate of revenues from ElectriCo's major businesses, 
2011-2015 
 
5.3.2 “Throwing away the burden”, “sealing the bleeding wound” and “one 
big company” 
Despite the group’s enduring success in transforming the state-run industries into 
a market-oriented corporation, it is still reported to be under the “transitioning 
pressure” of market shift. The biggest part of the group’s overall deficit is created 
by the Heavy Machinery Corporation, which was formed in 2004 as the then newly 
formed group’s response to the domestic heavy machinery market. Incorporated 
with the major former state-run machinery plants in the city, the corporation is 
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manufacturing, which had been regarded as the main contributor of the socialist 
state’s heavy industry in the pre-reform era. Today, the corporation is troubled 
with deficits in successive years and in 2015, it registered a total loss of 0.83 billion 
RMB. Such “enduring bleeding” from the group’s once pillar industry derives from 
multiple reasons, including outdated technology and a shrinking market. Also, the 
group has had trouble finding any new solution to incorporating the corporation’s 
lines of production into other business sectors. At the end of the visit for this study, 
it was reported that the group was proceeding with a plan to restructure the heavy 
machinery business through financial means of public or designated asset 
replacement.  According to the plan, a new limited liability company will be 
founded with the purpose of continuing only two types of production, casting-
forging and grinding machinery, which are planned to be integrated into the 
group’s nuclear power business in the future.  
As for ElectriCo’s thermal power, the profitability of this sector appears to have 
been robust during the span of “Twelfth Five-Year Plan”, but the declining figures 
of gross margin ratio suggests signs of the business’s long-term weakness. China’s 
discouraging policies regarding coal-fired power plants 29 will inevitably squeeze 
ElectriCo’s thermal power business in the future. 
Apart from the “burden from the past”, ElectriCo will also have challenging 
prospects in relation to its newly developed businesses as well as its current pillar 
industries. The wind farm business is another main source of deficit. According to 
the managing cadre in charge of the new energy businesses at ElectriCo holding 
company, the business “has been quickly on the fast track of ageing”, with the 
profit margins of wind farm devices consistently shrinking and the group is lacking 
any good answers to the surging demand for controlling technology in the market. 
From 2013 to 2015, the deficits of the group’s wind farm corporation were 0.55, 
0.27 and 0.23 billion RMB, respectively. Whilst it does not contribute a great deal 
to the group’s total deficit figure, the group is prioritising the “bleeding problem” 
                                                      
29 In early 2016, the Chinese authorities legislated to cease licensing new coal-fired power 
plants in the future. 
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of the wind farm business as a long-term task for resolving given the business’s 
importance in ElectriCo’s strategic plan.  
Figure 5-6 Gross margin ratios of ElectriCo's major businesses, 2011-2015 
 
Like many Chinese counterparts, ElectriCo’s wind farm division has been 
designated as having strategic importance by the state. In 2015, China's newly 
added wind power capacity was half of the global total of 63GW, which is more 
than the UK, Denmark and France combined have ever built. However, this does 
not mean that China is dominating the global wind power market in spite of it 
having an immense amount of installed capacity. In fact, the global market is 
segregated into two and whilst China is the colossus in terms of quantity, its 
market access is highly concentrated. That is, 97% of China's turbines come from 
23 Chinese wind turbine OEMs, thereby shutting out most of the western 
counterparts. Conversely, the rest of world is dominated by a handful of western 
and Indian suppliers, without any Chinese ones being involved (Jesse Broehl, 
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attributed to the support of state policies, which grant Chinese wind developers 
and plant owners feed-in-tariffs.  
Also like many other wind farm suppliers in China, ElectriCo is troubled with its 
"grid connection bottleneck". A study published in Nature (Lu et al., 2016) 
suggested that the primary challenge to China's wind energy lies in that the 
current mass-production-driven model of industry is failing to adapt flexibly to 
the overall energy system. In the starting period of the market, China's wind farm 
suppliers expanded their business rapidly thanks to easy coordination with local 
governments in deploying small sized wind farms. However, such a "honeymoon" 
of the wind farm device market soon cooled down as it became saturated and the 
problem of power waste emerged, whereby the grid operator tended not to 
dispatch wind power given its intermittent nature. As coal still remains as the 
dominant power source in China, it is difficult for the grid operator to balance coal-
fired power and wind power. Such an issue is a lesser concern in western countries, 
where mostly more flexible power sources are deployed.  
The current national policies have set objectives to weaken incrementally the 
dominance of coal-fired power, whilst at the same time prioritising the 
development of electricity storage systems for reducing waste in wind power 
generation. Such an attempt at increasing the flexibility of the overall energy 
system is technologically challenging as coal-fired power plants are not usually 
flexible in adjusting their power output, which also means more wind power is 
being "curtailed" by grid. In light of these issues, the wind farm suppliers have little 
choice other than shifting their business focus from being product-oriented to new 
types of wind power systems driven by smart grid technology. This new field of 
technology is also where the state policies are directed at, despite there being no 
successful example among Chinese suppliers as yet.    
5.3.3 Summary 
With an incremental, expansive approach to transition, today’s ElectriCo has 
successfully transformed inefficient, redundant pre-reform state assets of 
electromechanical  engineering into being a highly organised, profitable business 
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group. Nonetheless, the old problem of “grasping big and letting smalls go” still 
remains in that the group’s pillar businesses, power plant equipment and 
electromechanical engineering products are now suffering from long-term 
depletion of profit margins. Consequently, the group is still on the ongoing path of 
clearing up outdated production, whilst at the same time putting strenuous effort 
into seeking new growth points with new technologies and management methods.  
 
ElectriCo’s strategic choices made to respond these challenges pertain to three 
aspects. Firstly, the group will significantly be inclined to invest in new energy 
businesses, whilst at the same time weakening the current dominance of the 
thermal power sector. Secondly, the strategically important, cutting-edge 
businesses, will also be restructured with a new framework involving the 
development of integrated systems to replace the present product-oriented 
business model. By doing so, it is hoped that the group will prevent the new types 
of business from “prematurely becoming ‘sunset industries’”. Thirdly, the major 
manufacturing sectors will hopefully transform to be solution-oriented businesses, 
which are centred on service rather than product. In sum, new energy industries 
and service businesses will be ElectriCo’s future orientation in relation to its 
strategic transition. However, neither the new form of clean energy business or 
solution-led manufacturing industry had been fully shaped by the end of “Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan” span. Moreover, the eagerly anticipated growth of the wind energy 
business is now one of the major sources of deficit.  As a consequence, the group’s 
overall profit growth is still driven by its power plant related businesses and 
industrial goods manufacturing.  
 
5.4 The regime of labour management  
5.4.1 Workforce structure and its transformation 
In ElectriCo’s annual report in 2014, the group’s total amount of staff (“zhigong”) 
was reported as being 147,843, among which the number of production workers 
accounted for 51.5%. The rest were staff of a variety of non-production 
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professions, including managing and administration, 24%, engineering, 21.1% 
and research and development, 2.7%. The proportion of non-Hukou office 
workers is still comparatively small, but the number is growing rapidly since 
ElectriCo’s restructuring in 2008. Almost 70% of 20-to-35-year-old highly 
educated managing and engineering employees are from outside the Shanghai 
region, while middle-aged senior employees, who control the higher levels of 
management and CCP posts are predominantly indigenous Shanghai residents. 
Among production workers, only a very small number non-Hukou migrant 
workers are employed directly by the group itself; most of migrant workers are 
agency workers (or “dispatched workers”, “laowu paiqiangong”, means 
“dispatched” from the labour agency), who account for 21% of the total amount of 
production workers.  
Reduction in the number of workers is an ongoing process in ElectriCo since the 
former Bureau’s restructuring in 1997. In 1997, the head office of the original 
Bureau was merged with its subordinating entity “the ElectriCo corporation”, 
which was emerging as being market-oriented, having been established in 1985 
as the state-led Bureau’s response to the marketising reform. As the top level of 
ElectriCo’s management had been replaced with profit-oriented managers, the 
new head office of the business group immediately focus on reforming the “iron 
rice bowl” by removing surplus workforce from posts. Given few working units of 
ElectriCo were subject to closure or lockout due to the group’s essential role in 
Shanghai’s heavy industrial sector, the continuously shrinking size of workforce 
was as a result of management-controlled negotiation of layoffs and 
“resettlement”. Directors, engineers and middle managers in poorly performing 
work units were forced to leave their posts, but still retained their titles, basic 
wages and pensions (off-post, or “ligang”). The volume of laid-off production 
workers was relatively small in comparison with other “letting go” local SOEs, but 
almost 70% of low-skilled middle-aged workers (over 53 for males, 43 for females) 
were compelled to agree to early retirement (“internal retirement”, or “neitui”) by 




Another wave of workforce downsizing started in 2008, which was the same year 
when the national congress approved the new law of labour contract. Both 
ElectriCo’s PM offices and the trade union were under pressure from the 
guidelines that required SOE cadres to solve the enduring problem of “unequal pay 
for equal work”. After almost two decades of workforce restructuring, the majority 
of low-skilled production posts in ElectriCo were dominated by agency workers 
by 2008. However, the new legislation did not immediately come into effect), 
which brought concerns to ElectriCo owing to the rising financial pressure of 
increasing labour costs. Reducing dependency on cheap, temporary contract 
workers was agreed between the SOE cadres and its SASAC leaders. As a result, 
collective contracts signed with the labour dispatching company were suspended, 
which also meant that there was few chance for ElectriCo agency workers to 
continue to work when their contracts were due to be renewed. At the same, 
ElectriCo had to carry out the policy of selecting and training a few “excellent ones” 
from agency workers, in order to fulfil the requirement of co-opting and improving 
the diversity of core workers. By 2013, according to the ElectriCo trade union’s 
report, the proportion of agency workers had been reduced to 21% among shop-
floor workers for all levels of production units of the business group.  
5.4.2 Institutionalising collective consultation - an “innovative” framework 
ElectriCo has a long history of seeking harmony in labour relations through the 
means of collective consultation. For years, the contents and process of actual 
collective consultation has been dominated by the managers in the member firms. 
Given the diversity of types of production in ElectriCo, the leading cadres at the 
top level often tacitly permit managers at the grass-roots level to do whatever they 
wish towards keeping businesses profitable. Consequently, in ElectriCo’s 
transitioning history, there has been an enduring lack of organised opposition to 
the enterprises’ market-driven decisions on labour. As a result, when the current 
business group of ElectriCo was founded in 2004, the newly formed headquarters 
had to find a centralised solution for dealing with the huge amount of unresolved 
dispute cases. It formed a “petition office”, where there are cadre officials who are 
appointed to negotiate with disputing workers. At the same time, the group has 
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consistently been looking for ways to make the collective consultation system 
work as an institutionalised solution for creating harmony. In fact, such all-group 
level of collective agreement is still based on the group’s market-oriented politics 
and the collective contracts are no more than formalistic regulations containing 
leading cadres’ consensus.  
ElectriCo’s codified form of collective consulting rules emerged in 2014, in 
response to the group’s “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” agenda of further promoting 
collective consultation. There are two main agenda items in ElectriCo’s labour 
relations transition during this period: 1) to be in line with the state’s ideological 
campaign on “rule by law”; and 2) to strengthen headquarters’ control over the 
making of labour rules in the workplaces, with less control of the CCP apparatus. 
Regarding the ideological purpose, the headquarters’ CCP had long hoped to 
resolve the group’s “problems left over from (transitioning) history” through non-
political means. However, it was not until the period of “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” 
period, when more political pressure was exerted on the SOEs, urging them to 
promote the idea of “rule by law”, that the group began to compile a rulebook on 
collective consultation rules. Also, the long-standing issue of being unable to 
implement labour rules inside non-state-owned entities was another concern 
behind the compiling of the rulebook. It has been often reported that foreign 
managers have expressed hostile attitudes about the new labour legislation 
passed in 2008. Headquarters hoped that both non-CCP related managers and 
ACFTU officials in these organisations would make collective agreements on the 
basis of given bargaining rules, rather than resorting to political intervention from 
its level.  
According to this rulebook, all negotiating parties in ElectriCo workplaces are 
required to act in line with the collective contract regulations made by the 
Shanghai Municipality as well as the decrees and guidelines regarding female 
workers’ rights. The rulebook also sets out the format for collective agreements 
among the group’s member firms, stating that “negotiating parties should be in 
line with CCP’s ‘People First’ principle, and abide by the collective negotiation 
mechanism, fundamental rights of employees and perform the relevant 
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obligations as determined by the basic convention and proposals of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO)”. 
To initiate a collective consultation process, the management at member 
enterprises should, firstly, select representatives from its major departments: 
general accounting department, HR department and administration office. At the 
same time, cadres from the trade union are to join with their managing 
counterparts by representing workers’ collective interests. From selecting 
representatives to signing collective contracts at the final stage, the entire 
procedure is subject to the given instructions in the guidelines. Nevertheless, it is 
mentioned that representatives of both sides should have an informal meeting 
prior to the formal process of collective consultation, in order to “make friendly 
contact” and exchange opinions. In principle, the formal consulting session will not 
happen unless a rough agreement on the draft of the collective contract has 
already been made beforehand. Therefore, in effect, the consulting session is a de 
facto formality of a collective agreement that demonstrates regulated harmony in 
the workplace. 
The matter of making changes in wages is always raised by the management. That 
is, even though a trade union usually represents workers’ collective interests in 
wage and working hours in practice, it is never mentioned that the union has 
actively made proposals on these issues in the formal reports of collective 
consultation. It is not clear whether workers’ voices are seriously taken 
consideration in any form of informal negotiation that takes place before the 
formal consultation and the outcomes of consultation are always in line with the 
member firms’ business interests.  
5.5 HR-oriented strategy of new workforce configuration 
5.5.1 “Managing” workforce segmentation 
The group deploys a three-tiered framework to form a hierarchical management 
system (see Figure 5-7). In this scheme, the group headquarters is defined as the 
“supreme strategic centre”. The second tier is called the “profit centres” of the 
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“managing platform”, which covers eight industrial corporations owned by 
ElectriCo holding company as well as two corporations that are directly managed 
by headquarters, i.e. the automation and machinery integrated corporations. The 
managing team of ElectriCo holding company functions as the core decision 
making entity of this tier of the framework. These ten business corporations, 
altogether, form a line-up of the group’s “core” businesses, comprising the current 
main sources of profits as well as businesses regarded as future orientations in 
terms of strategy. Meanwhile, the other two business corporations that are 
directly managed by headquarters are excluded from this line-up, because the 
businesses run by these two, textile machines and refrigerating compressors, are 
not considered as being part of the group’s future orientation as planned, in spite 
of the two corporations’ reasonable profitability and operating conditions. The 
third tier of the scheme, called the “production and cost centres”, is the level at 
which the group’s member enterprises and plants are managed.  
 
The design and deployment of the system are the outcomes of the group’s attempt 
at acquiring “advanced management concepts and practices” through cooperating 
with one of the leading engineering MNCs based in Germany. In the group’s 
“Twelfth Five-Year Plan”, the three-tiered managing system deployed in the 
German partner was suggested as a “highly recommended model” to emulate 
owing to its effectiveness in centralising decision making regarding technological 
orientation. Also, the German corporation’s ability to coordinate organisations 
with different production categories was another reason why the “three-tiered” 
system was favoured by ElectriCo managers, who hoped to integrate different 
business corporations in order to develop new forms of businesses driven by 












Figure 5-7 ElectriCo's hierarchical managing scheme 
 
5.5.2 “Talent” selecting and the management system  
To select workers who have leadership potential, the management scheme 
includes a HRM-driven selecting and promoting mechanism, which was designed 
to give chances to all kinds of workers. Initiated along with the group’s campus 
recruiting project in 2004, the “talent selecting” mechanism originally only 
targeted the graduate recruits, offering them a roadmap to careers within the 
ElectriCo group. Named as the “Y-shaped” career roadmap, the scheme gives 
graduate recruits optional choices to become technological or research 
professionals or to join the group’s management and administration personnel. 
The recruits are subject to at least four years of training, apprenticeship and job-
rotating in order to be promoted to the cohort of “core talent pool”, within which 
the “young talent” will be considered as the group’s long-term employees. After 
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another five years of working experience in the group’s ten core business 
corporations, they are given opportunities to be selected into the “reserve cadre 
cohort”, which is the ElectriCo CCP’s rear echelon of key leading management and 
party governing posts at either business corporation or headquarters level. 
Today, the selecting scheme is being widely deployed all across the group, rather 
than merely treated as an experimental HR project piloted among graduate 
recruits. Similar performance assessing means are applied to the existing office 
workers and skilled engineers and technicians, offering them the same amount of 
training, but limited opportunities of job rotating and internal recruiting. In other 
words, the chances of being selected for the “core talent pool” for those who have 
entered the group through external recruitment only lie in the results of 
performance assessment.  
Also, the selecting process of reserve cadres has expanded to all personnel in the 
group. Solely selecting from the “core talent pool”, the group aimed to select 510 
“reserve cadres” (2015 figure) 30 from all levels of the group, including from the 
subsidiary workplaces of the major business corporations. Different from its 
piloting stage among graduate recruits, the system is now not only designed to 
transit capable workers to higher levels of the group hierarchy, but also to form a 
cohort of maverick cadres at the grass-roots level. As one of the HR managing 
cadres at ElectriCo holding company put it, all new candidates of this reserve 
cohort are simultaneously required to possess market-oriented skills as well as 
the political virtues of “being willing and capable of communicating with the 
masses”, and these “talented” workers’ experiences at the grass-roots level are 
valued in that the group’s cadre cohort “need to approach these subsidiary 
factories and plants actively.”  
 
 
                                                      
30 The number slightly varies annually. 
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Figure 5-8 ElectriCo's “talent” selecting and promoting scheme 
 
5.5.3 Becoming cadre – a HR-led solution  
Within the reserve cadre cohort, only the candidates for “deputy titled” posts and 
“leading technical talents” are transited from the “core talent pool” through HR-
driven means. Candidates for “formally-titled” cadre posts are still selected 
through behind-door political negotiations. Among these three types of potential 
leading cadres, only those with the “formal” and “deputy” titles are the cadres who 
possess political power. Meanwhile, those “leading technical talents”, as one of the 
newly invented political titles during the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan”, will be only 
granted consulting roles in decision making on various issues regarding the 
group’s strategy. Previously, as the technical professionals were selected from 
business corporations or subsidiary workplaces, these candidates were 
commonly chosen because of their leadership potential or insightful knowledge in 
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terms of market and technology orientations for the group as well as having talent 
regarding internal politics.  
This fusion of various types of cadre candidates reveals three aspects of the long-
term strategy that are embedded in ElectriCo’s party politics: “technological 
innovation” (kejichuangxin), “innovative entrepreneurship” (chuangxinchuangye), 
and “marching out” strategy (breaking into overseas market, or “zouchuqu” 
strategy). In the group’s “talent” selecting system, these sketchily addressed 
strategical goals are operated in accordance with the deployment the HR-oriented 
practice of the “competency model” (CM) among the group’s managing and 
technical professionals.  
By the time I finished my study visit to ElectriCo, the CM assessment had not been 
successfully applied in action - the plan was dismissed by the group’s leading 
cadres in its piloting stage. The HRM department required full access to the 
group's core strategy making circle so as to get a full picture of the group's future 
orientation in terms of technology and market. In addition, the CM piloting team 
raised a request to conduct a series of structured interviews with the group’s 
leading cadres. These interviews were designed for “spotting the ‘hidden traits’” 
of those “successful” technocrat cadres, who had started their careers in ElectriCo 
with technological jobs and who then landed managerial and administrative roles. 
However, this plan was called off by headquarters, worried that these interviews 
Box 1: ElectriCo’s to become cadres, an ideal “technical cadre” should 
possess following “hidden traits” – 1) being knowledgeable about trends of 
the industries either domestically and overseas; 2) being “adept” in 
networking within academia; and 3) being sufficiently competent to become 
leader of a research. “Competency model” was created based on a 
conceptualised framework developed by the HR department, in which all 
ElectriCo talents’ traits are categorised as two major types: “explicit traits” 
and “hidden traits”. In their definitions, the “explicit traits” entail the 
candidates’ professional skills, educational background, records of awards 
and honours, etc. The “hidden traits”, on the other hand, are largely defined 
as management-related skills that enable potential “talents” not to be 
limited by their professional career paths. Regarding the group’s efforts in 
selecting capable technical personnel team. (Source: ElectriCo’s draft 
manual of competency model for cadres) 
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would “make cadres doubt the uniformity of the group’s cadre corps”. This 
indicates that the cadres are doubtful the suitability of measuring their merits 
through non-political means.  
5.6 Summary of the case study 
The ElectriCo group is the outcome of an incremental transition of Shanghai’s local 
state-owned electromechanical engineering industry. Driven by the CCP 
apparatuses in charge of managing and supervising the industry, the transition of 
ElectriCo group has a history where the party intentionally selected and 
integrated the most profitable and strategically import assets of the industry. 
Today’s ElectriCo group is one of the leading manufacturers of thermal power 
plant devices and electromechanical engineering equipment. The group is also 
looking at engaging in new high-technology markets, such as clean energy and 
smart grid systems, with hopes of strengthening the group’s focus on these new 
businesses in future.  
Transforming from the original industrial Bureau to today’s business group, the 
ElectriCo CCP has long been attempting to distant itself from day-to-day 
management. The group now deploys an organised approach of managing a 
variety of member enterprises through a corporate structure and all ElectriCo 
subsidiaries have been given full autonomy in relation to marketing and sales. 
Meanwhile, the group has deployed a hierarchical personnel managing system 
across all subordinate workplaces. Driven by HR personnel, the system is designed 
to make ElectriCo workers’ capabilities measurable and quantified, so as to forge 
a new cohort of core workers for meeting its new strategic needs in relation to 
capable managerial and technical “talents”. The career paths designed by the 
group’s HR department apply to all workers in the group and various types of jobs 
across different ElectriCo workplaces are open to the selected “talents”. In terms 
of labour relations, working conditions, such as wages, working hours and 
bonuses are all collectively agreed between the management and ACFTUs of 
ElectriCo workplaces. All these negotiations are regulated by the group’s rules of 
collective consultation, which set a clear protocol on the process of collective 
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consultation. Despite such an institutionalised form of bargaining, the group 
ACFTU is rather powerless in its relations with management as these rules 
predominantly favour the group’s business interests. Other than addressing the 
state’s guideline of labour protection, the ACFTU largely plays a consulting role in 
the process of collective consultation.  
The managing cadres of ElectriCo are substantially influenced by HRM ideas and 
concepts. The professionally trained HR managers have a big say on the issues 
regarding effective ways of staffing managerial and technical personnel at the 
middle and grass-roots levels. However, nomination of high-level cadres is still 
behind the curtain as the HR-oriented standards and measurement do not apply 
to the group’s leading cadre personnel. Even if performance-oriented merits still 
matter a lot in cadre promotion, there are always many other political-related 
virtues involved in the process of appointing cadre employees, which the HRM 




Chapter 6 Case study: “TexCo” 
TexCo is a local state-owned business group that manufactures, designs and sells 
garment and textile products. Its predecessor, the Shanghai bureau of textile 
manufacturing industry, was a socialist administrative body governing the whole 
industry in the Shanghai region in the era of the planned economy. After 
successive waves of state-led transition and restructuring, TexCo now has 
diversified division in low- and medium-end garment production as well as selling, 
garment trading, fashion designing and industry-used textile manufacturing. The 
group holding corporation and its subsidiaries reportedly employed 48,919 
people and created total revenue of 32 billion RMB in 2014. As such, the business 
group is among the country’s largest textile and garment companies. 
6.1 History of the transformation 
The eastern coastal region of China, including the city of Shanghai, has historically 
been China’s centre of the textile and handicraft industry since the middle ages. In 
the mid-nineteenth century, after successive military failures against western 
powers, the imperial government of the Qing dynasty was forced to open up 
Shanghai as a free trading port for foreign capital. With skilful indigenous 
craftsmen and its convenient location regarding logistics, Shanghai quickly 
became a popular destination for investing in textile production. As a result, 
foreign-owned factories in Shanghai became the origin of China’s modern textile 
industry. True self-dependent textile production of an industrial scale also 
emerged in the same period, with the “Shanghai Mechanical Textile Bureau” being 
established in 1889. This was under the supervision and sponsorship of Li 
Hongzhang, the most powerful political figure at that time, and also one of the most 
prominent pro-modernising reformers in China’s late imperial era. Governed by 
Li’s own staff, the bureau was regarded as an important part of his “Self-
Strengthening Movement”, an ambitious political experiment aimed at 
modernising China’s technology, while remaining its traditional cultural values 
and retaining its institutions. Li’s hope of developing China’s self-dependent textile 
industry through one single strong corporate was quickly dashed by a series of 
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unfortunate events: accidental fires, hyperinflation, and another grand military 
defeat. The bureau was gradually dissembled into a few private-owned, highly 
specialised manufacturing entities during the first few years of the twentieth 
century.  
Subsequently, the government was unable to take steps to nationalise Shanghai’s 
textile industry until the end of World War II. In 1945, the nationalist government 
(KMT) took over all formerly Japanese financed textile factories, and centralised 
them within one single state-owned corporation, China Textile Industries Inc, 
arguably, the biggest textile company in the world. Headquartered in Shanghai, the 
corporation was directly supervised by the KMT’s Economy Ministry, and funded 
by state bankers. During the period of China’s civil war, the entire centralised 
textile industry was controlled by the KMT for the sole purpose of producing 
military supplies. In 1949, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over the 
corporation headquarters after the People’s Liberation Army successfully 
besieged and captured Shanghai. As a result, the original institution of KMT 
corporate was replaced with the CCP-led bureau in 1950, which continued the old 
corporation’s headquarters management function. The primary goal of the 
communist government in early years of the PRC was to restore Chinas’ economy 
from the damage brought about by years of wars. Hence, regulation over existing 
private-owned companies and factories was limited. In fact, the post-civil-war 
economy kept its hybrid form until 1953, when the CCP’s central government 
embarked on the radical development of nationalising industry in order to 
implement the PRC’s first Five-Year Plan. According to this plan, private-owned 
textile production entities in Shanghai were transferred to being under the charge 
of the newly formed Shanghai Textile Administration Bureau, with full state 
ownership. Led by the local CCP in Shanghai, the new bureau was ordered to 
specialise in producing high-end products by “fully utilising Shanghai’s pre-reform 
industrial advantage”. From then on, this political arrangement of leaving 
Shanghai’s textile production under the local CCP’s direct governance remained 




Figure 6-1 Transforming history of TexCo (1889-1958) 
 
 
During the 1980s, Shanghai’s textile industry witnessed a “golden age” of growth 
thanks to the CCP’s opening-up reform policies. The manufacturing units were 
encouraged to set their own profit agenda, rather than following one single plan 
covering every aspect of the industry. Moreover, the local textile industry was both 
financially and politically supported by the local CCP. With the aim of making 
China’s economic reform in the eastern coastal region a focal point for 
development, the CCP in Shanghai systematically promoted its local industries by 
relieving state intervention in firm-level management and encouraging firm-level 
party leaders to create “new ways” of running the economy, including the 
establishing of joint-ventures with foreign partners and participating in the 
emerging tertiary industries. However, the market reforms of the 1980s also 
brought a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as a decreasing amount 
of state supplied cotton. At the same time, the responsibility for paying state 
workers’ permanent wages bill and benefits for 500,000 workers as well as 
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280,000 retirees was gradually transferring to companies and factories. By 1990, 
the industry had become the top debt creator in Shanghai’s local state sector. The 
textile bureau experienced continuous drops in total profit at breathtaking speed, 
from 1.8 billion RMB in 1989 to 0.7 billion RMB in 1992. Contrasting with 
Shanghai’s emerging state-owned automobile manufacturing business, which 
created profits worth 1.4 billion RMB, in total, with only 24,000 workers in 1992, 
the textile industry was viewed as a “deeply troubled” domain by the local CCP and 
was required to carry out radical reforms so as to improve efficiency. 
In 1992, all textile production units in Shanghai were required to proceed with the 
process of “internal rectification” for eliminating inefficiency, which led to 
enormous laying–off of “Danwei” workers in Shanghai between that year and 1998. 
The radical plan of liberalising the industry was directly down to political pressure: 
Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” to Shanghai conveyed the central CCP decision 
makers’ will to invest heavily in Shanghai, in order to develop the city as “the 
financial and trading centre in east Asia”. In order to respond to the guidelines 
from the central government, Shanghai’s local CCP designed a roadmap for 
scrapping the city’s “giant-sized”, “poorly performing” state industry, so as to 
enable the city to become a new powerhouse involving a market-oriented 
economy, in which tertiary industry would be prioritised. In terms of the textile 
industry, the municipal CCP committee issued a guidelines document, stating that 
it should be upgraded to being consumption-driven, rather than retaining its role 
as the nation’s supplier of strategic resources. So as to abolish the industry’s 
traditional cotton yarn production, 164 related production units were forced to 
close in 1992, amounting to 1/3 of cotton products manufacturing. In 1995, the 
Shanghai textile bureau, the governing body of the state-managed industry, was 
restructured to be a holding corporation. Despite removing party cadres’ direct 
intervention at firm-level management, the factories and companies continued to 
be affiliated with the new corporation through the newly installed ownership 
structure.  
Whilst the local government had already lost its power of making managing 
decisions 0wing to the corporate structure being replaced by autonomous 
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management, it was still the CCP‘s concern to eliminate outdated productivity in 
the textile industry in order to relieve the local debt problems created by TexCo. 
In 1998, the state council decided to bail out TexCo’s three major listed 
companies31, which at that time were still lacking in financing capacity. As the new 
corporation’s biggest shareholder, Shanghai’s local government remained its main 
power in supervising the central-government-enforced process of reducing 
spindle numbers on the shop floor. 32At the same time, these low efficient units in 
the industry were also forced to participate in central government’s debt-to-
equity swap plan, with their debts being bought by the TexCo holding corporation, 
which would later sell these to state-owned banks. Accordingly, TexCo established 
a new company in 1998 - an entity with the partial function of an assets 
management company, directly managed by the holding corporation, in response 
to the central government’s pressure regarding debt swapping. By 2003, there 
were 144 TexCo affiliated units that had transferred debts to banks, amounting to 
2.9 billion RMB. Consequently, the holding corporation gained full control of the 
SOEs that were originally governed by the old bureau.  
In 2004, another milestone of TexCo’s historical transition occurred, the group’s 
leadership decided to scale down its original major manufacturing business, which 
had experienced a constant deterioration in profit since the company’s mid-1990s 
restructuring. Aiming for “integrating high-quality assets and scrap the inefficient 
production”, some traditional and historically prestigious production of TexCo in 
the industry were totally abolished in the aftermath of the 2004 restructuring33. 
From 2004 to 2007, there 552 working units were written off from the list of local 
Danweis, in accordance with the group’s scheme of “upgrading production”. These 
working units were ordered to close or transfer to other profitable units’ control, 
but there are few records regarding the details of these changes. Also, there is 
evidence indicating that any process of transferring workforces was undertaken 
during that period. In fact, the fate of these failing units have only been mentioned 
                                                      
 31 They are the corporatised bodies of the industry’s main producer of consumer goods.  
 32 Resulting in cutting 10 million spindles in three years. 
 33 Cotton textile production 
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in head office’s guidelines in a rather vague manner,  referring to them ending up 
with a variety of possible outcomes, including ordered bankruptcy and sell offs34. 
As a result of these changes, only 15% of the group’s revenue in 2014 was 
contributed by garment factories and companies, of which the brands mainly 
provided low- and medium-end products in the market.  
Figure 6-2 Transforming history of TexCo (1978-2004) 
 
After four years of transition, a new corporate structure of TexCo was shaped on 
the basis of the firm’s efforts to shrink its size and workforce downsizing (called 
by leading officials the group’s “second start of a new undertaking”). Also, it was 
hoped that the new formation of the business group would bring TexCo’s leading 
officials new aspiration of the group’s strategic transition towards “hi-tech and 
                                                      
 34 It was stated that there were eight approaches for leading officials to terminate their 
units in order to secure TexCo a future of “completely existing outdated manufacturing” : 
ordered closure, suspension, merger, transferring ownership, moving location, selling off, 




fashion” into reality. These transitioning efforts have resulted in the group’s 
radical reduction in manufacturing as well as a surging trading business, from 
which the majority of TexCo’s revenues are now created. In fact, in 2014, the 
trading businesses contributed 26.5 billion RMB that accounted for 83.2% of the 
total revenue. At the same time, only 12.1% of the group’s revenue was 
contributed by the garment factories and companies. Regarding the remaining 4.7% 
of revenue, this was attributed to a range of tertiary industries mostly not related 
to the textile industry and this is discussed later. 
6.2 A hybrid control structure 
After the 2004 restructuring, a new TexCo hierarchy emerged based on multiple 
shareholders. With 78 percent of shares held by the local SASAC, TexCo is one of 
the largest state sector governing body’s fund receivers. As demonstrated in the 
illustration shown below, a limited company was founded to play the role of the 
new group of core business, which comprises five business corporations with 
various business foci.  A few non-commercial bodies that used to be attached to 
the pre-reform bureau were also incorporated into the new corporate governing 
structure. For example, the group’s “central academy”, which used to be 
Shanghai’s main textile research facility, directly controlled by the original 
industrial bureau in the Maoist era, was assigned to be led by the managers with 
the same level of party-system titles as the business corporation managers, in a 
corporatised form. In addition, there are another four corporatised entities, 
categorised as “companies for other functional purposes”. These working units’ 
original functions were primarily to provide a variety of supplementing services 
before the TexCo working units’ corporatised transformation, such as logistics and 
cleaning. Some tertiary services (like property management) were also integrated 






Figure 6-3 TexCo corporate struccture 
 
According to TexCo’s original restructuring scheme in 2004, the original bureau’s 
centralised powers were designed to be scattered through this new corporate 
structure, with the intention of replacing party-system governance with “modern 
enterprise managing”. In light of this, the holding corporation’s function has been 
defined as a capitalised core entity of Shanghai’s state-owned textile industry, 
from which top TexCo apparatus should have withdrawn its direct control in 
running the business. However, in reality, there has been no clear organisational 
boundary between the limited company and the share-holding corporation. In 
particular, many leading officials hold professional titles from both corporate 
bodies and the two companies continue to share the same office building. In 
addition, the two corporate bodies are usually referred together as “the head office” 
by TexCo staff. Moreover, managers and directors who hold job titles of the limited 
company are largely working in various professions in the holding corporation 
(the parent company in terms of ownership structure). The leading officials in this 
“headquarters” are pre-dominantly party cadres, who are experienced in working 
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in the state-owned textile industry. Additionally, during the period of 
corporatising transition, most of these cadres kept their jobs and obtained new 
titles in the restructured new corporation by undertaking mandatory professional 
training provided by TexCo. After such an “enforced knowledge upgrading” within 
the top circle of management, these old cadres were automatically entitled to 
qualifications that gave them automatic job positions in the new formation of the 
group. As a result, this new “headquarters” is still strongly driven by party political 
decisions.  
Run in the form of a joint-venture, these business corporations permit the “head 
office” to remain in control of these manufacturing plants and enterprises through 
a complex ownership structure. This capitalised formation of the corporate 
system enables TexCo’s leading officials to fullfil a double simultaneous agenda in 
relation to forced transition. On the one hand, managers in business corporations 
and their spin-offs are given full autonomy in formulating brand developing and 
marketing strategy as well as for attributing responsibility for profit and loss. 
Whilst on the other hand, “the head office” is still able to control and supervise 
their performance at a distance through the CCP’s cadre evaluating system, where 
cadres’ careers are directly determined by the amount of political tasks they 
accomplish.  For instance, after all major garment brands were transferred under 
Business Corporation B’s management, 30% of shares of the “Fusiliers”, the 
TexCo’s most profitable garment brand that used to enjoy a nationwide popularity 
in pre-reform era, were held by the “head office”. In 2005, over half of the 
managing party cadres were approached by their superior official from “head 
office”, with the intention of directing them away from their posts. They were 
given option of either to stay and accept the risks from the performance assessing 
system, or leave for a rather more “relaxed” post arranged by the “head office”. In 
the same year, Business Corporation B announced a new managing team that was 
selected from various TexCo working units to replenish the vacant managing 
positions left by old cadres, who had opted to leave. From then on, the enterprise 
was given full autonomy in designing brand strategy and making marketing 
decisions, while Business Corporation B, its parent company in terms of the 
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ownership relation, has been continuing to grasp tightly the arrangements 
regarding the managing of personnel.  
6.3 Market  
After the government’s radical implementation of “grasping big and letting small 
go” in 1992, mass yarn production substantially diminished in Shanghai. State-
owned textiles enterprises were ordered by the local CCP to shift their focus to 
high-value added businesses. Today, TexCo has fully quit from its pre-reform role 
as the nation’s major cotton yarn supplier, which used to be one of the state-
assigned roles of the city’s state-owned textile industry. Today, in line with the 
CCP’s local development plan, TexCo now aims to become a new form of state-
owned textile corporation that concentrates on hi-tech fibre production and 
fashion desi.  
Whilst most of local the SOEs in textile powerhouse regions have transitioned into 
being small-sized suppliers concentrating on a single type of production, TexCo 
was one of the very few that was determined to continue as a large-size, highly 
integrated corporation. Nowadays, it is reportedly running three types of business, 
which are self-claimed as its “main businesses” (zhuyingyewu): manufacturing, 
trading and property letting as well as a managing service, which is categorised as 
“other” in most of the group’s official reports. Subsidiary companies and plants are 
integrated into TexCo’s five major business corporations based on different 
categories of production and service they are assigned to offer. So far, export and 
import outsourcing is still its main profiting engine, but the group’s leadership is 
determined to direct TexCo along a path that will lead to it becoming a leading 
high-end textile manufacturer.   
6.3.1 Trading sector  
TexCo is the only textile SOE in the top 10 list of China’s biggest garment export 
companies and its trading business has continued growing since the business 
group’s restructuring in 2004. In 2014, as aforementioned, the revenues from this 
business reached to 34.98 billion RMB, accounting for 83.2% of the group’s total 
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income. The “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” set the new task of shifting from high-cost, 
low value-added production for TexCo’s Shanghai-based garment companies, 
which formally focused on and domestic consumer-oriented market and hence, 
many were forced to close or restructure. After being integrated into TexCo’s 
Business Corporation C, the self-brand managing group shifted their focus from 
the overseas market to the domestic one. As a result, there was a constant 
shrinkage in export revenues from 2011 to 2014. Nowadays, TexCo’s trading 
business is dominated by businesses controlled and managed by Business 
Corporation A, the majority of which are outsourcing agency companies.  
Figure 6-4 TexCo's incomes from trading business, 2011-2015 (Jan-Jun) 
 
Meanwhile, TexCo is actively looking at overseas destinations for investment, with 
the hope of making the group’s export business better positioned in the global 
value chain. To this end, it has founded a new cotton plantation in Sudan, and has 
been moving the group’s labour-intensive production to Myanmar and Bangladesh 
through establishing joint-ventures with local stakeholders. TexCo’s intentions 
behind these oversea moves are twofold. Firstly, the group’s export-oriented 
production has suffered consistent shrinkage of profit margin due to the ever-
weakening overseas demand since the financial crisis in 2008. Hoping to bringing 
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sources will guarantee that the corporation’s consumer-oriented OBMs re-engage 
with exporting business with a cost efficient value chain. Secondly, TexCo hopes to 
reduce costs in its importing business by buying-out local material suppliers. 
Overall, by driving production overseas as well as controlling local suppliers, the 
aim is to achieve the transitioning task of “quality over quantity” and creating 
more added value in its exporting and importing business than previously.  
6.3.2 Manufacturing sector  
Since the global financial crisis happened in 2008, profits made by TexCo’s 
manufacturing sector have been continuously declining. According to SASAC, 
TexCo has again “become a patient”, who “suffers from chronic disease caused by 
low value-added production pattern”. The worries for TexCo’s manufacturing 
sector are twofold. Firstly, the continuously dropping demand from the overseas 
market was a major reason for this decline. Secondly, TexCo’s low-end 
manufacturing sector had to deal with the growing pressure from rising costs of 
materials and labour force, especially the latter. Specifically, the cost of the “paying 
for harmony” strategy of accommodating labour disputes within general 
workforce in the midst of a legally raised wage standard was another enormous 
financial burden for TexCo (details will be discussed later, see “influences from 
new labour law”). At the same time, the group was under pressure to upgrade its 
production in accordance with the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan”. According to the plan, 
the TexCo subsidiaries that targeted the low-end consumer brand market, such as 
the domestically focused suit and shirt companies, would be forced to close and 
transfer their personnel to Business Corporation C, TexCo’s core OBM corporation, 
by 2012. Since then, the newly integrated business corporation has been on course 









Figure 6-5 TexCo's revenues from TexCo's main manufacturing sectors (2011 - 2015 
Jan-Jun) 
 
Figure 6-6 Gross margin ratio changes of main manufacturing sectors (2011- 2015 
Jan-Jun) 
 
Nowadays, the group’s manufacturing sector comprises three categories of 
production: industrial textiles, consumer brand textiles and high-end fibres. 
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group’s reconfiguration in 2010. In particular, TexCo’s recent booming automobile 
textiles have kept expanding with a steady rate of profit margin of around 14% 
each year. With an income of 1.47 billion RMB in 2014, this represented a growth 
of 39.59% over the previous year, for at this time TexCo’s Business Corporation A 
had succeeded in implementing its production chain all over the country. It now 
has suppliers in seven different cities, with the line-up of products including: car 
carpets, car interior fabrics and safety belts. Its cooperation with one of the leading 
German automobile company has contributed 20% of the total revenue that the 
entire automobile textile sector created.  In addition to this, TexCo is one of the 
biggest producers of civil engineering fabrics, having 30% of the market share in 
the greater Shanghai region.  
Secondly, the brand consumer sector now mainly targets the domestic market. 
TexCo’s current major brand producers used to be the biggest state-run garment 
factories that were run as the national centres of clothing rationing during the 
planned economy era. After waves of restructuring and transformation since the 
radical reforms in early 1990s, they have been downsized to be subsidiaries 
attached to TexCo’s Business Corporation B, exclusively producing and marketing 
those old state brands. Contrasting with the centralised approach that their 
predecessors adopted so as to base the entire production chain in Shanghai, these 
companies now have spin-offs all over the country through insourcing , mainly 
being used as cotton yarn and fabric suppliers in garment production. These spin-
offs outside Shanghai, mainly located in the neighbouring provinces, such as 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu 35 , supply 40% of the fabric used for TexCo’s garment 
production, and the remaining 60% comes from external procurement. In the 
mean time, TexCo’s Shanghai-based OBM fabric companies have been targeting 
the production of high-end branded yarns and fabric only. With regards to 
marketing, Business Corporation B is now the central decision making body of all 
                                                      
35 As the state-controlled textile industry disintegrated, a new cluster of the textile industry 
emerged in these provinces from the 1980s onwards. Predominantly comprising township 
and village enterprises (TVEs), many being collective-owned, these textile enterprises quickly 
replaced their state-owned counterparts in Shanghai, as the domestic powerhouse of cotton 
yarn suppliers.  
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branded fabric and garment products, directly controlling in-store selling all over 
the country. In 2014, with these attempts at integration, over 113 costly inefficient 
TexCo brand stores were forced to close across the country, and they were 
replaced by 270 new chain stores. These changes caused a hike in sales in that year 
of 10.73% when compared to 2013.  
Thirdly, high-end functional fibre production is the newest category in TexCo’s 
manufacturing sector. With the hope of forging another growth engine in the 
future, headquarters decided to merge three major hi-tech companies into one 
single corporatised body, Business Corporation D, in order to strengthen its 
control over strategic planning. In 2014, the largest of the three, “LJ fibre”, was 
enforced to halt production and initiate restructuring in order to eliminate 
outdated productivity. Because of this restructuring, the revenue from hi-tech 
sector reportedly shrank dramatically by 70.18% in 2014 compared to the year 
before. Founded in the form of a joint-venture in 1994, LJ was assigned with the 
purpose of developing and selling TexCo’s new polyester products. However, its 
oversized workforce (571 workers by the end of 2014) and invention of a new 
type of polyester of questionable profitability were not compatible with TexCo’s 
scheme of forging an R&D powerhouse for high-end fibres. Since then, Business 
Corporation D has halted the process of developing the new form of polyester 
products. Regarding the other two brands, “Unique” and “TAL”, they were 
assigned the targeting of different market sectors, namely, high-end chemical 
fibres supply and heat-resistant materials production, respectively. “Unique” is a 
transitioned state-run factory, which specialised in producing chemical fibres in 
the pre-reform era. “TAL” transitioned from being TexCo’s affiliated research 
facility, which was the Shanghai textile bureau’s core research unit responsible for 
Box 2: PSA, or “Polysulfonamide Fibre”, is a type of heat-resistant fibre 
developed by Chinese scientists during 1980s. Similar to DuPont’s 
“Nomex” in terms of function and usage, it is widely used in a variety of 
China’s self-dependent industrial projects, ranging from fire-fighting 
equipment to thermal-protective coating of military aircraft. TexCo’s PSA 
products were chosen to be used on China’s first manned spaceship in 
2003. (Excepted from SASAC’s 2011 yearly report, p5) 
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China’s independently developed heat-resisting material, PSA (see Box 2), to being 
a company in its own right,  but continuing with this research. From 2013 onwards, 
“Unique” started to expand its overseas market through directly selling its newly 
developed heat storage fibre to a German garment producer, which accounted for 
1% of total production in that year. Apart from this small progress towards 
creating a diverse line of production, “Unique”’s profits are still mainly made for 
the domestic market, in which it has already won the reputation of being China’s 
leading high-end fibre supplier. Meanwhile, “TAL” has assigned as being TexCo’s 
model enterprise that produces and sells its self-developed technologies. 
6.3.3 “Others”  
The majority of the reported revenues from this sector pertain to the income from 
TexCo’s property letting business. 36  Since the radical downsizing reform of 
Shanghai’s local textile industry, a large amount of plants and facilities have been 
left abandoned. To manage these “relics” left from the early period of reform, 
TexCo has its own property managing subsidiary. Begun as an office based in 
headquarters and subsequently becoming a self-managing company, it now runs 
businesses of letting and offering tenement administration services. Some of those 
properties located in urban central areas are used as TexCo’s affiliated tertiary 
industries, such as restaurants or hotels owned by other TexCo companies. Many 
of the others that are located in Shanghai’s old industrial areas are rarely used for 
commercial purposes owing their disadvantageous locations. Former dormitories 
and administrative buildings have been refurbished and tenanted for living 
purposes, while plants and warehouses have generally been left idle in the long 
term.  
Since 2011, TexCo has been urged to utilise these properties for its industry-
related purposes by the local CCP. Specifically, in the group’s “Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan”, the call was made for idle properties to be properly utilised to benefit the 
                                                      
36 The other small portion of this officially claimed “other sectors” is TexCo’s R&D related 
services, including one testing company and four publishing units that edit and publish 
academic works on the textile industry. They are functional units rather than profit makers.  
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group’s “main businesses”. According to the official document, these lands and 
properties are not supposed to be put up for sale. Instead, they are expected to be 
used as part of TexCo’s plan of forging new profitable businesses, such as in 
relation to the fashion industry and advanced textile technology. Moreover, the 
areas surrounding these old state industrial zones are to be transformed into a 
new cluster of emerging industries. In particular, in relation to those abandoned 
plants, the local government’s hope was that TexCo would invest in recycling these 
buildings to become art studios and lofts that would attract artists and fashion 
designers to these areas. In accordance with these guidelines, 94 percent of the 
abandoned plants have been incorporated into the city’s new “fashion zone”, being 
let to fashion industry related tenants, thereby attracting rental incomes worth 0.9 
billion RMB by the end of 2014. 
6.3.4 Summary 
After over two decades of transformation, TexCo nowadays has completely 
stripped away Shanghai’s historically significant production of cotton yarn and 
labour-intensive weaving industry. With the aim of rebuilding a local state-owned 
textile industry based on low cost and high added value, all the remaining 
companies and plants are now integrated into five major business corporations. 
These are tasked with centralising those units’ managing power so as to make 
TexCo a large state-owned business group, a high-end textile manufacturer and a 
leading OBM in the fashion industry.  
The ambition of TexCo’s “Twelfth Five Year Plan” is ultimately 1) to shift the 
group’s current profiting pattern from consumer-oriented OBMs’ supplying 
business in overseas trading to brand and marketing-oriented production and 
sales in the domestic market, 2) to  strengthen the group’s development and 
production of high-end fibre with an integrated hi-tech focused business 
corporation, and 3) to develop TexCo’s fashion-oriented brands by utilising the 
group’s idle properties, with the aim being to attract world leading designers to its 
newly developed fashion zone. In sum, hi-tech manufacturing for the fashion 
industry is set to be TexCo’s future orientation in terms of its marketing goals. 
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However, the group’s related businesses still account for very little in terms of size 
as well as the proportion of its total revenue. That is, profits from the group’s 
backbone businesses, such as outsourced trading and domestically oriented 
garment production and sales, are still predominant in its income and the planned 
future industries have yet contribute significantly to the corporation.  
6.4 The regime of labour management 
6.4.1 Workforce structure and its transformation  
Based on the 2014 data available to the researcher, the entire business group of 
TexCo now has 19,737 workers in total, among which there are 9,674 long-term 
contracted workers, 2,752 agency workers, and another 4,406 are categorised as 
“other types”. Among these, there are 10,063 workers are reportedly “off-post”, 
meaning that over half of reported number workers are not actually working, but 
are still registered as receiving off-post wages and pensions. Besides these, there 
are unknown number of redeployed workers, described as fairly large amount, 
who still receive minimum living wages from TexCo.  
There has been a vast shift in the structure of labour force in TexCo’s transforming 
history since the early 1990s, with the state’s plan being to “close, halt, merge and 
transfer” (关停并转) SOEs with poor efficiency. A radically implemented “letting-
go” policy caused large scale of laying-offs and the redeployment of state workers 
in Shanghai’s state-owned textile industry. With a rapid shrinkage of the number 
of workers from 0.6 million to no more than twenty thousand in 2014 37, TexCo 
has witnessed a fundamental change from a state-planned textile and garment 
manufacturer to a market-oriented enterprise that is heavily engaged in trading 
and design businesses. Traditional “Danwei” workers have increasingly been 
replaced with graduate recruits and migrant workers in the wake of the SOE’s 
                                                      
 37 According to another report, the 2014 number was fifty thousand. Given the 
inconsistent nature of the statistics, the number of workers who were “actually working” in 




forced transformation. Nowadays, the majority of the formal workforce are highly 
educated, highly skilled office workers or technicians, who work for the 
enterprise’s primary profitable trading business.  
In spite of TexCo’s efforts of shaping a workforce focusing on the fashion industry, 
traditional labour-intensive production units still remain. These factories are the 
result of an ongoing process of merging and restructuring low efficient working 
units throughout the period of SOE reform, since early 1990s. Inside these 
factories, there are the business group’s remaining “Danwei” workers, who were 
preserved by company’s leading officials during the period of layoffs owing to 
their high skill levels and prestige on the shop floor. Agency production workers 
are also widely deployed at the shop floor level in those factories, on average 
accounting for 12% of the total number of workers of this type of work unit. This 
contrasts with the very small proportion of agency workers, at around 5%, in the 
major trading business companies, who are mostly hired for periphery jobs, such 
as security and reception posts.  
With regard to TexCo’s large relocated workforce, who left their working units but 
were promised pension and minimum living fees, this is still a heavy financial 
burden as the corporation continues to be responsible for providing welfare to its 
former workers. Unlike the previous case of ElectriCo, there is not a highly 
organised cost centre that focuses on managing off-post workers’ wage and 
pensions as well as responding to their appeals. Instead, the cadre-managing unit 
and “human resource management” department at TexCo “head office” are given 
full power in managing the pension fund as well as in resolving individual 
incidents of rights of appeal. Owing to the chaotic policy change during the period 
of restructuring, much ambiguity regarding the interpretation of regulations 
ensued. As a result, a major part of these departments’ routine work was 
responding to workers’ grievances through various means, including individual 
persuasion to negotiating with groups of workers who had collection petitions. 
Whilst these departments have put a considerable amount of effort in an attempt 
to standardise and regulate the procedures regarding the resolution of labour 
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disputes (mostly, “leftover problems from history”) 38 , these disputes are still 
largely addressed through informal means of negotiation. 
6.4.2 Labour relations transition and rules making   
Like most of their counterparts in state sector, TexCo has established a system of 
collective consultation in its workplaces by following related legal relations and 
party guidelines.  The corporation has a long history of deploying collective 
consultation for directing labour disputes into a formal channel. In 1993, the state-
run textile industry was subject to massive state-driven workforce downsizing 
that aimed to cut the number of workers from 550,000 to 40,000. In the absence 
of a formal framework for legitimising such a marked shift in the amount of  labour 
required,  the former textile bureau introduced a “collective consultation” system 
and collective contracting in a few selected working units for “piloting” purposes. 
TexCo’s plan for implementing the new system of employment relations 
comprised three steps, as follows 1) First off, a few working units with few excess 
workers were selected to pilot the collective consultation. 2) Next, cadre leaders 
were asked to study the successful piloting cases and then to replicate the method 
in the units they were responsible for. 3) After most of the enterprises in 
Shanghai’s state-owned textile sector had provisionally signed collective contracts 
with firm-level unions based on the aforementioned collective consultation, the 
leading local textile ACFTU and the representatives from the textile bureau signed 
Shanghai’s first industry-wide collective contract. In 1997, in accordance with the 
collective contract signed between the TexCo holding company and the TexCo 
ACFTU,  over 80 thousand state workers were removed from their posts through 
early retirement, reassignment or buyouts. In the same year, there were nine 
additional collective agreements signed at TexCo’s first “Congress of Workers and 
Staff” (CWS)39, covering the collective agreements on issues, such as wages, rights 
                                                      
 38 There was also pressure from the local ACFTU demanding firm-level unions to solve 
the problems by fulfilling the Xi administration’s recent guidelines in relation to “ruling by 
law”. 
39 This is the platform in which “collective consultations” actually take place and it is largely 
ceremonial rather than a real arena for collective bargaining between interest-based parties.  
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of female workers and agency working conditions, etc. Since then, the CWS has 
been organised every year in April for annually updating collective contracts.  
The collective contract signed by the TexCo union and the holding company is 
more a guidelines document than a contract specifying rules on key bargaining 
items, such as wages and working hours. By way of setting the political agenda, the 
contract updates tasks in relation four aspects every year: 1) strategic planning of 
the workforce, 2) harmony among workers, 3) safety in the workplace, and 4) aid 
and support for the workers who are suffering from illness or a heavy financial 
burden. Subsidiaries’ management and the firm-level ACFTUs also need to sign 
collective contracts, in which there are specifications regarding  wage levels, 
working hours and the rules on bonuses. It is worth noting that the collective 
contract signed at the top level of the TexCo group guarantees all subsidiary 
enterprises the power to adjust wage levels in accordance with their own business 
situation. Moreover, the subsidiaries’ management and grass-root ACFTUs come 
to an agreement on the contents of collective contracts prior to the formal signing 
of the group’s “top contract”. Given such a formalistic nature of the group’s 
collective contract, there is little room for TexCo’s headquarters to enforce 
decisions on wages and workings hour through formal bureaucratic channels. 
To ensure various subsidiaries achieve the “greatest common divisor”40 in relation 
to the collective contract, the TexCo ACFTU seeks to impose political pressure on 
collective consultation. It sets three principles of consultation for all subsidiary 
firm-level ACFTUs: 
1. Wage and working hours specified on the contracts should be 
higher than the legal lowest standard; 
2.  Collective consultation is supposed to go beyond “merely 
bargaining” so as to “create a contributive atmosphere among workers” 
with “TexCo characteristics”; 
3. Firm-level unions should have “big-picture thinking” to ensure 
the collective consultation is conducted in line with the group’s needs 
regarding workforce replacement.  
                                                      
40 A commonly seen Chinese political term that stands for seeking common interests.  
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In light of these principles, the procedure for signing the group-level collective 
contract is predominantly through informal negotiation and communication 
between the various levels of cadre officials. Before the formal signing ritual at 
CWS, the ACFTU officials need to conduct large-scale inquiries among all TexCo 
subsidiaries so as to obtain a comprehensive picture of the various types of labour-
management relations – the annual agenda listed in the final text of the collective 
contracts should be generated from this stage. Then, a draft is passed among the 
administrative and union cadres so as to collect their opinions. Any objections or 
doubts from the subsidiaries are heard through the channel of party cadre 
meetings. Whilst the ACFTU claims to hold the perspective of “seeking common 
points while reserving difference” in the preparation of group-level collective 
consultation, in actual political negotiations its officials strive to eliminate 
“differences” by imposing political pressure directly from the headquarters party 
committee. The formal signing of the group-level collective contract does not 
happen until the group ACFTU feels confident that the proposed political agenda 
is feasible for all the subsidiaries.  
The group-level collective contract comprises four components, the main group 
contract and other three contracts specialising in particular issues that take the 
form of supplementary documents in relation to wages,  female workers’ rights 
and workplace safety. From 2010 to 2014, a few adjustments were made to the 
listed political agenda in the main contract. In particular, subsequent to the 
initiation of the “Twelfth Five-Year plan” in 2011, strategic workforce planning 
came to involve a series of political campaigns aimed at selecting and showcasing 
TexCo’s “model workers”. According to the contractual terms, these campaigns 
entail skill competitions as well as “collective study” sessions among all types of 
workers in TexCo. The winners of these competitions are entitled to become 
TexCo’s “model workers”, which is not just a prestigious title, for it also a piece of 
propaganda used for showcasing TexCo’s new objectives and the new standards 
for being a capable worker in the new era of transformation.   
With regard to harmony in workforce, the contracts signed during the period of 
the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” focuses on the following issues:  
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1) The proportion of agency workers in all TexCo enterprises 
should be reduced to below 15%. At the same time, firm-level ACFTUs 
should grant the remaining agency workers ACFTU membership. In 
addition, the enterprises should set up incentive mechanisms for 
enabling agency workers get promoted or transferred into the formal 
workforce.  The ACFTUs are also required to incorporate agency worker 
representatives in the CWS. 
2) The enterprises have the responsibility of negotiating with the 
labour agency companies over the issue of agency workers’ annual 
vacations.   
3) The amounts in the severance packages for laid-off workers (for 
the reasons of workforce replacement, such as shut down or plant 
removal) must be more than Shanghai’s local standard average 
monthly wage in the past year.  
There are other ACFTU traditional political responsibilities regarding 
guaranteeing workers’ welfare addressed in the contract that are also presented 
in the form of political guidelines, such as increasing the amount of the aid package 
for “needy workers” as well as launching charity campaigns for those workers. In 
general, in spite of the well-established state-led union system throughout the 
entire TexCo group, the top level ACFTU does not have substantial influence on 
key issues, such as wage levels and working hours. In fact, there is no specification 
of hourly and monthly wages in the group’s top-level collective contract produced 
by ACFTU and headquarters management. Instead, this contract states that there 
is some flexibility for work units to decide upon their own wage levels according 
to their level of profitability. As a result of the downsizing and redundancy, the 
wage system in TexCo has developed into being highly differentiated across the 
various types of production and services. The top-level ACFTU at headquarters, 
having been effectively engaged in representing production workers’ voices in 
relation to standardising wages during the early period of SOE reform, have now 
become incapable of representing the new TexCo workforce, in general. Also, the 
union has been unable to make any changes to the performance-based bonus 
system.  
Unlike its weak position within TexCo’s collective consultation system, the union 
is formidable as a political guidelines enforcer. During the period of the fieldwork 
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visit, it was actively operating a project in relation to collectively studying the 
CCP’s recent anti-corruption guidelines. This was particularly addressed in a 
series of “cadre education” sessions, where in a somewhat indoctrinating manner, 
it was held that workers “should be given full freedom in fighting against 
corrupted SOE leading officials”. The CCP’s anti-corruption movement is at the top 
of the agenda of the Xi administration. As part of this political movement covering 
all aspects of life across the whole country, anti-corruption in the state sector is 
specified as an ongoing struggle aimed at “clearing up corrupted SOE officials who 
feather their own nest by sacrificing people and workers’ profits and wellbeing”41. 
Whilst it is difficult to know to what degree the union’s influence in enforcing CCP 
discipline has led to regulation of TexCo officials’ behaviour, the trade union is still 
a trusted listener for workers wishing to complain about the misconduct of 
managers. Their concerns are reported to managing cadre officials and the CCP 
committee through the channel of inner-party discussion.  
Despite of the somewhat unfixed nature of the top-level collective contract, the 
TexCo headquarters still sets specific rules that require the TexCo Holding 
Corporation and ACFTU to sign the special contract on wages. There were a few 
instances of substantial wage bargaining taking place in the form of collective 
consultation before 2008. Complying with the nation-level campaign of promoting 
ACFTU-led wage bargaining, all TexCo ACFTUs have been required to carry out 
yearly bargaining (as part of collective consultation) specifically on wages since 
2008. The central ACFTU permits differentiation of agreed standards in relation 
to wages, whilst also seeking to stipulate common rules on wage bargaining.  Given 
the issue of “equal-pay-for-equal-work” was raised as a political concern by the 
local CCP in 2008, the contracts signed since then have all highlighted the 
following aspects regarding the approaches to improving the group’s 
compensation system:  
- Any change in wages should “take the market environment 
and the enterprises’ business situation into consideration”. 
Propositions of change from either management or the union side 
                                                      
 41 From studying anti-corruption material. 
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should refer to the guidance wage levels issued by the local 
government. In addition, workers and managers should collectively 
benefit from the profits of enterprises. Any wage reductions will, 
firstly, be targeted at personnel management rather than other 
workers. 
- Setting a standard on wage increase for all subsidiaries: all 
workers who were paid at the average level in the past year were to 
receive a wage increase of 11%. Those who earned more than double 
the average wage level in the past year could only receive a 5% 
increase. For the others who were paid just 60% of the average level, 
the rate of wage increase, in principle, would not be below 16%.   
- With the principle of “awarding the capables”, the enterprises 
should make decisions of wage changes on the grounds of the 
outcomes of skills tests and qualifications assessment. Individuals 
who gain official titles of skilled workers can instantly receive a bonus, 
ranging from 500 to 1000 RMB, depending on the nature of the title.  
Unlike the main collective contract, the wage-focused one does not specify the 
underlying political objective of these rules (dissolving the increasing pressure of 
labour unrest caused by unregulated use of a temporary workforce). Instead, the 
contract points out that the collective agreement on wages should be based on two 
principles: 1) mutual benefit of capital and labour, and 2) that the wage should be 
distributed according to workers’ capacity, performance and title. Quoted from 
one of the ACFTU cadres, “we build channels to enable agency workers get involved 
in all kinds of party-led ‘appraising and selecting’ activities, so as to create more 
opportunities for agency workers to be better paid and even get transferred into the 
formal workforce”. All types of workers, including agency ones, are included in this 
merit-based wages system.   
6.4.3 HR-oriented management  
In contrast to the professional managing hierarchy in ElectriCo, HR-oriented 
management practices are much looser in TexCo. In spite of the fact that the term 
“HRM” appears in a wide range of documents, including the guidelines issued by 
headquarters, there is little evidence that a hierarchical managing system with HR 
elements is actually functioning throughout the business group. TexCo’s business 
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corporations have unevenly deployed a system that is outside the cadre managing 
one, which is aimed at controlling three major aspects: wages, performance 
assessment and performance-based bonuses. Apart from being used for workforce 
development, HR-oriented ideas and practices have had a quite limited influence 
on the key decisions regarding the group’s strategic planning, as well as the 
selection of the managing/administrative personnel. In fact, the old measures in 
relation to CCP-led personnel management are still sovereign in all aspects, such 
as promotion, selection of reserved cadres and evaluating leading officials.  
Like many other new approaches that SOEs are experimenting with, developing 
“HRM” into a “modern personnel managing system” is regarded as part of TexCo’s 
long-term project of business transition, as aforementioned, from a corporatised 
state-owned group comprising textile producers to a multi-national corporation 
specialising in “high-tech products and fashion design”. For this reason, TexCo’s 
fashion industry related OBMs, the group’s “future businesses”, have been given 
priority in terms of deploying HR-oriented management. Specifically, the Business 
Corporation C, which also includes some of the TexCo’s old garment brands, was 
chosen to be the piloting unit of “HRM”. The present HR professionals who work 
in the “head office”, its subordinating “limited company” to be specific, have all 
been promoted from this particular business corporation, and now work for the 
cadre officials who are in charge of supervising the group’s high-end fibre and 
fashion business.  
Decisions on workforce planning are highly centralised by this personnel office at 
headquarters. It has issued guidelines to all TexCo units about setting targets for 
controlling and selecting workers. All branch personnel offices in the TexCo 
business corporations are supposed to align with such a framework, which has the 
purpose of overall workforce shaping. Meanwhile, the business corporations have 
been given autonomy in certain managing practices for meeting their own 
business needs, such as payroll and benefit policies. Lacking HRM professionals, 
the “HR” departments in TexCo subsidiaries are largely administrative units, 
rather than a new form of strategic managing body. Thus it would appear that 
installation of HR-oriented techniques in these managing bodies has not 
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fundamentally changed these units’ ways of controlling labour management. The 
ongoing agenda of labour management in TexCo’s transformation in relation to 
redeploying off-post workers and replacing an inefficient workforce, is still the top 
priority of these personnel managing units. With the exception of the leading 
cadres at headquarters, none of managers or HR-related cadres in TexCo’s 
business corporations or their subsidiaries is involved in strategic decision 
making. 
How is TexCo’s “HRM” influential? An example from the experience of 
“Competitiveness Model” building 
TexCo’s “HRM” department at headquarters is led by three personnel managing 
cadres, who at the same time are professionally trained managers. Being 
responsible training and performance assessment, workforce planning and old 
workforce redeployment, they represent the voices of personnel management for 
a set of decision making occasions, where both professional managers and party 
cadres are involved.  
Inside the “HR department” at head office, there is another personnel managing 
unit called the “HRM office”. Before TexCo’s restructuring in 2004, it used to be the 
personnel managing office running basic technical functions, such as issuing 
payrolls and benefits. Nowadays, in accordance with the group leadership’s idea 
of integrating labour managing forces into one single supreme body at 
headquarters, the office has been designed for management and supervision by 
the three, aforementioned, main cadre leaders. However, the real relation between 
these three and the office is rather distant in that they are not really intensively 
involved in the office’s day-to-day work. Instead, their work is largely about 
communicating between the HQ Party committee and the managers who have HR 
professional backgrounds, with the aim being to devise new labour management 
plans for their own areas of responsibility in the form of party-oriented guidelines. 
In the mean time, the “HR” office has continued to play the identical role it had 
before 2004. The cadres in the HR office, in addition to workforce development, 
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have been given the power to harmonise the workforce and negotiate with it in an 
informal way.  
In spite of it mainly performing a consultation role, the HRM unit’s voice is still 
taken seriously into consideration by the three leading cadres. On occasion, it has 
even been given full authority in relation to decision making and implementation 
on such matters as designing a new index for evaluating office workers’ 
performance. As quoted by one of the leading cadres in relation to their role 
regarding the group’s piloting unit, one task was to “instill HR ideas and values” in 
the group’s party-led decision making process. Despite this, the extent of the HRM 
unit’s actual involvement in key decisions is still governed by leading cadres’ 
rather arbitrary manner of injecting HR elements into various labour managing 
aspects. To start with, they were merely asked to design a framework for 
recruiting highly skilled workers who would be assigned to work in the group’s 
newly formed high-end fibre corporation. Subsequently, they were tasked with 
building a performance assessment system for all the business corporations. In 
addition, during the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan”, one assigned task by the leading 
cadres is to design a “competence model” to be used for the purpose of selecting 
capable managers and cadre leaders for forming TexCo’s new leadership in its 
emerging hi-tech and fashion-related businesses (it is also the entry point of my 
inquiry in TexCo’s HRM unit).  
As an observing participant in this research (I was given the title of “temporary 
post”, similar to being an “external advisor” in ElectriCo), I discovered that TexCo’s 
HRM unit at headquarter’s role under the guidance of the leading cadres have been 
influencing different levels of management across the corporation in the following 
somewhat limited ways.  
The HRM unit has directly engaged with the group’s agenda of providing skills 
training to managers and cadre leaders since the very first day of its formation. 
Working with the Communist Youth League (CYL) branch committees in the newly 
formed corporations, the HRM unit was initially concentrating on arranging a 
series of skills training courses for young cadre leaders, who were newly 
transferred to the managing posts in the newly formed Business Corporation C. 
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The contents of those courses ranged from basic IT skills training to knowledge 
relating to the high-end textile industry and management science. At first, the 
majority of the HRM unit’s staff were also CYL cadre officials, just having finished 
their internship in the personnel offices of their original working units and then 
having been transferred to the piloting HRM unit.  
“They were carefully selected vanguard cadres who have excellent traits 
in both political quality and professional knowledge. HRM is a project 
concerning our group’s future - such a task should be handed to young 
capable talents.”42  
Comprising three CYL cadre leaders and six staff members, who had working 
experience in both CYL administration and personnel management in TexCo’s 
garment enterprises, the HRM unit took charge of designing and arranging all 
training sessions for the newly formed Business Corporation C during its first 
three years. “They were like our course organisers. We had plenty of courses, taught 
by external experts on a variety of things ”43. Given Business Corporation C’s new 
role as TexCo’s OBM in the consumer-oriented market, the HRM unit was 
encouraged to arrange more training sessions related to brand strategy and brand 
marketing. Moreover, the head of the unit was told that they  were shouldering 
the responsibility of shifting managers’ old mentality of expecting financial help 
from headquarters.  
“Back then, many managers (in Business Corporation C) were newly 
transferred from those old prestigious (having famous brands in pre-
reform age) enterprises. Lots of them didn’t truly understand the reason 
behind such a move of merging and restructuring…… some of them 
strongly believed that headquarters was merely integrating assets to stop 
further losses. As long as they sat in a new secured post and saw no more 
bleeding from their units’ revenue, they didn’t think they needed to make 
any changes…… you see, the problems lay with their ideas. That’s what we 
                                                      
42 Interview with LM cadre A  
43 Interview with Mr. LF, the manager of the industrial corporation C 
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aimed to change – building a new mentality of strategic managing with HR 
means.” 
Designing a performance assessment framework was another task that the newly 
formed HRM unit was initially given. With the hope of universally measuring 
workers’ performance throughout the entire TexCo hierarchy, regardless of 
whether the workers were contract-based or had core (or “formal”) status, the 
labour managing cadre leaders gave the HRM unit full authority to design and 
apply the assessing framework they had worked out for Business Corporation C. 
As with other similar frameworks widely applied among capitalist corporations, 
the TexCo version of performance assessment includes a set of indices as well as 
measuring means, such as questionnaires, observation reports and peer-
evaluating worksheets. They were required to match with “universally applied 
rules” in order to make sure that workers would be assessed only according to 
their performance and actual output44. 
However, designing a framework that excludes non-performance related factors 
from the assessing standards is one thing, putting such a framework into effect is 
another matter. According to the HRM unit’s manager, headquarters had never 
actually seriously considered treating the new assessment framework as the 
group’s only standard in making decisions regarding personnel arrangements.  
“…I would say (in answering my question on the range and effect of the 
implementation of the personnel assessment framework) the contract-
based workers who were recruited after 2004 are fully subject to the 
personnel assessment framework. The changes of bonus and promotion are 
made according to the ‘more pay for more work’ principle. As for the rest 
(TexCo’s formal workforce), there are of course more factors taken into 
consideration, because of our complex history of transition - we try our best 
to balance fairness and flexibility.” 45 
                                                      
44 Interview with HRM manager A 
45 Interview with LM cadre B 
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During my visit to one of the subsidiary enterprises of Business Corporation C (as 
part of the “competency model” design, I was involved, as an observer, in a team 
that was dispatched to the subsidiary workplaces to learn about the managers’ 
jobs and achievements), but the manager I questioned was confused regarding my 
inquiry about the performance records of their formal workforce. According to 
him, the assessment was just about evaluating the enterprise’s agency workers’ 
performance and not the permanent members of staff. Whilst he did report that 
they did have the core workers’ performance records, these files were confidential 
and could not be reviewed for the current research.  
6.5 Summary of the case study  
The TexCo group is the result of years of “grasping bigs, and letting smalls go” 
policy in Shanghai’s state textile industry. From a state-run industry that had over 
500,000 permanently employed state-workers to the present business group of 
only 20,000 contracted employees, Shanghai’s state-owned textile industry has 
undergone a radically downsizing course driven by the CCP’s local development 
goals. Today’s TexCo group integrates the most valued assets that were once 
governed by the state-run bureau of the textile industry. Since the radical 
downsizing reform in early 1990s, TexCo now has completely quit from massive-
scaled yarn manufacturing, Shanghai’s most important state-run production in the 
pre-reform era. The group, today, has a diverse line-up of businesses, ranging from 
traditional apparel and fibre products manufacturing to fashion designing.  The 
trading sector has been TexCo’s powerhouse of revenue since the business group’s 
foundation, while the emerging “future sectors”, at present, remain small in terms 
of size as well as profitability.  
As an entity that involves promoting the group’s business interests as well as those 
of the local CCP in relation to maintaining the state-owned industry, the TexCo 
headquarters has deployed hybrid forms of labour managing approaches for 
rebuilding a state workforce. Since the foundation of the current group, all TexCo 
subsidiaries have been given full autonomy in relation to marketing and sales, but 
the nominations for key management posts are largely collective decisions made 
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in accordance with the CCP’s internal personnel politics. In terms of labour 
relations, management and firm-level ACFTUs are required to organise 
consultation in order to make collective agreements on the rules regarding 
working conditions, such as wages, working hours and bonuses. Additionally, the 
managing cadres and the group’s supreme ACFTU official have to sign a collective 
contract of general provisions for applying to all TexCo units, by which managers 
and ACFTU officials at all levels of the group receive the same specific rules and 
somewhat vague political directions. Given there is lack of rules or protocol on 
organising collective consultation at the headquarters level, the process of 
collective consultation is predominantly driven by party politics. ACFTUs are not 
just enforcers of labour laws and provisions, for they also avidly cooperate with 
other party apparatuses in relation to various types of political campaigns aimed 
at strengthening the business oriented skills of all types of workers without 
damaging the harmony within the overall TexCo workforce. 
With regard to workforce reconfiguration, TexCo has a preference for training its 
own workers and managing personnel for meeting the emerging needs of the 
group’s new market strategy. As aforementioned, the original unskilled state 
workforce was largely replaced through multiple party-controlled channels, 
which included lay-offs, early retirement and “long-term vacations”. The vacancies 
left by such coercive measures were quickly filled with a temporary workforce, 
especially agency workers. In recent years, in the wake of the state’s project of 
regulating temporary labour, the proportion of agency workers has reportedly 
been constantly falling since the beginning of “the Twelfth Five-Year Plan”. There 
have been some measures to regulate and accommodate agency workers, such as 
offering ACFTU membership and raising wages. At the same time, the group has 
issued guidelines aimed at limiting agency workers to the unskilled jobs, which 
enables management to replace them easily.  
HRM staff appear to have limited influence in the rule making process. Whilst 
headquarters encourages subsidiary corporations to deploy HR-oriented 
practices for training and selecting capable talent, professional HRM is only 
treated as an experimental project deployed in the group’s rising fashion business. 
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The HR-oriented managers are often given consulting roles in the CCP-driven 
process of cadre selecting, but their opinions on regulating talent selection have 
barely been taken into serious consideration by the leading cadres. In contrast to 
ElectriCo, HRM departments do not have a voice in in terms of making regulations 




Chapter 7 Discussions and theoretical reflections  
In the previous chapters, I have mapped out the labour managing regime of both 
local state-owned business groups with a comparative format of a case study 
template. In this chapter, I discuss the dynamic formation of this complex system 
in Shanghai’s local state sector. Based on the findings from the two case studies, I 
argue that the different landscapes of labour management displayed in the 
templates are the outcomes of the firm-level cadres’ negotiation on the boundary-
drawing strategy in relation to the overall workforce. To respond to the emerging 
market pressure in the post-crisis era and the state’s inhibiting stance regarding 
the temporary workforce in the state sector, the CCP cadres had to ensure 
simultaneously the flexibility of workforce as business interest and harmony 
among workers as their political responsibility. The first section of this chapter 
discusses the internal political process of the making of the two groups’ labour 
relations configuration - demonstrating how the state guidelines regarding agency 
labour regulations were operated at firm-level and how eventually the boundaries 
were drawn between the two groups’ formal workers and agency workers. The 
second section focuses on how local state-owned groups have drawn invisible 
boundaries among formal contract workers. Here, the discussion is centred on the 
two groups’ avid attempts at setting up a merit-based promoting and co-opting 
system for transmitting fresh blood into the groups’ line-up of reserved cadres.  
Revealing local state-owned groups inside labour politics, the discussion then 
focuses on the questions about the diversity of the labour managing methods 
within the local state sector. What can be generalised from both cases? Is there 
commonality in local SOEs’ labour managing ways? Or, what does “being local” 
mean to the reconfiguring process of labour managing regime in those former 
socialist workplaces? This chapter also focuses on the differentiation found in 
these two cases. That is, in order to adapt to the new market environment of the 
respective industrial sectors, both state-owned business groups have evolved 
their distinctive ways of managing the labour force. To what extent are the forming 
of those new managing approaches determined by the different natures of the 
industrial sectors? How is the emerging market environment influenced by 
164 
 
Shanghai’s local political agenda? Does such differentiation signify collision 
between interest-based groups, or the path of the CCP-led labour managing 
system in China’s local state sector? A theory regarding the CCP’s agenda of 
pioneering and implementing a merit-based labour managing system in SOEs is 
also discussed in the later part of this chapter. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In the section 6.1, I first provide a summary 
of the labour regimes of the two SOBGs and then focus on discussing the top CCP 
apparatuses’ strategic choice in handling both groups’ diversified and segmented 
workforces. Next, the discussion is extended to the types of “flexible firms” that 
the SOBGs aim to become in responding to such a complex configuration of the 
workforce. In subsection 6.1.4, I contend that the CCP-led labour regimes of these 
two SOBGs exhibit a “hierarchy-network” duality nature and explain that such a 
feature derives from the party apparatuses’ versatile roles in handling various 
aspects of labour management. The following discussion regarding the group-
based CCP’s different roles in multiple labour management matter is developed to 
respond to this duality conception.  In the next two sections, 6.2 and 6.3, I 
summarise and explain four types of actors the group-based CCP is playing within 
the SOBGs. Specifically, the party exercises its political control hierarchically, 
through having group-based party apparatuses play the roles of “managers” and 
“enforcers”. Whilst considering the SOBGs as networks of organisations, thus 
functioning as “facilitatror” and “regulator” through distant political control.  
In section 6.2, the discussion centres on the different approaches that the CCP 
apparatuses in the two groups have taken in handling the party’s political project 
of labour relations reshaping. Starting from considering the differentiated 
dynamic of management-union relationship at the top level of the groups, I discuss 
the group-based CCP’s roles as “enforcer” and “regulator” of the party-state’s 
guidelines. Party cadres with different professional backgrounds work together to 
enforce the party’s decree of downsizing the temporary workforce and are seeking 
alternative approaches (or “innovative” approaches according to the CCP’s official 
terminology) to union organising, such that it can retain political control over non-
state workplaces as a “regulator” at a distance, thereby delegating day to day IR 
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matters to the grass-roots cadres. In section 6.3, I focus on discussing the CCP’s 
managerial duties in SOBGs. Regarding the diversified forms of managerial control 
in the two groups, I conceptualise the CCP’s roles in relation to the shaping of HR-
oriented management as “manager” and “facilitator”. Despite being varied in 
terms of the degree of managerial control and core/periphery workforce 
composition, both SOBGs simultaneously seek functional and numerical flexibility 
in their staffing strategies.  The discussion is further extended to scrutinise the 
party’s attempt of forming an internal merit-oriented co-opting mechanism for 
selecting the “core workforce”. Then, I contend that the CCP’s unique dynamic of 
meritocracy plays a key role in shaping the authoritarian unitarism in the focal 
SOBGs.  
7.1 Local SOBGs - the party’s men, or the business men, and their 
mixed interests in managing labour 
7.1.1 Summary of the labour regimes in the two groups 
The case studies have confirmed the assumption about the nature of Shanghai's 
local SOBGs as the unit of analysis - they are the political consequences of the 
Chinese party-state’s long-lasting project of state sector transformation. The CCP's 
continual dominance over labour management has resulted in a complex ecology 
of a local state sector, in which new organisations and institutions constantly 
emerge along with the CCP's ever-changing politics of labour. The findings of the 
case studies challenge two conventional conceptions on Chinese SOEs' labour 
managing system, namely: 1) There is a universal pattern of labour management 
across all institutions in the Chinese state sector; 2) the transitioning SOEs are 
experiencing ongoing evolution of their own patterns of labour management in 
response to the respective contingent market settings.  
As the two case studies have unveiled, both ElectriCo and TexCo have experienced 
three stages of transition in shaping the present form of labour regime. Firstly, the 
dismantling of the state-run industry marks the dissolving of the party state’s 
social contract of “the three irons”. In the wake of the corporatising transition of 
the original administrative bureaus, the power for managing the labour force was 
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decentralised to the individual enterprises and plants. Secondly, control over the 
labour management of state-owned industries was recentralised as a result of the 
forming of business groups. Formed through the party’s political arrangement, the 
groups are expected simultaneously to undertake the quest of profitability and the 
responsibility of maintaining labour harmony. Thirdly, as part of the party state’s 
plan of “deepening SOE reform”, the groups were asked to accomplish twofold 
political tasks regarding labour management simultaneously: regulating a 
temporary workforce in all affiliating entities, and forging a “talented”, skilled 
workforce as a response to the local state sector’s “Twelfth Five-Year Plan”.  
Over the course of this evolving process, it can be seen that the party has 
consistently played sovereign roles in reshaping the labour managing institutions. 
On the one hand, SOBGs’ headquarters, the groups’ supreme entity for making 
political decisions, have played the role of conveying the directives and guidelines 
regarding SOE reform from the upper-level of the party apparatuses. The TexCo 
case has also provided evidence that the headquarters’ political power stretches 
beyond the business group, functioning as a regulating body that sets rules for the 
city’s other types of textile production units. On the other hand, there are top-
down, organised form of managing measures taken by the top-level party 
apparatuses, aiming to reshape the groups’ workplaces into being HR-oriented 
regimes with the goal of profitability. Shedding light on how this complex 
arrangement has come into place at TexCo will help explain the variation of labour 









Figure 7-1 Conceptualisation of group-level CCP's flexible roles on LM matters 
 
7.1.2 Within-group segmentation of the workforce  
As the findings from the case studies have suggested, almost all kinds of labour 
managing practices adopted in the two groups derive from the group 
headquarters’ top-down decisions, which appear as various forms of control. To 
understand the headquarters’ multiple roles in implementing labour management 
strategy. It is essential to consider the internal job disparity within Shanghai’s 
local SOBGs.  
As has been mentioned above, staff formations are significantly varied among the 
groups’ subordinating organisations, depending on ownership type and the level 
of the hierarchical structure. According to ElectriCo and TexCo's early grouping 
schemes in early 2000s, organisations in both groups were given differentiated 
goals of workforce reconfiguration. In general, enterprise entities were 
distinctively stratified into three layers in terms of staff formulation: 
a) Headquarters level - ElectriCo defines its headquarters as the “strategic centre” 
of the group in its HRM building scheme. Given the headquarters’ assigned role of 
supreme managing entity, its personnel are all recruited through the group’s 
internal labour market or by direct promotion from other subordinating 
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organisations. Like the senior cadres who have worked for ElectriCo for years, the 
leading managers at this level all receive permanent job security. In addition, they 
are given a large number of opportunities to rotate their jobs across branches. 
Meanwhile in TexCo, the headquarters is mainly staffed with managing cadres 
who are promoted through the political channel. Given TexCo’s lack of an 
organised HR-oriented approach, this means that there are fewer market-based 
rotating opportunities available, but in terms of job security and political career 
path there is no significant difference to their counterparts in ElectriCo. 
b) Business corporations - The corporations at this level, or “tier 2 units”, are the 
groups’ profit and strategical centres, where workers with various types of traits 
and skill work together. Seemingly open to the jobs market given their assigned 
roles as self-financing entities, however, these corporations were found to have 
fairly limited access to the external jobs market. Instead, employees are largely 
recruited through internal channels of selection and nomination. In addition, 
employees with various security conditions and bonus schemes are blended 
unevenly across these corporations. 
According to ElectriCo’s definition of its all-group HRM scheme, those business 
corporations are “the pivots of management connecting the headquarters with 
grass-root production units”. The managers at this level are expected to interpret 
macroscopic decisions made by the headquarters into practical guidelines of 
managing measures. In order to meet with the group’s requirement on human 
resource related to market expansion, the business corporations are expected to 
absorb “talents”, who are not only professionally experienced, but also capable of 
party matters. Consequently, these business corporations offer a considerable 
amount of opportunities for job rotation and internal promotion for professional 
managers as well as managing cadres selected from all levels of the group 
hierarchy. Contrasting with ElectriCo business corporations’ heavily professional-
concentrated formation of employees, there are only a handful of “tier 2” entities 
in TexCo offering such high flexibility of cross-organisational training and skill 
development for managing personnel. As a result, the managing and technological 
personnel, who are part of the group’s long-term, flexible wage scheme, are only 
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placed in TexCo’s few “future businesses”. The rest of the business corporations 
are still staffed with senior cadre personnel, who have the right amount of 
management knowledge and experience.   
Apart from these internally recruited employees, there are a few labour market 
employees who are externally recruited by both groups. There is a large number 
of graduate recruits who are employed through the group’s annual campus 
recruiting scheme and they are involved in the group’s “talent” project, which has 
the purpose of selecting a new cohort of a long-term, skilled workforce. The 
boundary between these graduate recruits and the long-term employees is not 
distinct in that their works are largely organised with common goals and 
processes. Meanwhile in TexCo, such a form of HR-controlled work flexibility is 
only deployed in the group’s fashion and hi-tech centred business groups, while 
the rest only offer flexibility on administrative position nominations across 
organisations.  
c) Production units - The organisations at this level (“tier 3” units) are the main 
employers in which TexCo’s short-term, contingent employees are placed. The 
managerial or supervisory positions are predominantly taken by the long-term 
staff, who are referred to as the ones who have entered “bianzhi”, sometimes 
called “leaders”. The number of this “leader” minority is dependent on the various 
business conditions of each enterprise. For instance, the entities pursuing short-
term profits, like TexCo’s trading companies, are generally staffed with fewer long-
term personnel, whereas the entities that are expected to become future 
powerhouses of state industrial outputs are full of long-term employees working 
on a wide range of jobs. For ElectriCo’s graduate recruits, working in those non-
managerial positions are usually parts of their assigned quests to gain experience 
from the “grass-roots” production centres.   
With regards to the non-managerial majorities at this level, jobs are highly open 
to the external labour market.  As the groups’ production centres or “tier 3” units, 
these workplaces have substantial need for an external labour force in order to fill 
the workforce gap left by the enduring SOE reform. Both ElectriCo and TexCo have 
been recruiting agency workers as a flexible solution to minimising labour cost. 
170 
 
Before the state released new legislation discouraging temporary employment, 
some “tier 3” enterprises even used to reportedly have agency workers as much 
as 60% of the total. Even though the local SOBGs in Shanghai have taken actions to 
control the number of agency workers since the new legislation in 2007, “labour 
dispatching” is still a preferred approach in recruiting production-line workers. As 
for the other contingent workers who are externally recruited, they are often the 
replenished cohort assigned to fill the vacancies left by laid-off skilled 
technological personnel. In general, they are treated as equal to the groups’ long-
term workforce in terms of welfare, but it varies greatly regarding other aspects 
across the different workplaces in relation to opportunities of promotion, skills 
development and access to bonus schemes.  
7.1.3 The new form of flexible firms in the local state sector   
The within-organisational inquiries of the two case studies have revealed that 
ElectriCo and TexCo, both simultaneously, subject to political pressure from the 
national and local levels, have been carrying out two major initiatives in regards 
to workforce reconfiguration. Firstly, as state-owned entities have been forced to 
eliminate excessive numbers of workers and inefficient production, the groups 
have avidly adopted the flexible strategies of deploying temporary and contingent 
workforces. These strategies are the outcomes of the group headquarters’ ardent 
attempts at transforming the original state industry via the creation of networks 
among various forms of organisation, including outsourcing, insourcing, 
subcontracting as well as joint ventures and partnerships. The formation of the 
current group hierarchy (or, in the internal political terminology, “Bu-Ju”) is in line 
with the CCP’s dual agenda of reducing labour costs as well as business expansion. 
Secondly, the group headquarters, representing each group’s nexus of mixed 
interests, have played a sovereign role in making their strategy regarding human 
resources, even though the leading cadres often have not engaged in direct control 
in branches and affiliating business entities. The top-level managing cadres have a 
strong willingness to enhance workers’ commitment by providing various training 
and promoting channels, in order to forge a core workforce with high skill and 
high job security.  
171 
 
These two images reflect these state-owned business groups’ twofold needs for 
different forms of flexibility in terms of labour managing strategy. On the one hand, 
market challenges from private and foreign-owned counterparts have prompted 
the state sector to dissolve the original socialist contract that guaranteed political 
prestige as well as permanent security to workers. As a result, these groups have 
had to seek new staffing methods to replenish the shortage created by the massive 
laying-off and workforce re-settlement during the period of radical SOE reform. 
Thanks to the “Grasping Big” policy, resulting in the creation of local state-owned 
business groups, the formation of organisational networks has enabled managers 
from different forms of workplaces to configure flexible staffing strategies that suit 
their own needs. Contingent and temporary workers who are given limited or no 
job security have turned out to be very much favoured in all kinds of affiliated 
entities. On the other hand, in response to both local and nation-wide political 
pressure to strengthen “national champions”, the top managing cadres of these 
groups have been continually seeking new solutions to forging the groups’ new 
core workforces. The ideas and practices of HRM have been remarkably popular 
among the managing cadres. For them, the notion of creating high-performance 
work organisations by providing workers more opportunities for training and 
involvement brings new hope of strengthening the SOEs’ performance without 
damaging the existing unitary form of rule-making regarding jobs. To varying 
degrees, these groups have already deployed HR-oriented managing practices 
with the hope of creating a kind of flexibility that enables high-skilled, regular 
workers to accomplish various types of tasks.  
In all, these groups’ labour managing systems appear to be of a dualist nature - the 
“hierarchy” that, in general, seeks to implement long-term, high-performance 
strategy and the “network” that involves pursuing loose reorganisation state 
industry with pragmatic and flexible practices. To understand the ways in which 
the different types of labour utilising flexibility are balanced or traded off within 
these organisations, firstly, it is necessary to scrutinise the very nature of local 
state-owned business groups, as the units of analysis. 
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7.2 “Enforcer” and “Regulator”: the party’s role in the reshaping of 
employment relations  
7.2.1 The state’s strategic tasks for the state sector 
Since the enactment of the 1994 Labour Law, collective contract and collective 
consultation have largely been ineffective in making progress towards promoting 
confrontational bargaining between management and the labour force. The 
current institutional setting of collective contract and collective consultation 
resulted from two party-led campaigns in early 2000s and 2007-2008, 
respectively. Those campaigns aimed to tackle with the turbulence of labour 
relations left by the SOE reform46 (“grasping big, letting smalls go” in the early 
2000s) and the further wave of “deepening SOE restructuring”47 (brought about 
by the global financial crisis in 2008). The fear of uncontrollable labour unrest and 
press exposure of the increasing number of labour disputes have always been the 
CCP’s top concerns, as they want to minimise direct political intervention.   
The empirical inquiry of this research happened to take place at the point when 
the local CCP apparatuses embarked on launching a regional-wide campaign in 
response to the “Twelfth Five-Year plan”. Being subject to subsidiary plans issued 
by two local administrative entities, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security (MHRSS) and SASAC, both ElectriCo and TexCo were given the dual tasks 
of upgrading the capacity of overall workforce as well as maintaining harmony and 
stability among workers. In the Five-Year plan guidelines issued by MHRSS, the 
urgency of further expanding coverage of the collective contract and collective 
consultation system was addressed as a premise for “solidifying the rear area of 
SOEs on the course of deepening the reform”. In the same guidelines, the central 
CCP’s demands to the local authorities were also delivered to the SOEs - a series of 
                                                      
46 The campaign came along with the 2004 amendment of “Collective Contract Provisions”.  
47 In 2007, the national ACFTU urged all branches across the nation to seek innovative means 
for controlling the reported number of labour unrest. Regional bargaining and trade-wise 
bargaining were particularly highlighted as ACFTUs’ main approaches to be used in the non-
state sector during the campaign. They were also widely implemented in those workplaces 




clear tasks finalising the expanding coverage of the collective consultation system: 
by 2013, 80% of SOEs in Shanghai’s local state sector should have finalised setting 
up such a system.  
Promoting collective consultation and further expanding coverage of the collective 
contract were addressed as one of the most urgent tasks to accomplish in MHRSS’s 
“Twelfth Five-Year plan” guideline. From 2010 to 2011, the initial stage of the 
Twelfth Five-Year plan, MHRSS, ACFTU and CAE jointly organised a negotiating 
mechanism “the Joint Assembly of Labour Relations” to discuss about the issue of 
harmonising labour relations. The following strategic decisions regarding the 
imposition of collective consultation on enterprises at the local level were 
collectively made at the joint meeting of this tripartite mechanism: 1) launch a 
series of political movements across the nation for strengthening cadres’ 
consciousness on the necessity and urgency of such policies; 2) set clear quantified 
tasks on the coverage rate of signed collective contracts and collective 
consultation to local cadres responsible for state economy and labour affairs.48 All 
three parties delivered fairly demanding decrees to their subordinating units at 
the local level. In doing so, the Joint Assembly represented the central CCP as 
whole, by setting the tone of China’s labour relations reform over the next five year 
span.  
The guidelines issued to Shanghai’s local state sector highlighted two aspects. 
Firstly, like all non-state-owned economic entities, SOEs were also mandated to 
expand coverage of collective contracts and collective consultation to their 
temporary labour force. Unlike her sister provinces that play role of the nation’s 
powerhouses of manufacturing industry, Shanghai has relatively low level of use 
of a temporary workforce due to the fact that the state-owned manufacturing 
sector shrank significantly during the years of SOE reform. However, the vacancies 
left by the SOEs’ lay-offs and redeployment in the remaining manufacturing-
related businesses were quickly replenished by the personnel supplies provided 
by labour agency companies. By 2010, the average proportion of agency workers 
                                                      
48 Three guideline papers 
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in Shanghai’s local state sector was around 20%. In the wake of the state sector’s 
major strategic adjustment in promoting “advanced manufacturing industries” 
(another important Five-Year plan agenda), dealing with the agency labour force 
became an urgent mission for firm-level CCP apparatuses. On the one hand, the 
quick shift from the state workforce to the agency workforce was often justified as 
being an essential move to preserve those enterprises’ manufacturing industries. 
Nowadays there is also purportedly “inertia” among managers who want to keep 
such a labour strategy with the purpose of controlling cost pressures. On the other 
hand, both enterprise cadres and local administrative cadres have, on various 
occasions, conveyed their anticipation of getting rid of SOEs’ dependence on 
labour dispatching and enter the high added-value market with high skilled 
permanent staff. 
The local MHRSS’s 2011 guideline regulating labour dispatching has stipulated 
four basic principles for SOEs, with the expectation that any new move regarding 
the issue of labour dispatching should be in line with the consensus made by the 
tripartite joint meeting at central level as well as with the 2007 new labour law. 
Also, the guideline emphasised three aspects that the SOE cadres should focus on: 
1) defining the “temporary”, “auxiliary” and “replaceable” working posts that can 
be legitimately replenished with agency workers; 2) letting the agency workers 
receive the same payment as the others for the same work (Equal-Pay-For-Equal-
Work); and 3) enabling agency workers “democratically” to participate in 
management. These key points were not only addressed in guideline papers that 
were issued to both local MHRSS and various levels of trade unions, for they were 
also regarded as the priorities for the managing cadres in enterprises.  
Secondly, the guidelines addressed the necessity and urgency of directing SOEs’ 
missions of redeploying redundant workforces into a codified framework by 
continually promoting collective consultation in a top-down way. In addition, SOEs 
had to resort to dissolving disputes on the ground with written-down regulations, 
rather than using ad hoc informal procedures that took up much time. To be more 
specific, enterprise cadres were given a few principles of dealing with labour 
disputes under the new normalities of labour contract law: preventing media 
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exposure; strictly preventing from workers’ organised petitioning to the central 
authorities located in the capital; and ensuring harmony in the workplace through 
the form of “rule by law”. If redeployed workers were at odds with the SOEs’ 
arrangements, then the personnel managing cadres had to act based on collective 
contracts signed by the management and union.  
In sum, further extending the collective consultation system was seen as the 
solution to tackling the SOEs’ problem of an excessive agency workforce for CCP. 
Moreover, the grass-root CCPs in Shanghai were also assigned tasks aimed at 
increasing the coverage of such a system.  
7.2.2 Strong union, weak union: ACFTUs’ uneven significance in the party’s 
labour politics  
How did the local SOBGs set out to implement those schemes developed by the 
higher authorities? As has been found in the case study research, the CCP at the 
SOBGs have been playing double roles in implementing labour relations 
restructuring. For reducing temporary employment, both ElectriCo and TexCo’s 
headquarters gave direct instructions to the subordinating party apparatuses, 
which mandated them to reach the new standard of the temporary employment 
limit. Simultaneously, the groups were encouraged to develop “innovative forms” 
of union organising as a semi-administrative unit of the CCP’s governance in 
addition to the local-level LR regulations. It is notable that as a de facto 
administrative entity rather than independent interest-based union, the group-
based ACFTUs are involved in these party-led governance practices. The case 
studies have also revealed that the two groups appear to have different dynamic 
of union-management relationship, which has been paramount in determining 
what sort of contingent pattern of party governance in relation to LR restructuring 
the two groups have developed. 
Overall, the headquarters ACFTUs of the two cases are quite similar, with both 
having been Shanghai’s leading unions in the state-owned electronic engineering 
and textile sectors, respectively. Once the local CCP proceeded to “grasp bigs” 
among local SOEs, the two local ACFTU apparatuses were incorporated into the 
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emerging local state-owned businesses with the de facto new roles of leading firm-
level unions in ElectriCo and TexCo. Even though they have continued functioning 
as the ACFTU’s subordinating bodies that ideologically represent all workers’ 
voices in those two sectors in Shanghai, their political importance has been 
gradually neutralised, in particular, because their registered membership fell 
continuously throughout the years of SOE reform. Despite this growing 
powerlessness, the ACFTU and its subordinates have been given increasing 
autonomy and manoeuvring room in bargaining in recent years, in order to 
achieve the CCP’s post-crisis agenda of defusing potential social unrest caused by 
labour disputes.  
The literature review has already covered the patterns of union organising in the 
non-state sector in the wake of the legislation of the labour contract law. At face 
value, the state sector would appear in prior work to have being governed through 
the “state-led pattern”, i.e. a vertically deployed administrative system with full 
ACFTU control. With strong ACFTU presence at all levels throughout the entire 
business groups, ElectriCo and TexCo have been able to execute labour relations 
related guidelines and decrees more efficiently than their counterparts in the non-
state sector. However, the power relations between the unions and the two groups’ 
top-level management are quite different. ElectriCo’s union mainly plays a 
supportive and consultative role at the headquarters level, while TexCo’s is 
authoritative, despite it not actively engaging in headquarters cadres’ collective 
decisions on labour management arrangements.  
Evidence from the case studies suggests that such different relations with 
management have been largely shaped by their distinctive restructuring 
trajectories. Both ElectriCo and TexCo’s unions have the dual roles of being the 
two business groups’ ACFTU subordinates at firm level and also the industry-
based ACFTUs in the Shanghai region. As a result, the two unions’ actual range of 
responsibility and coverage of workers have been largely determined by the 
degree of “letting-go” in the two state-owned sector. For any enterprise that was 
not incorporated into the newly built business groups, these ACFTU-led unions 
still retain their administrative coverage over those “letting smalls go” workforces. 
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Since the 2004 restructuring has led to a thorough corporatisation of Shanghai’s 
state-owned electronic engineering industry and ElectriCo’s union’s dual 
responsibilities as sectoral and regional unions now, ostensibly, overlap. 
Meanwhile, TexCo’s business group’s emergence was not accompanied by such a 
transfer of the workforce from the original SOEs. In fact, by 2010, TexCo workers 
only accounted for 28% of the total population of textile industry workers in 
Shanghai. The rest of the workforce worked in the enterprises from non-state 
sector, which largely used to be “let-go” former SOEs that became joint-ventures. 
The new ACFTU guidelines in 2008 stated that the TexCo union also had 
responsibility for representing these “outsider” workers’ rights. The guidelines 
also advised TexCo’s union to work with the regional unions located in Shanghai’s 
districts and counties, in order to “explore innovative ways of including non-state 
workers”. 
Such a large scale politically assigned workforce has brought an authoritative 
voice for the TexCo union at the group’s headquarters. Especially after 2008, when 
ACFTU was given more administrative power for harmonising the workforce, 
when having comprehensive regulations for all Shanghai textile workers was seen 
as a prime political concern in TexCo headquarters. As a result, the union officials 
are now  able to place demands from the ACFTU on the negotiating table without 
discussing trading-offs between the group’s business interests and their own with 
inner-party managing colleagues. As can be seen from the case study, new 
decisions on wages and terms of contract were formalistically made in the 
Workers’ Council (zhidaihui), with hardly any organised negotiation between the 
union and managing cadres. ACFTU directives were quickly transformed to be 
TexCo’s guidelines and all textile businesses in Shanghai were going to follow 
these. In contrast, ElectriCo’s union does not have such political responsibility 
outside the sphere of the business group’s workforce. As the following statement 
shows “…new decisions (on wages, working hours and terms of contract) should be 
made by considering the present conditions of enterprises’ performance and 
situations of industrial sectors and also, the nation’s macro-economic background”49, 
                                                      
49 Excerpt from ElectriCo handbook of “collective consultation” 
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ElectriCo union is not as hard-line as their TexCo counterpart, which is able to 
transcribe the ACFTU directives into action by avoiding trading-off with the 
managing cadres. Consequently, ElectriCo’s union has always sided with the 
group’s market-oriented interests and played a supportive role as a workforce 
harmoniser.    
7.2.3 Enforcing cuts of agency worker numbers through setting political 
tasks   
Apart from the ambiguously expressed guidelines, it has emerged that the CCP set 
very clear tasks regarding collective consultation coverage and the number of 
signed collective contracts. These tasks have been integrated in a range of political 
agendas regarding labour relations, and have been taken seriously by those cadres 
who have wanted to promote political careers According to tasks assigned by 
ACFTU, there should have been 80% of SOEs having signed collective contracts by 
the end of the Twelfth Five- Year plan and the coverage rate of collective 
consultation should have grown with an annual rate of 10% during this period. In 
2013, the local MHRSS claimed that Shanghai had accomplished the tasks set at 
the beginning of Twelfth Five-Year plan, and the city aimed to finalise full coverage 
of collective consultation in all enterprises by 2015. The level of completeness of 
these quantified tasks appears to be the main indicator for assessing the various 
CCP apparatuses’ performance in reforming labour relations. At the local level, 
each of Shanghai’s districts and counties were downwardly given similar tasks of 
having to match the percentages required by their municipal superiors. Given the 
fact that Shanghai’s manufacturing industries were highly regionally 
differentiated due to historical communist planning, the three parties of the local 
authority - ACFTU, MHRSS and SASAC - separately issued a series of local 
guidelines to ask for cooperation between enterprises and sub-local authorities 
for jointly completing the tasks. 
Compared to the local cadres, who oversee non-state sector and small/medium-
sized businesses, the administrative cadres in the SOEs have been more efficient 
in accomplishing those tasks, given the nature of the state sector’s strong political 
background. Nonetheless, there are still a few obstacles within the political-
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business system of the local SOEs that make cadres’ task completion a challenging 
job. Both Shanghai’s local administrative cadres and enterprise cadres are 
dedicated to the SOEs’ market shift and the transformation of business model 
(another series of political tasks) and the question is whether these political 
moves of reforming labour relations will be at odds with the local government and 
SOEs’ business-based agenda.  
The completion of the party’s agency worker cutting scheme was considered an 
important indicator for assessing individual cadres’ merit regarding their political 
career. However, the tasks appeared to be at odds with the groups’ managing 
cadres’ interests, in particular, with regards to the speed required for their 
implementation and so they complained about the “party’s testing trial” for them.  
According to the ElectriCo union’s report on the group’s collective consultation in 
2013, it was found that there were three aspects of worry and confusion expressed 
by managers and grass-roots cadres, as follows.  
1) The directive asking enterprises to give agency workers 
“temporary”, “auxiliary” and “replaceable” jobs (the Three Types, 
or “sanxing”) is too vague and awkward to operate. The managers 
complained that categorising jobs as such is unrealistic per se, since 
agency workers are extensively blended into the overall workforce. 
They claimed that some “auxiliary” or “replaceable” jobs are in fact 
dominated by long-term contracted workers, many of whom were 
reportedly already in fear of losing their jobs and being replaced by 
agency workers upon hearing about the upcoming policies. Thus, 
mutual agreement on “sanxing” was scarcely possible between the 
management and union, as cadres from both sides feared that it would 
bring multiple troubles, not only about coping with the overuse of 
agency workers, for it would also threaten the harmony among formal 
workers. Additionally, the union cadres resisted the idea that let firm-
level unions oversee the deployment of the “Three Types” workers. 
Instead, as they proposed, it should be the local government or the 
industry association taking more responsibility in making detailed 
rules on defining the “Three Types” workers and related protocols for 
labour force restructuring, so that ACFTU would not be the sole 




2) It is difficult to make a unitary regulation on wage bargaining 
across all ElectriCo enterprises, because of their diverse 
ownership structures and regional distribution. Some managing 
cadres in joint ventures reported that their foreign partners were 
reluctant to cooperate with them in initiating the collective consulting 
procedures. Others said that the foreign managers explicitly objected to 
bargaining about wages, on the grounds that wage levels vastly varied 
among the other provinces and cities where their other branches and 
sister enterprises are located. The foreign partners also reportedly 
refused to talk about wage adjustment with the firm-level ACFTU, 
whose officials had hardly any enforcing power in those joint ventures. 
The managing cadres also pointed out that it would be difficult to 
implement a unitary protocol for conducting collective consultation, 
because of the differentiated ownership structure among ElectriCo’s 
joint ventures.  
3) The idea of incorporating agency workers into firm-level unions 
was widely resisted by both management and the ACFTUs. Other 
than the fear of rising labour cost, the main discontent reportedly 
derived from the fact that the responsibilities of voice representation 
and bargaining that the ACFTUs would be forced to undertake were 
supposed to be parts of the dispatching companies’ jobs. Managing and 
union cadres complained that it was unfair and unreasonable to direct 
the pressure of solving labour-management tension within ElectriCo 
onto them. They suggested that it should be the unions of those labour 
dispatching companies, to which agency workers paid their union 
membership fees, being the party responsible for representing that 
workforce.  
In TexCo, reactions from subsidiaries were not formally recorded in any document 
as decisions from the leading ACFTU at the headquarters were quickly executed 
without consulting cadres at subsidiary units50 , but similar discontented voice 
about wage consultation could also be heard from managers and personnel 
managing cadres. Like their counterparts in ElectriCo, ambiguity on the 
categorising criteria of the “Three Types” of jobs for agency workforce was one of 
the main reasons for their discontent regarding the tasks of extending collective 
consultation on wages and contract terms. In relation to the demand that 
enterprises categorise “auxiliary” and “replaceable” jobs in zhidaihui, the group’s 
                                                      
50 See the details on TexCo union’s directives to all ACFTU branches in textile enterprises in 
Shanghai in next subsection.    
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personnel managing cadres complained that the new directives would 
“unintentionally inflict political damage” within TexCo’s workforce:  
“It is utterly unrealistic in TexCo – we actually have lots of comrades who 
have worked for the Textile Bureau for years, and they are still working 
on jobs that are not related to our current businesses… It is true that 
agency workers are normally recruited for low-skilled jobs, but we have 
never created a special category to put them into workplaces. You will 
find formal workers and agency workers working together in any TexCo 
workplace. If we categorise jobs by defining some as ‘important’ and 
others as ‘less important’, I dare to say that it would be an act of creating 
fractures within the overall workforce…”51  
The unpopularity of the party’s “Three Types” ultimately ended up with 
managers and grass-root cadres’ inaction. To accomplish the task without 
any substantial change, the member enterprises resorted to deliberately 
obfuscating the statistics by counting retired and off-post workers as part of 
the total number (“amplifying denominator, and diluting proportion”, as 
quoted by PM cadre A at TexCo’s HQ).  At the same time, the party-state 
apparatuses of the local region remained silent on the failed enforcement of 
the “Three Types” guidelines.          
7.2.4 “Innovative” ways of union organising 
The SOBGs’ power as an LR regulator over the industries stems from the fact that 
the group-based ACFTUs are still entitled to represent politically all workers’ 
rights and voices in the particular industries from the region. However, the group-
based ACFTU nowadays is hardly able to directly engage with the LR matters in 
many member organisations, because these organisations have either emerged 
with non-state ownership, or have already been driven out of the sphere of the 
party’s direct control. Inside the groups, new organisations emerged with a wide 
range of ownership types; while outside, the group-based ACFTUs are now 
required to take charge of representing the workers in the non-state-owned 
enterprises that used to have connection with the groups. In light of these new 
conditions, the group-based ACFTUs have developed new types of union 
                                                      
51 Interview with Mr. L, the senior TexCo PM cadre 
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organising approaches, which are different to their conventional ways, in order to 
undertake their responsibilities of protecting workers’ rights at various types of 
“non-state” workplaces in a flexible manner. These new approaches are expected 
to enable the group ACFTUs to retain their political influence without taking any 
direct enforcing measures in member organisations. As the ElectriCo ACFTU 
leader described at interview, “We were told to bring new methods into 
negotiations with the administrative side (managers) and create harmony in all 
possible ways….. after all, it has to be flexible in such ways otherwise these guidelines 
would collide with our strategies”52.   
In spite of the varied ways of deploying “innovative” union organising practices 
amongst the two groups, there are two principles that are central for their party 
apparatuses to follow: 1) workers should be unionised within the framework of 
collective consultation, and 2) the “Workers’ Council” should be the only 
institution that puts rules into effect, regardless of the ownership type of 
workplace. In addition to these, the workplaces are encouraged to involve extra 
institutions or departments, such as supervisory boards and board directors, to 
act as a supplementing component to those union organising practices. To sum up 
the “2+X” principals of union organising, workplaces are encouraged to suit 
themselves regarding their union organising model. Without giving any clear 
instruction, the “X” part of the plan allows for all kinds of pragmatic measures that 
facilitate collective agreement being made by all parties. Such a flexible 
arrangement is usually jointly made by ACFTU, the management in member firms 
and the branch party committees (also called mini “tripartite” coordination).  
For TexCo, the main focus of the new"2+X" style of union organising is to build up 
union associations at the district and county levels in the Shanghai region. 
According to the regional ACFTU’s report in 2004, the “non-public” textile 
workforce, accounting for 88% of the total number of textile workers in the city, 
are largely non-unionised and lack voice representation. Ostensibly, the enduring 
“letting-go” procedure of Shanghai’s local state textile industry has led to the 
                                                      
52 Interview with Mr. Z, the leader of ElectriCo group ACFTU. 
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TexCo ACFTU, once the state-controlled industrial union representing all state 
textile workforce in Shanghai, becoming a firm-level union. According to the 
ACFTU officials, the “let-go” workers have described their fate of being driven to 
non-state-owned workplaces as an “arranged marriage” and have called for 
“returning parents’ house”. Cooperating with Shanghai’s regional ACFTU, TexCo’s 
ACFTU seeks to influence union organising at those “non-public” workplaces by 
utilising its regional counterpart’s administrative power. A new institution 
created by TexCo and regional ACFTUs, named the “Regional-based Union 
Association of Textile Industry”, is regarded as the “new parents’ house” for the 
“non-public” workers.  
Meanwhile in ElectriCo, the tripartite cooperation of union organising mainly 
takes place inside the group system. Despite the fact that almost all state-owned 
engineering enterprises have been incorporated into the group, the ElectriCo CCP 
has rarely extended its entitled authority over LR rules outside of the group for 
any substantial purpose. Instead, ElectriCo CCP has put much effort into training 
the grass-roots ACFTU officials in how to bargain with non-state-owned 
employers. With support from the leading party apparatuses at the headquarters, 
ElectriCo’s ACFTU’s solution to such diversity of organisations is to sign a 
“industry-based collective contract” with the group member employers. In 
contrast to the “regional industry-based collective contract” deployed among 
TexCo member entities, the contract is only signed by the ElectriCo ACFTU and 
management from different levels of the group. Such an “industry-wide act” of 
collective bargaining can be traced back to the late 1990s, when the then ElectriCo 
corporation was still in the turbulence of enduring “letting-go”. The contract once 
covered all state-owned entities that were administrated by the former industrial 
bureau of electronic engineering, providing a legal framework for the downsizing 
and labour redeployment. Nowadays, this approach is used as the group ACFTU’s 
response to the bargaining difficulties deriving from the member firms’ diversified 
ownership types.  
There are a few records showing what kinds of specific measures were deployed 
in the party’s attempts to institutionalise these new forms of union organising. 
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According to one of the ACFTU officials in ElectriCo, the headquarters has referred 
to its effort in promoting “innovative” ways of union organising as “man-to-man” 
tactics. Whilst exerting pressure on individual managing cadres and ACFTU 
officials in member firms, the headquarters has largely let the grass-root cadres 
figure out their own way of reaching a consensus with non-state managing 
personnel in joint ventures and holding corporations. There are a great deal of 
political activities involved, including the party-led training programmes aimed at 
improving the ACFTU cadres’ negotiating skills, and also informal forums 
participated in by all administrative and managing personnel that are designed to 
enhance mutual understanding between management and ACFTU. Once an 
agreement is reached, collective consultation at those member firms is subject to 
the rules formulated by the headquarters-based ACFTU. What is more, firm-level 
leading cadres are supposed to regulate the whole process of collective 
consultation in accordance with the protocol made by this ACFTU.  
Despite the fact that TexCo and ElectriCo have developed very different scenarios 
after adopting the “innovative” union organising approaches, there are many 
challenges shared by the party apparatuses of both groups. A common expression 
regarding the difficulties of grass-roots ACFTUs’ attempts at union organising is 
the “three ‘NOT’ problems”, which are “management not willing to talk”, “unions 
dare not to talk” and also, “are not capable of talking”. With these problems, it is 
inevitable that grass-roots cadres often resort to asking for direct political 
intervention from the headquarters. 
“There can’t be any real collective consultation happening without 
(political) pressure from a higher authority… we have our tasks, and 
they have their own as well. When the administrative cadres (the term 
often referred to for managing cadres) talk about the emerging 
pressure from the new market normals that the group is faced with, 
what can you say?”53  
                                                      
53 Interview with Mrs Q, the chief director of cadre managing office at ElectriCo headquarters. 
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Similar worries over powerlessness were also conveyed by the TexCo cadres 
during the research visit. Additionally, many TexCo union officials have found 
themselves underqualified for the new tasks of union organising.  
“For historical reasons, lots of our ACFTU comrades are rather more 
‘old-fashioned cadres’ (tu-ling-dao) than bargaining professionals. 
Even though they have worked for the bureau (the former textile 
bureau as well as the current TexCo business group) for years, they find 
their ability does not match with their will when real bargaining with 
administrative (managing) cadres.” 54 _(Mr Z from TexCo cadre 
managing department, formerly worked in TU) 
It was often reported that the ACFTU officials found themselves feeling awkward 
when communicating with managers during the process of seeking agreement on 
collective consulting rules. The headquarters ACFTU attributed these problems to 
the lagging behind of knowledge and skills of the grass-roots officials, who kept 
their jobs but had hardly any real bargaining power ever since their units were 
forced to be drive out of the system of the state-owned group. To reactivate their 
roles as the state’s representative of labour voices, a series of training and 
workshop sessions were organised with the expectation them reequipping 
themselves with the essential knowledge and skills of bargaining.  
“At first, almost everybody was (in the scenario simulation session of 
skill training) clumsy… some of our old comrades not only retained 
their conventional way of creating harmony, but were also anxious 
about their new jobs… They kept saying (in an anxiously joking 
manner), ‘we are now old and useless; this job should be left to young, 
capable cadres’… I know they were actually in shock with the new 
policies (the political changes in labour relations).”55 
                                                      
54 Interview with Mr Z, the chief director of cadre managing office at TexCo headquarters. 
55 Interview with Mr Y, the senior PM cadre at TexCo headquarters, who had working 
experience in ACFTU.  
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For ElectriCo, on the other hand, the main challenge for the party apparatuses was 
to bridge effective communication with the managers in the group members’ joint 
ventures. The negotiating process with the group’s private or foreign partners was 
said to be incredibly difficult for the grass-roots cadres. Without ACFTU existence 
since the forming of those firms, many of the managers from the foreign side of the 
partnership were reluctant to initiate talks on forming new consultation-based 
labour relations. As has been revealed in the case study, the group’s “union 
association” approach has been operated by another HR consulting corporation 
that is profoundly influenced by Shanghai’s local CCP. Operated as a service of 
“outsourcing union duties”, the “union association” is seen as a credible third-
party by both firm-level management and the headquarters CCP. Throughout the 
whole process of integrating this institution from the outside into firm-level 
labour relations, the headquarters ACFTU has largely been cooperative with 
managers either from the headquarters or the foreign partner in joint ventures.  
According to one of the senior officials from a major ElectriCo joint venture 
partnered with a Japanese company, ACFTU was given assignments to win over 
the support of Chinese-born managers during the negotiations: 
“The main tactics was to firstly win over Chinese-born managers of the 
Japanese side… We made much effort to convince them that the new 
framework will be well-organised and mutually beneficial to the 
interests of both sides… It is not only a labour of ‘charisma’, but 
‘smartness’ – for instance, when we proposed a new rate of wage 
increase, we need to have sufficient market information at hand and to 
persuade them with statistics and reasonable arguments… It was a 
tough job, requiring a great deal of negotiating skills and new 
knowledge, definitely not as simple as creating a new ‘trophy’ union.”             
In fact, there have been few reports of foreign partners ever having had open 
conflict over the terms of the proposed collective contract. Their reluctance could 
be attributed to the unpredictable and changeable nature of Chinese legislation. 
To counter this perspective, the headquarters instructed the grass-roots ACFTU 
officials to have more training on the new legislation in order to be able to 
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“convince them that business interests would not be sabotaged, because of the 
arbitrary implementation of LR rules and laws”. In general, the majority of ACFTU 
officials’ efforts in operating this new union organising arrangement were centred 
on learning about and listening to the firms’ business needs. At the same time, this 
predominant role of management also enabled ElectriCo’s headquarters-based 
ACFTU to retain its link with the groups’ large number of joint ventures without 
directly intervening in LR matters at the firm level.  
Thanks to the joint political pressure generated by the firm-level “tripartite” 
mechanism, all these kinds of negotiations between ACFTU and management 
ultimately ended up with settled upon collective agreements. By 2014, both 
ElectriCo and TexCo claimed that they had accomplished the tasks of extending 
the collective consultation system through the “innovative” means of a “regional-
based industrial union”. For the local SASAC, TexCo’s new approaches are 
considered an example of how a group CCP can retain political influence over the 
“outsider” workforces via regulation of firm-level collective consultation, rather 
than directly enforcing LR rules, even if those former textile SOEs currently have 
no connection with the group in terms of ownership. ElectriCo’s case primarily 
centres on organising new forms of union in the group’s large number of joint 
ventures. It demonstrates the possibility that the CCP is also able to have an eye 
on working units with complex ownership types. Both of these two types of 
controlling approaches require a series of within-party negotiations and 
cooperation.  
7.3 “Manager” and “Facilitator”: the party’s role in HR-driven 
selection of “talents”  
The case studies confirm a basic assumption of this research: a firm-level CCP’s 
intention and approach to promoting market-oriented labour management can be 
highly diverse depending on the various transition trajectories of the local state 
sector. For ElectriCo, the HR-oriented ideas and practices have been widely 
integrated into various aspects of day-to-day management. The managing cadres 
in the group are avidly involved in HR-oriented management shaping across the 
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entire hierarchical body. Meanwhile, TexCo has paid much less attention to 
pursuing market-driven labour management with HR dominance. Leading CCP 
officials’ approaches to developing HR-oriented management are largely to do 
with overseeing the “piloting” procedures undertaken by the group’s profit 
centres. With respect to the two groups’ assigned political tasks, such a 
differentiation is an accurate reflection of the two groups different positions in the 
ongoing course of transition. TexCo’s circumstance is often interpreted as 
“unfinished reform” in the local CCP’s political rhetoric, while ElectriCo’s highly 
organised HR-oriented managing system is regarded as a successful example of 
the local state sector’s “modernising” course.  
Such differentiation in managing roles also reflects how the two groups handle 
different goals of staffing flexibility. As it has been discussed in the first section, 
the complex nature of both groups’ workforce composition has driven the two 
groups to adopt mixed staffing strategies. In this section, I examine the two groups’ 
flexibility-oriented strategies by looking back at their roots in state’s political 
scheme and then move the discussion on to the lens of the groups’ differentiated 
shaping process regarding the merit-based selection system. 
7.3.1 Forging a competent workforce as a political task  
As has been discussed in the ElectriCo case study, there is the strong presence of 
a well-organised strategic HRM hierarchy throughout the entire business group. 
Decisions on training, selection and promotion are highly centralised in the HR 
department at the headquarters, the group’s core labour managing body. Over the 
years since the forming of the current business group, ElectriCo managing cadres 
have been eagerly introducing HR-oriented ideas and practices, with the hope of 
improving workers’ competency. HR-controlled performance assessment has 
been widely adopted in branches and plants. Professional merit, including skill 
and performance, is valued over politics-related traits in the group’s talent 
selection. Under such a system, the merit-based principles for selecting core 
workers are applied to all kinds of employees throughout the group.  
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The case study on TexCo has revealed another pattern of top-down labour 
management in that HR-oriented practices have never been substantially 
incorporated into its hierarchy. Without an organised HRM system, the "talents", 
or the new TexCo workforce aiming for the group's new market strategy, were 
selected through political processes directly overseen by the CCP apparatus. 
Decisions on selection and promotion are usually collectively made by party 
cadres, who are responsible for various professional duties. Only the group's skills 
training projects for the high value companies have been left to be run by 
professional HRM personnel.  
Despite the contrasting patterns found in the two case studies, both business 
groups' attempts at reforming their ways of managing and reconfiguring the 
workforce were triggered by the local CCP's political campaign of upgrading 
human resources in the state sector. In order to be in line with the national project 
of “talent strategy”, all Shanghai’s local SOEs were required to upgrade their 
human resource layout from 2004 onwards. In 2012, the local SASAC organised a 
special meeting themed “improving human resource in the state sector”, in which 
representatives of the HR department from the main local state-owned business 
groups received guidance about making “cadre enhancement” a priority in their 
long-term endeavour of “building up a new cohort of talents”. Simultaneously, 
SASAC’s decision was overlapped with other CCP directives regarding human 
resources, including the Shanghai municipal government’s plan to make the city 
an “International Highland of Talents” and also, the local MHRSS’s plan of 
attracting certain types of “talents”, whose skills are purportedly essential to the 
city’s future development plan. These particular types of “talents” are defined as 
follows. 
a) “Pioneering research talents” - This category of “talent workers” 
was experienced researchers who are capable of leading SOEs’ tasked 
projects on new technologies. This term was used to particularly stand 
for the highly educated returnees, who had research related working 
experience overseas. Whilst in the context of SOEs’ workforce 
reconfiguration, the term was broadly used for all capable research 
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personnel. The definition was later altered, whereby SOEs are now 
required to select “pioneering research talents” from existing 
employees rather than introducing them from outside.  
b) “The talents with innovative and entrepreneur spirit” - The “talents” 
falling in this category are expected to get involved in the local state-
owned business groups’ “future businesses”. Given key jobs in the 
newly formed branches, these “talents” are guaranteed a great deal of 
autonomy in relation to management and formulating market strategy. 
Candidates either from outside or inside the CCP-dominated 
establishment are all welcome, as long as they are equipped with the 
essential market-oriented knowledge and experience. 
c) “Highly skilled talents” - This term is used to describe the shop-floor 
workers and technicians whose skills and techniques meet with the 
SOEs’ transitioning goal of expanding to new market segments. 
According to the MHRSS’s “Twelfth Five-Year plan”, the amount of 
skilled workers in the city was targeted to expand to 250 thousand. For 
the SOEs, the main task in relation to this type of “talents” is to improve 
senior workers’ skills through training and skills competition.  
In order to be in line with these political tasks regarding the required “talents”, the 
human resource strategy of both ElectriCo and TexCo was presented in a way that 
merged these CCP national plans with the businesses’ own demands for an 
efficient workforce. This was especially so for ElectriCo, with the group’s 
headquarters-based HR department issuing detailed guidelines on delivering the 
tasks and particular methods for fulfilling the “talent“-oriented HR strategy. Plans 
for the three types of politically defined “talents” were interpreted into specific HR 
tasks as follows:  
- Reducing the proportion of managing personnel, while increasing the 
number of technical personnel;  
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- Focusing on building up the cohort of “urgently needed talents”: including 
100 “pioneering research talents”, who are expected to lead ElectriCo’s 
newly formed research teams; 50 “entrepreneurial talents” for leading 
ElectriCo’s newly formed overseas businesses; and another 100 skilled 
technicians and engineers working in the group’s emerging businesses, such 
as green energy, the smart power grid and recycling technology; 
- Developing and applying the framework of “competency model” to the 
selection process for “urgently needed talents” as an experimental project. If 
proven successful, the framework then would be widely adopted throughout 
the whole group for selecting all kinds of professional talents.  
TexCo, on the other hand, did not issue guidelines in such a manner. Apart from 
vaguely delivering the political tasks in a way that replicated the local MHRSS’s 
directive, its leading labour managing office has barely made any substantial move 
toward forging a new core workforce. Given that TexCo’s HR-oriented practices 
have been limited to within the group’s “future businesses”, there has been a lack 
of motivation among the group’s conventional sector to select professional 
workers through non-political channels. However, the group’s leading cadres have 
avidly devoted themselves to establishing partnerships with a variety of Shanghai-
based academic institutions, in order to provide the graduates and academics fast-
tracks for the opportunities in relation to training, research and formal jobs in 
TexCo. Coordinated with the party committees from both sides, these academia-
enterprise collaborative projects for “talent cultivation”, place a predominant 
focus on designing and marketing in the fashion industry. In local news, these 
party-driven attempts of “industry-academia” cooperation have interpreted as 
“model examples” of former state industry seeking innovative ways of practising 
the state’s “talent” strategy. Both TexCo and its partnered institutions have 
fulfilled dual political tasks through the industry-academia cooperation: a) 
cultivating local SOEs’ human resources to fit in with the city’s “marching outward” 
strategy; and b) integrating the local resources from various types of party-
controlled organisations, in order to make TexCo an example of transforming a 
labour-intensive industry into being a high value-added one.  
192 
 
7.3.2 “Talent Strategy” – the shaping of the ideology 
In light of the above, we can see that both ElectriCo and TexCo have worked to 
incorporate the state’s project regarding the “talent strategy” into the groups’ own 
cadre managing system. Shanghai's local state sector urgently needed a solution 
to solve the "brain shortage" during the period of radical reform. The "talent 
strategy" offers local state-owned groups a new framework for identifying 
potential cadre candidates from the grassroots workforce.  
The term “talent selection” first appeared in the State Council’s guidelines for the 
“Ninth Five-Year Plan” in 1995. Highlighting the “fundamental shift” from a 
planned economy to a “socialist market economy”, it suggested that a new 
personnel management system must be equipped in line with the new form of 
economic growth. Jiang Žemin, China’s former president as well as the former 
supreme head of the CCP, issued his mandate of “Three Represents” (san-ge-dai-
biao) in 2000, highlighting the importance of introducing hybrid forms of 
ownership to the Chinese economy (see Gallagher, 2002).  
The “Three Represents” ideology suggests the CCP should always:  
• "Represent advanced social productive forces";  
• "Represents; the progressive course of China's advanced culture";  
• "Represent the fundamental interests of the majority", thus promoting 
political consensus.”  
As part of this mandate, the new idea of attracting talent from all walks of life, not 
just limited to within the party trained workforce, was addressed by the former 
Vice President Ženg Qinghong. In 2002, the Central Party Committee and the State 
Council jointly released China’s first national talent strategy, urging party 
organisations at all levels to shift the traditional cadre personnel management to 
the more inclusive “talent capital management”. The guidelines state that “talents 
exist both inside and outside cadre corps” (“cadre talent” and “non-cadre talent”). 
Hence, it is essential to ensure principles and methods of talent selection keep 
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evolving. In general, there has been an increasing emphasis on merit-based 
approaches to managing talent both from inside and outside of the cadre corps 
(Chen et al., 2015).  
With Jiang’s new mandate, cadre selection and co-optation in China’s party-
controlled organisations have been extended to a significantly wider range of 
candidates. People who opted to take non-political trajectories of careers, such as 
overseas graduates and professionals who have working experiences in private or 
foreign companies, are all welcome to join the state’s cadre corps. In Chinese 
terminology, “cadre” is a term used to distinguish people with leadership, 
management and administrative responsibilities from peasants and ordinary 
contract-based workers. There are cadres in a variety of organisations regardless 
of sectors, including party and state administrative units, civil service divisions 
and enterprises. In the pre-reform period, the main criteria of cadre selection and 
promotion were political loyalty (“redness” and also moral virtue) and seniority. 
Whilst merit-based elements were also considered to be important, cadre careers 
in the Maoist era were for those who were ideologically “Party’s men” more than 
technically capable talents. However, China’s market reform has caused a huge 
deficiency in skilful workers and capable managers in the state sector. As a result, 
cadres - not only those who have administrative responsibilities, but also 
facilitators and actual managers in SOEs - had to respond to such pressures with 
new cadre incorporating methods and principles. 
7.3.3 “Bianzhi” is back? – cadre selection and the groups’ new formation of 
differential workforces  
To improve the cadre corps in general, the party state embarked on its “bianzhi” 
system reform in 1991, which literally means “compiling and formulating”. It 
usually refers to a planning book that records the authorised number of personnel 
in a working unit. It also refers to making a plan of personnel numbers, as a verb 
in Chinese administrative terminology. By cascading the collection of bianzhi 
figures and information from party organisations through all levels, the central 
Party apparatus is able to control the party-state personnel of the entire nation. In 
most cases, Bianzhi is interchangeably defined as the Chinese version of the Soviet 
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nomenklatura system. Under the Soviet system, nomenklatura is a “list of 
positions, arranged in order of seniority, including a description of the duties of 
each office” (Brødsgaard, 2006). There is also a listing mechanism of cadre leader 
selection and promotion in the CCP’s party-state, but the Soviet system was not 
completely the same as bianzhi. A bianzhi list includes all party-state personnel in 
a working unit, while the nomenklatura only contained a pool of personnel who 
could potentially be recommended, promoted and transferred into leadership. In 
general, bianzhi is a list of all the “party’s men” in a party-state organisation, thus 
delineating a boundary between the core and periphery workforce. 
Before 1991, the bianzhi was controlled by the State Labour Bureau in that it used 
to be merely regarded as a labour planning scheme covering almost all working 
people of the entire nation, in contrast with the nomenklatura system that 
emphasised party politics matters, such as leadership selection and 
administration issues. In order to make a slimmer and more professionalised 
cadre corps, control of the bianzhi system was directly placed under the Central 
Committee of the CCP in the 1991 reform. Due to this fact, it can be difficult to 
Three types of “Bianzhi” 
 
- Administrative bianzhi: authorised posts in party and government 
administrative bodies. Salary and allowances come directly from the national 
budget. This category is actually the party-state’s only remaining “Iron Rice 
Bowl” 
- Civil service bianzhi: established posts in civil service organisations (shiye 
danwei). Civil service organisations in China’s party state are defined as the 
units that have no administrative power over other bodies. They are also non 
profit-seeking units, which differ from enterprises. Hospitals, courts, schools, 
universities, and other institutions covering services, such as health care, social 
welfare, culture and research, all fall in this category (See Lam Tao-Chiu and 
James L. Perry, 2001, pp. 19-40). Not fully funded by the government, these 
units are supposed to be fiscally self-sufficient by relying on multiple sources of 
income.  
- Enterprise bianzhi: posts in enterprises or other profit-oriented entities at 
various level of the state-related economic domain. It should be noted that 
private- and collective-owned enterprises are not covered by the bianzhi 
system. Neither the state-funded payroll nor guaranteed permanent job 




distinguish between bianzhi and nomenklatura, especially in the context of cadre 
selection and the CCP’s internal politics in relation to leadership changes. In the 
present context of blending a market-oriented workforce, bianzhi, or “enterprise 
bianzhi” (qiye bianzhi) is diminishing from official usage, as all reformed state 
enterprises are supposed to be established upon market-driven labour managing 
principles. 
As an ambiguously defined category in the post-reform era, “enterprise bianzhi” is 
not often used in that SOE workforces are supposed to be market-oriented 
workers who build employment relations through a labour contract with their 
employers. Some managers even saw it as an outdated concept during the early 
period of SOE reform. In reality, the term is normally used to describe the profit-
seeking economic entities that are affiliated to civil service units. Contrasting with 
the other two types of bianzhi, personnel under this category are usually not 
guaranteed job security and pension. Hence, enterprise bianzhis within the civil 
service system are usually referred to as “bianzhi outsiders”. 
In spite of the fact that has been disappearing from the SOEs’ official terminology, 
“enterprise bianzhi” is still being interchangeably used with other terms in various 
informal circumstances, such as “core workforce” and “formal workers”. For 
instance, when I was talking about how senior cadres remain their positions the 
restructured business group with the personnel managing cadres in both 
ElectriCo and TexCo, they emphasised the fact that all managers and cadre leaders’ 
bianzhi status is now enterprise bianzhi, whereby they are not entitled to claim 
allowances and pensions from the state budget any more. Another circumstance 
took place as I was working as “external specialist” with ELectriCo’s HRM 
department. Every time when we were talking about the new recruits’ career-
choice path, the HR managers always mentioned that they would ultimately “be in 
bianzhi” or become “formal workers (zhengshi zhigong)” as long as they devoted 
five to eight years of endeavour to getting through the group’s long-term career 
training.  
Merit-based principles and means are predominant in these SOEs’ selection of the 
“core workforce”. In Shanghai’s local state-owned business groups, cadre 
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personnel management, to some extent, has been incorporated into the HR-driven 
talent selection. On ElectriCo’s roadmap of the career path for its new recruits 
(primarily targeted at graduate recruits who are considered to be quasi-core 
workers), becoming a cadre is the terminal stage in their long journey of skill 
training and interning post rotation. “Talent” is a general concept that refers to all 
ElectriCo workers, who are considered to be promoted or transferred to technical 
or managing posts, including both existing cadres as well as ordinary workers 
whose employment status is only based on their contract. By getting through the 
merit-based evaluation designed and executed by ElectriCo’s HRM department, all 
workers have the opportunity to be absorbed into the group’s talent pool. Then, 
according to their different professional backgrounds, they will be further 
directed to different trajectories of career training and rotating internship across 
a variety of ElectriCo’s working units. Whilst it is not completely clear that if those 
“reserved talents” (the ones being absorbed into the talent pool) would receive 
any guarantee on safer job security, it was confirmed during one interview with 
HRM managers that a talent would be treated as ElectriCo’s “core workforce” once 
he/she was selected to a leading or managing post. 
These findings suggest that HR-oriented practices offer a merit-based solution 
that enables ElectriCo’s bianzhi to evolve in line with the business group’s market-
oriented agenda. Firstly, it preserves ElectriCo’s cadre corps in the midst of SOE 
reforms by continually redefining the criteria of cadre selection. Emphasising the 
importance of merit, candidates’ professional skills and performance now figure 
much more prominently in the process of cadre selection than the party’s 
traditionally valued virtues, such as political loyalty (“redness”) and self-discipline. 
Secondly, as with the approaches deployed in China’s civil service system, the state 
corporation has opened up its core workforce by co-opting outsiders of the party-
state system with various means of merit-based assessment. On the one hand, the 
conception of co-opting “talent” and formulating the group’s “talent pool” signals 
ElectriCo’s embracing of market-oriented labour managing principles, whilst on 
the other hand, it subtly augments the legitimacy of the new form of “core 
workforce” with HR-driven ideas and practices. This has created a virtual wall 
between the “contract-based” workers and the rest of the workforce. As a result, 
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segmentation of the workforce has returned to the present meritocratic labour 
managing system of ElectriCo, in a similar way to the old days’ bianzhi/non-
bianzhi distinction.  
7.3.4 The party’s confined managerialism – two market conditions 
To sum up the two groups’ managing cadres’ concerns in formulating staffing 
strategies, they must simultaneously “enlarge the cake”, whilst justly “dividing the 
cake”. To “enlarge the cake”, a limited number of workers have been granted high 
internal flexibility and a great deal of training opportunities. Both groups hope 
that such an approach to selecting and accumulating “talents” will bring long-term 
benefits. “Dividing the cake”, on the other hand, entails the CCP’s managerial 
scheme of distributing remuneration and high-security posts to a workforce that 
consists of a wide range of skill levels. Whilst the CCP guidelines mentioned in the 
beginning of this section have shown an intuitive picture of how the party plans to 
formulate flexible strategies of staffing, the actual process has lacked transparency 
of rules in that “dividing the cake” has essentially been allocated to the party’s 
within-group governance.  
Balancing these two goals is central to applying the state’s “talent” strategy to the 
groups so as to make staffing flexibility for the managing cadres a reality. 
Regardless of the types of business strategy that have been formulated, ElectriCo 
and TexCo need to balance the “cakes” such that they are shared by the following 
four basic types of labour:  
1) Old “cadre” workforces - The managerial and administrative personnel who 
have gained seniority for their work experience since the pre-reform era. Their 
enduring stay in the groups is largely owing to their experience in peace-making 
as well as their knowledge and skills in managing market-oriented organisations. 
The cadres who fall into the age group between 45-55 are considered to be the 
backbones of both groups’ cohort of leading managing personnel, who are given 
high mobility among the posts in the headquarters and the holding corporations 
that serve as the groups’ profit centres. In TexCo, there is a large proportion of 
these old cadres who have been given permanent jobs in non-core business 
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sectors, given their age and outdated qualifications. ElectriCo’s senior cadres have 
to prove their qualification through being tested by performance assessment. 
However, decisions on suspension or removing unqualified cadres from their 
posts are still made by the branch party committee at the headquarters. In other 
words, cadre staffing decisions are still dominated by high-level political decisions, 
rather than entirely determined by HR-driven means with quantified 
measurement.  
2) New merit-based workforces with long-term potential - Recruited for 
managerial and skilled technical jobs, these workers in ElectriCo are primarily 
graduate recruits who are considered as the groups’ “reserved” cohort of cadres. 
They are subject to a series of assigned training programmes and job rotation 
among a variety of the group’s member entities. The “apprenticeship” period, 
taking at least eight years, also grants them sufficient seniority  to be moved to the 
group’s “cadre” pools, in other words, “entering bianzhi” (jinbianzhi). Very few of 
these recruits opt to drop their apprenticeship programme and quit from the 
groups. That is, most of these potential “cadres” strive to “enter bianzhi” for a 
stable career. Their work experience leads to them being formally confirmed a 
long-term employees, which also means they have sufficient high quality 
employability, that if they decide to leave, they are considered by other 
prospective employers as being fully qualified. Meanwhile, in TexCo, where there 
is no campus recruiting scheme, these core workers are primarily hired from the 
external labour market for their experience and high technical or managing skills. 
Employed in the group’s high-end manufacturing sector, they are offered a decent 
salary and long-term job security. There have been a few case of acquiring “talents” 
through external recruiting by ElectriCo, as the group’s talent strategy is based on 
the culture of “self-cultivation” and “learning-oriented organisations” (xuexixing-
zuzhi)56.  
3) Periphery “outer-bianzhi” workers - The employees recruited for the 
contingent, short-term jobs. These labour market employees are widely deployed 
                                                      
56 Quoted from the interview with ElectriCo headquarters’ HRM manager. 
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in the groups’ “tier-3” or lower levels of member firms. As a result of the legal 
change in 2008 57 , the SOBGs have significantly discouraged any further 
recruitment of labour market workers. In principle, the existing periphery 
technicians and engineers who have been employed for over two fixed terms were 
instantly given status as core workers, depending their seniority and their proven 
qualification of skills. There have also been a number of cases where the 
employers refused to renew contracts on the grounds of workers’ incompetence. 
In ElectriCo, these short-termed, contingent employees have access to the group’s 
HR-driven scheme of promotion, but usually can only obtain tenure with some 
extraordinary merit that is recognised by the group. For most cases, these workers’ 
contracts will be ultimately terminated on the grounds of their lacking 
competence. Many of them spontaneously opt to leave within the term of the 
contract. In TexCo, on the other hand, member enterprises are given autonomy 
regarding external recruitment. It is rare to see an external recruited employee 
obtaining an offer of a long-term job subsequent to their initial short-term based 
contract.  
4) Temporary/agency workers - With the state-driven discouragement of agency 
employment and reduction of the number of agency workers, the remaining 
agency workers were also given chances to become the groups’ core cohort of 
technicians. However, these changes have largely been in name only and the vast 
majority of agency workers have eventually been returned to labour agencies once 
their contracts terminated.  
In general, the CCP’s influence on HR-driven managing matters has mainly 
reflected the groups’ core workforce staffing strategies. As ElectriCo seeks to 
integrate its main business sectors for breaking into the high-end manufacturing 
market, the group has targeted its staffing strategy as heavily relying on a new 
cohort of skilled workers. Hence, its CCP actually has the leading managing role 
within the whole group hierarchy. In contrast, TexCo has invested its high-skilled 
personnel in specific future-oriented sectors; at the same time, the group has 
                                                      
57 Employment contracts must be made open-ended after two fixed-term contracts. Also, the 
employer must state the reason for terminating existing employment contracts. 
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needed to maintain its traditional businesses. As a result, professional HR-
oriented managing practices have only been adopted by the organisations that 
engage in the group’s “future businesses”, such as the high-end manufacturing and 
fashion businesses. TexCo’s CCP only plays a facilitating role in these organisations’ 
piloting and experimental project on HR-oriented measures.  
7.4 An authoritarian pragmatist future? – A theoretical reflection 
As has been discussed above, differentiation of the form and extent of control can 
be found at all levels of the SOBG systems, according to ownership types and type 
of business of the individual organisations. On the one hand, such intra-
organisational heterogeneity demonstrates how much autonomy the grass-roots 
managing cadres are granted and also the diversified nature of their jobs. On the 
other hand, it can be seen that both the two investigated SOBGs manifest strong 
uniformity in terms of operating the CCP’s guidelines and decrees. Two types of 
governing approaches, campaigning and task-based cadre personnel management 
were found that have been adopted by the leading party apparatuses for ensuring 
all levels of the groups are in line with the CCPs’ political agenda. These two kinds 
of governing approaches have led to a diversity of implementation within the 
groups’ member firms owing to the lack of clear instructions on how to achieve 
the goals that the party has been aiming for. The actual processes of deploying 
labour management have turned out to be highly flexible, but at the same, the 
leading cadres are always ready to intervene directly when there are unresolvable 
issues with political measure. Hence, the SOBGs, as regimes through which the CCP 
implements its labour politics, appear to be either hierarchical, in the sense of 
directly planning and operating labour management or loosely organised as 
networks of organisations with the party’s distant political control.  
7.4.1 All-level heterogeneity and the spectre of the party: still a monolithic 
approach to the IR system?  
Now a picture of how the groups’ labour management operates as a part of the 
party’s labour politics has been provided, it is apt to return to the question posed 
at the beginning – what does such an authoritarian model of labour control in the 
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SOBGs mean for the party-state’s path of industrial relations? In the industrial 
relations writing that has attempted to give answers to the “what comes next” 
question regarding China’s path, a focal aspect of the debate has been whether 
China’s post-reform shaping of industrial relations is on a converging or diverging 
path. After over three decades of reform, China has not reached the ultimate 
destination of liberal-pluralism, or confirmed “divergent” viewpoints that its 
industrial relations system would develop into an indigenous system of rules, as 
happened in Korea and Taiwan.  The nation’s bewilderingly fast pace of 
socioeconomic change has made it increasingly difficult to develop a theory 
demonstrating a monolithic image of China’s industrial relations system. Instead, 
there has been heterogeneity of union strategies and the CCP’s political influence 
on labour relations not only between, but also within regions, industrial sectors 
and in relation to ownership types. With respect to the local state sector in 
Shanghai, the intra-sectoral heterogeneity has been derived from the changes in 
the emerging market environment as well. These changes have included the 
following. 
1) Initial decentralising that led to managerial prerogative in SOEs, which was 
followed by re-centralising that finally forged the current business groups via 
“grasping bigs” policy. This has created a large cohort of cadre managers who have 
(or have been assigned with) the market-oriented interests of their own businesses.  
2) The local CCP’s developmentalist agenda of revitalising the local state sector by 
encouraging the managing cadres of SOBGs to act independently to find solutions 
that will benefit the groups’ business interests. 
3) The party leaders at local SOBGs have continued to own the responsibility of 
creating harmony within the local state workforce. However, such responsibility is 
now largely undertaken by grass-roots party cadres at various levels of the group 
hierarchies, rather than fulfilled with a uniform command of party governance. As a 
result, the actual negotiating processes of firm-level labour relations have turned out 
to be highly flexible and informal. 
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In spite of such a heterogeneous nature of the local state sector in Shanghai, the 
CCP’s ubiquitous existence in almost all aspects of labour management is still an 
important institutional phenomenon yet to be adequately explained. In business 
school writing, the party-business relationship has been frequently discussed (see 
Brødsgaard, 2012), but there has been a lack of in-depth scrutiny regarding the 
particular measures and methods that the CCP has adopted to influence market-
based matters within businesses. In this research, the case studies have revealed 
that the CCP apparatuses are often behind many seemingly contradicting or even 
adversary relations. If all kinds of interests within labour relations can be finally 
balanced under the CCP’s command, does that mean there are separate interest 
groups emerging within the group-based CCPs？Would that mean there is a 
pluralist possibility for China? If not, then what kind of institutional dynamics of 
party-driven governance is behind such form of authoritarian unitarism in those 
SOBGs? On the whole, in order to shed light on what does SOBG’s labour 
management mean to China’s path of industrial relation shaping, we need to study 
the party.  
7.4.2 All party’s men - a sustainable future of authoritarian unitarism? 
As the case studies have revealed, the CCPs in both groups have been seeking 
simultaneously the achievement of multiple market goals. At the same time, they 
have also been striving to build consolidated employment relations with various 
types of workers. The managing cadres have constantly altered labour managing 
strategies in response to the groups’ market and technological contingencies. 
Being “core” or “periphery” workforces is not necessarily determined by 
particular political or social backgrounds. Across different departments and 
organisations within these group hierarchies, it is difficult to conclude that there 
is common standard in terms of what the groups’ core workforces consist of. 
Looking at it from the perspective of party governance, allegiance and loyalty to 
the party are still central to selection and promotion. However, from a market-
oriented perspective, skills and achieved merits are particularly valued nowadays. 
Hence, there appears to be two layers of co-existence of seemingly contradictory 
logics: 1) that between the labour strategy in responding to contingent needs of 
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market and technology and the personnel management driven by the political 
principles of the party-state; and 2) what has been mentioned in an earlier part of 
this chapter, the contradiction between the two different types of staffing 
flexibilities, functional and numerical, within the groups.  
To refute this apparently contradicting perspective, it is necessary to consider the 
dual identities of the focal SOBGs as market-oriented entities with the CCP’s 
governing system of local state-owned industry. First off, from an organisational 
perspective, the groups’ needs for a mixed labour strategy conform to some 
management school writers’ conceptualisation of the contradictory types of 
labour flexibilities, namely, functional flexibility and numerical flexibility 
(Kalleberg, 2001). Even though a few studies have suggested that simultaneously 
seeking both kinds of flexibility is possible in some scenarios, such approaches (for 
example, HRM) often result in tension and conflict between the temporary and 
permanent workforces (Geary, 1992). Some other researchers have offered a 
combined framework that attempts to consolidate the contradiction between 
functional and numerical flexibility, with Atkinson having been one of the most 
influential researchers who has been devoted in this endeavour. His core-
periphery model offers decision makers at government and firm levels a 
framework for deploying a segmented labour strategy. This framework indicates 
that the workforce within an organisation is separately treated such that the long-
term, “core” part and the short-term, “periphery” part, with which managers can 
establish different employment relationship. This Weberian ideal-type has been 
criticised for its oversimplifying of the dynamics of the real world (Hakim, 1990, 
p. 162). For example, the scenarios in which core and peripheral workers may be 
assigned the same jobs or allocated within the same department is neglected in 
Atkinson’s model. Also, the framework is not able to offer an explanation as to how 
organisations are able to obtain the numerical flexibility from the core workforce, 
for example, through an overtime working culture derived from some HRM 
practices (Ackroyd and Procter, 1998, pp. 170–175).  
A similar problem would happen if ElectriCo and TexCo were examined with a 
core-periphery framework. That is, except for the agency workers, the 
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segmentation within the groups’ formal contracted workers is rather ambiguous. 
Labour managing practices regarding wages, welfare and job security are 
unevenly implemented among the groups’ affiliated organisations. In ElectriCo 
and TexCo, “core workers” (those who are given high job security and relatively 
more opportunities for training and promotion) are primarily deployed in the 
headquarters’ directly controlled holding corporations, which are the groups’ core 
entity of formulating strategy on marketing, research and development and sales. 
Meanwhile, “periphery workers” (those who are given contingent jobs with short-
term contracts) comprise the backbone workforce in the subordinating 
corporations and ordinary production units. Such internal disparity was not a 
direct outcome of the group headquarters’ top-down enforcement, but rather, 
shaped by a dynamic transitioning process. On the one hand, as a revamping 
solution for the state sector, the formation of the business group in the early years 
of the 21st century, enabled the newly formed headquarters to act in the role of 
the state’s strategy designer, enforcing that the labour managing practices 
adopted in all subordinating units was in line with the issued general framework. 
On the other hand, mixed deployment of “core workers” and “periphery workers” 
within the organisations has been widely practiced among the group-governed 
units, thanks to the pragmatic staffing approaches they have adopted since the 
early period of reform. Many posts and departments have interchangeably staffed 
with the new labour market workers and the remaining senior Danwei ones. 
Next, from a political perspective, those SOBGs by their nature are governed in a 
way that mirrors the upper-level party-state’s decision making mechanics. For the 
party, those group hierarchies are supra-organisational institutions that have 
been assigned to operate the state’s strategic decisions on labour relations. The 
operating methods are allowed to be flexible in adapting to the enterprises’ 
contingent conditions, but in the end the results are supposed to comply with the 
party’s political goals. With such a form of CCP reign, the collective consulting 
system in these groups is not only a labour managing solution of seeking a 
consolidated framework of employment relations within organisation, but also the 
party-state’s political attempt to build a quasi-corporatist IR system in the local 
state sector. ACFTUs are supposed to represent all SOBG workers by addressing 
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labour interests in collective consultation with the “management and 
administration” side, largely represented by the party’s managing cadres. By 
adopting such a corporatist framework that is seemingly similar to German and 
Swedish IR models, the party hopes to legitimise core workforce participation in 
the groups’ hi-tech, high skill business sectors. In addition, given the powerless 
status of firm-level ACFTUs, the “collective agreement” that was de facto created 
by the CCP is often interpreted as a legitimate result based on the spirits of 
“democracy” and “cooperation” between the union and management. As a result, 
other effective channels for expressing labour interests are literally non-existent 
in accordance with the “rule by law” principle in industrial relations. Also, the 
CCP’s often pro-management stance has been institutionalised through this quasi-
corporatist framework, which enables managing cadres to deploy the internal 
flexible labour strategy easily.  
In addition, creating a flexible organisation comprising workforce targeting for 
different market goals is another party interest. As almost all SOBG managing 
cadres have stressed - “making profits is naturally the fundamental goal for us to 
carry out reforms” and hence, the managerial forces within the group systems are 
always highly organised and dominant. Without independent opposition to the 
party’s managerialism, market-based interests are always monolithic in any of the 
CCP’s decision making regarding labour management. The dualism of the 
ideologically defined “working class”, namely “cadres” and “masses”, has 
constantly been altered throughout the CCP’s history. In relation to the party-
driven industrial relations, such dualism was eliminated during the early period 
of the SOE transition, when the traditional socialist contract between the Danwei 
and the working class was scrapped by the party-indulged managerial prerogative 
in Shanghai’s SOEs. Nowadays, the new political-economic settlement, the hybrid 
form of governance of the local state-sector led by SASAC, requires a redefined 
dualism: a new cohort of long-term, high-skilled workers for the state industries’ 
future oriented strategy; and also another sizeable cohort of contingent workers - 
short-term, replaceable and low-skilled, in order to make the industries’ low 
value-added production sustainably profitable. It should be noted that this 
typology of two cohorts of workers only reflects the party’s updated “cadre-mass” 
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notion, rather than the real dualist formation of workforces. The complex nature 
of core/periphery formation, in reality, reflects the groups’ flexible organisational 
settings and ambiguous rules regarding the “transmission belt” of elite cadres.  
To sum up, there are two faces of the CCP’s controlling approaches in response to 
growing contingencies. To mitigate the increasing inequality between capital and 
labour, the CCP (the group CCPs) has been, on the one hand, avidly attracting and 
co-opting a new form of high-skilled workforce at the organisational level, with 
the hope that these new core workers will play an important part in the groups’ 
commitment and its cooperation-based labour management. On the other hand, 
the party has been seeking to rebuild harmonious industrial relations at the 
institutional level through top-down implementation of a collective consulting 
system. These managerial and political measures are targeted at creating a form 
of fluid managerialism, which will secure the CCP’s agenda of forging high value-
added state industry along with industrial harmony. In addition, there is the other 
face of the CCP that has been seeking to amplify short-term managerialism, whilst 
at the same time undermining any possible form of organised labour opposition. 
At the organisational level, the group the CCPs have been deploying labour 
managing measures aimed at numerical flexibility, including the exclusion of the 
non-core business sectors through outsourcing or distantly controlling production 
units. There are also a number of member organisations staffed with office 
workers who are only employed for contingent goals. At the institutional level, the 
party-state’s pseudo-tripartite system legitimises undermining ACFTU’s status. As 
a result, labour dualism in the local state-owned sector has been intentionally 
further consolidated and made even more complicated.   
It seems that the CCP’s flexible ways of governing have made it possible for two 
contradictory labour managing logics to co-exist. Goldthorpe (1984) has argued 
that corporatist and dualist structures are unlikely co-exist because their logical 
and ideological implications fundamentally contrast with each other. However, the 
discussions in previous sections of this chapter revealed the fact that such “co-
existence” has been created in Shanghai owing to the group CCPs’ changeable roles 
regarding different types of political and managerial matters. Such flexible 
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methods of control are also based on ACFTU’s non-antagonist, consulting role, 
which has been dynamic in its relationship with other party-controlled 
institutions, but nonetheless remains powerless. Also, the SOBGs’ models of 
“flexible organisations” have been shaped by the CCP’s flexible ways of labour 
control, thus resulting in the co-existence of two contradictory types of flexibilities, 
i.e. functional and numerical within the organisations. It would be appropriate for 
organisational study writers to examine the party as a supra-organisational to 
provide understanding regarding such a form of co-existence. Another important 
aspect worth noting is that as the CCP has responded to a variety of contingencies, 
both internally and externally, the party’s labour management approaches in the 
SOBGs have not been uniform. Burns and Stalker (1995) have pointed out the 
ways western corporations’ self-adaptive mechanism in the midst of highly 
complicated settings of contingency. Accordingly, the group CCPs often alter their 
stances in a continuum of two extreme ideal types of approaches: “mechanistic” 
and “organic”. However, it remains to be seen how sustainable such a unitarist 
approach can be. Alternatively, in striving to achieve the dual goals of authoritative 
control and market success simultaneously, has the CCP found a solution to 
engineering its increasingly urgent contingency problems?  
7.4.3 Developmentalist state and managerialist party 
For the CCP, the main difficulty in governing local state-owned enterprise derives 
from the diversity of their business categories, as well as their linkages to the local 
party authorities’ developmental agenda. In the middle of the nexus of party-state 
policies, the local developmental agenda and their own autonomous managerial 
power granted by the party, the party leaders of these enterprises are under 
pressure to choose carefully strategic options from their toolkits. For the firm-
level CCP, both business and labour harmony are political matters. In particular, 
the SOBGs in Shanghai, the “top students” in terms of governing the local state 
sector, must maintain their role as the nation’s model example of state-sector 
reform.  
The ways in which the CCP is delicately balancing business interests and labour 
harmony as found in the case studies reflect the party’s pragmatic nature. To 
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sustain its control over the state-owned industry, it has no choice but 
simultaneously to play multiple roles in labour management, in order to adapt to 
the post-reform political-economic settlement. To understand the potentially 
unsustainable future of such organisational unitarism, it is necessary to consider 
the post-war changes of industrial relations system in the European context. 
Political monolithism 
The first half of the twentieth century was the age of Fordism and capital accumulation. 
At the workplace level, the basic principle of Fordism, standardised control of 
production, was mirrored by bureaucratic systems of personnel administration. A 
formalised mechanism of collective bargaining was built upon the basis of mass trade 
unionism that was shaped on the labour side. Such an adversarial relationship was 
gradually accepted by employers in institutionalised ways for its benefit of containing 
and regularising industrial action. At societal level, an organised mass labour force had 
become a potent participant in constructing post-war political settings. The Keynesian 
welfare state was built on the basis of guaranteeing effective state intervention in 
mass production. Treated as an extension of the industrial relations system at the 
workplace level, the political system had developed into being a consolidated arena, 
where the labour force and employers, as monolithic political powers, were able and 
supposed to seek mutual recognition of rights and status.  
Segregated labour market 
Such a consolidated framework of industrial relations subsequently was eroded in the 
wake of the increasingly divided labour market. This change can be attributed to a 
couple of aspects of development. Firstly, employers in the public sectors of Western 
European countries, especially those in manufacturing industries, had growing 
interest to become competitive participants in the global market, which inevitably 
collided with the traditional notion of collective bargaining that guarantees public 
sector unions pushing for the adoption of their own distinctive agenda. In the wake of 
the rapidly forming post-war global market, the employers became increasingly 
exposed to multiple endogenous factors that were difficult to predict, such as the 
global energy crisis and market pressure from emerging economies like Japan and 
South Korea. Secondly, new technological developments, especially computing 
technology and microprocessor-based products, have exerted a fatal impact on 
Fordism. As a result, the process of production was profoundly differentiated. For 
employers, a flexible labour strategy had become crucial in guaranteeing firms’ 
success in such a new global political-economic setting. Also, these changes in 
management were mirrored by a new framework of industrial relations, which called 
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for building a new political consensus through having a more flexible approach to 
labour-management relations, such as creating internal flexibility of jobs and involving 
labour’s participation in management.  
Managerial prerogative 
In the European context, the growing pressure of global competition and technological 
development forced managers to adopt more flexible approaches in handling 
employment relations, which consequently evolved into becoming the managerial 
prerogative. The very foundations of the industrial relations system, organised 
representation of labour interests and a codified rule making process via collective 
bargaining, were gradually dissolved by the contagious managerial mentality within 
organisations. Also, the market liberal policies adopted by Western governments in 
the last two decades of the twentieth century accelerated such trends – the upsurge 
in the international flow of capital and the labour force has driven managers to seek 
flexible strategies for coping with contingencies. In particular, given the profound 
influence that financial institutions exert upon firms’ strategy making, managers are 
often constrained by the investors (or their computers), who “vote by feet” (Streeck, 
1992). In light of these changes, the workforce is becoming a factor that is supposed 
to commit and cooperate in forging corporation cultures. “Managing people as a vital 
form of resource” has consequently become a predominant notion amongst managers.  
In contrast to the European experience, China has taken a completely divergent 
path in terms of state and societal level of industrial relations evolution. Without 
an adversarial relation between union and employers in the one-party state, there 
was no issue regarding employment relations within organisations, before the CCP 
initiated the “opening-up and reform” policies. In the wake of the dissolving of the 
socialist contract of permanent job security and fixed pay, SOE managers had no 
choice but embarked on coping with the dilemma between market-oriented 
interests and labour harmony. The case studies on ElectriCo and TexCo have 
demonstrated different approaches that cadres and managers in these business 
groups adopted to resolve such a dilemma. Regarding which, a common trajectory 
that the two groups have generally undergone has been revealed. First off, the 
process of “Grasping big and letting small go” in the local state-owned industry has 
brought the groups an ongoing quest of workforce configuration. The old Danwei 
workers, the original core workforce, politically and technically, were sequentially 
stripped of their privileges guaranteed in the pre-reform era. In fact, in various 
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ways, they were coercively driven from their jobs. Meanwhile, the influx of a new 
workforce owing to labour market opening-up and loosen restrictions on Hukou 
quickly replenished the vacant posts left by the “resettled” Danwei workers. Next, 
the group CCPs started to build up new forms of legitimacy by regulating the 
relations between the various forms employers of workers inside the group 
hierarchies. In accordance with the upper level of the CCP’s political guidelines 
and decrees, a quasi-corporatist framework of collective consultation was 
deployed in the two groups. The deployment process within them appeared to be 
highly flexible, given the diverse settings of power relations between the party, 
managers and labour within the groups’ member organisations. However, the 
deploying of collective consultation in the two groups has ended up with a new 
form of the CCP’s controlling mechanism of employment relations within these 
diverse settings, whereby the party has been able to continue its reign over labour 
management at the grass-roots level, but not frequently intervening in detailed 
matters. Thirdly, in response to a growing amount of market contingencies, both 
groups have opted to pilot and limitedly deploy HRM-based labour managing 
practices. In ElectriCo, such a trend of prevailing HRM notions and approaches is 
especially apparent - the traditional party-driven approaches of managing and co-
opting new workforces are now augmented with HR-oriented practices of 
quantified measurement of performance and employees’ career development. 
HRM professionals are also given a say in the group’s strategy making. Whilst their 
counterparts in TexCo are still constrained within the group’s piloting project of 
future orientation, these quantified controlling practices are also widely adopted 
its member enterprises, being regarded as the “advanced” and “effective” means 
of improving profitability.  
In general, the evidence regarding Shanghai’s local state sector reveals a 
“compressed history” of transforming labour management. In a relatively short 
period of time, from early 1980s to the present, the group CCPs have had to endure 
dilemmas and challenges in relation to the ever-changing forms of labour-
management collision that European countries had undergone throughout the 
entire post-war era. Instead experiencing a history of politically being opposed to 
each other, as has been the case in the Western context, the managerialism of the 
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state sector and voice representation of the various workforces have been packed 
within one grand political agenda of the CCP. For over three decades of party-
driven market reform, the CCP has remained sovereign and seemingly determined 
to continue its comprehensive control over all parties of industrial relations.    
“Talent”-based meritocracy: the new face of pragmatist unitarism  
From the case studies, it has that the party-led meritocratic selecting and 
promoting system is the key institution for ensuring that the CCP successfully 
operates its paternalistic rule over the focal groups’ labour management. In terms 
of selecting capable workers from grass-roots level, the CCP’s meritocratic 
approach is not new. That is, achieved merits have always been a significant 
indication of capable party cadre candidates. Whilst other political factors, such as 
seniority and loyalty, were once valued more than merits, the notion of selecting 
by measurable skills and merits has become particularly valued in the midst of the 
SOEs’ enforced transition. As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
contemporary definition of “cadre” has moved beyond its original political  
meaning in the pre-reform era. Today’s “cadres” are defined as elite managerial 
and administrative personnel, who are extensively deployed in the party-state’s 
bureaucratic organs. In both ElectriCo and TexCo, workers’ roads to the groups’ 
cadre cohort largely overlaps with the roads to the core workforce. With such an 
upgraded version of the “transmitting belt” of the CCP’s elites, both core and 
periphery workers’ interests (the dualism of “cadres” and the “masses” or those 
who are “inside bianzhi” and “outside bianzhi”) have become intertwined with the 
group CCPs’ managerial means. 
It is concluded that the group CCPs have aimed to incorporate core workers into 
the party’s cadre management so to achieve the following goals. Firstly, by offering 
opportunities of promotion to key managerial and administrative posts, it is hoped 
that such a co-opting method will bring new skills and “brain power” into the 
cohort of party cadres. Secondly, the selecting and managing practices with HR 
elements are used to mitigate the divisions among the groups’ diverse workforces. 
Meritocracy is not only seen as the party’s transmission belt for new cadres, for it 
is also the solution to quelling the voices from various types of workers within the 
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groups. As quoted from one of the managing cadres at TexCo’s headquarters, “…let 
all workers ‘take the same exam’, and let the ‘final score’ judge (who are the 
competent workers)”58. In defending the fairness and transparency of ElectriCo’s 
labour managing approach, the cadre who supervises the HRM department’s work 
said, “a lot of speculation suggests that state enterprises only select workers who 
have human connections (guanxi), and that is totally false - no individual in an 
(member) enterprise is able to nominate or promote workers. All of our youth 
cadres are chosen by the system rather than personal connections”. Moreover, 
meritocratic ideas are spread as an ideological rhetoric, emphasising the notion 
that workers gain what they exactly deserve. Managers of member enterprises are 
given headquarters’ tacit consent to eliminate the incompetent and inefficient 
workers, as judged by the quantified measures. Such power is also authorised in 
both groups’ collective contracts in an uncodified manner, which allows for a fair 
amount of leeway in their interpretation.  
However, the evidence from the empirical inquiry into the ElectriCo group could 
suggests the possible ineffectiveness of such a managerial approach. The group’s 
HRM department has struggled to deploy its piloting project of “competence 
models” (CM) among senior cadre leaders, who conveyed their concerns about the 
potential damage that HR-oriented quantified measures could inflict on the 
group’s overall cadre management. In the party academy meeting regarding the 
pilot project, the HRM department was criticised for “neglecting the group’s real 
need for ‘talents’ in the designing of CM”. The senior leading cadres were 
particularly not happy with some of evaluating standards regarding the group’s 
future oriented industries, which require cadres frequently to update knowledge 
related to those new technologies and markets. “The leaders (leading cadres) said 
these cutting-edge industries matter in the group’s future, but the standards of 
evaluating cadres overall shall not be totally built on these particular sectors” (the 
head of HRM department). As a result of the rejection from the top, the experiment 
of deploying the CM system was ultimately suspended and the “core talent” 
candidates selected via the HRM-controlled channels are now subject to being 
                                                      
58 Interview with Ms L, the TexCo senior cadre in charge of “cadre training” at headquarters. 
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scrutinised by the headquarters leading cadres. Consequently, it is reasonable to 
suspect that the results of the group’s meritocratic system exactly reflect the 
selecting standards the group claims to follow. In the other focal case, TexCo’s CCP 
oversees every step of the selecting process, making the “talent” selection no 
different from the group CCP’s traditional way of selection.  
By their very nature, meritocratic managing systems in both groups have been 
deployed on the basis of weak unionisation and disorganised representation of the 
workers’ voice. It validates workers’ failure to secure safety and decent pay. It 
makes an ultra-form of managerialist idea deeply rooted in workplaces: in front of 
the monolithic being of market forces, all kinds of non-market-oriented voices are 
irrelevant. Given such paternalistic and pragmatic approaches to tackling labour 
voices, SOBGs’ meritocracy should be understood as an institutional and political, 
rather than merely managerial, process of engineering the group CCPs’ ideal 
workforce formation. For the party cadres, both business success and labour 
harmony are political and hence, the workforce formulating strategy is bound to 
be flexible.  




The frame of reference demonstrated above illustrates four ideal types of 
workforce formulating strategies determined by two continuums: 1) the party’s 
aim regarding selection; and 2) the selecting standards for potential core 
workers/cadres. In terms of the level of deployment extensiveness, I contend that 
there are two ideal types of organisation that the groups’ member organisations 
can possibly result in given the CCP’s willingness to resort to meritocratic means 
to reshape the overall workforce. They will either create a new form of Weberian 
“iron cage”, in which the member organisations of the groups will ultimately 
evolve to be highly rational bureaucracies that meticulously measure workers’ 
traits and deploy quantified means of control or they will retain the traditional 
types of party organs, where rules of jobs are totally determined by political 
decisions. It has also been learned from the case studies that the meritocracy in 
SOBGs does not necessarily abide by the principle of selecting by “merits”. Despite 
the selecting systems being designed with the intention of offering opportunities 
regardless of workers’ backgrounds, “merits” have been defined differently across 
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and within the SOBGs. Hence, the CCP’s flexible selecting standards can be 
understood as a continuum of “Hard” type and “Fluid” type. The “Hard” type of 
standards represents the SOBGs’ requirements on measurable elements, such as 
skills, educational backgrounds, awards and achievements. The “Soft” standards 
include some unquantifiable traits regarding workers’ cooperation and 
commitment within organisations, such as communicating skills and political 
awareness. 
7.4.4 Party’ choice to be “future-oriented” – what to do, and what not to do?  
From my participatory observation experience, leading cadres in both groups 
conveyed similar worries about the potential danger that new technologies and 
labour managing means would damage labour harmony in the groups’ workplaces. 
Especially in ElectriCo, where the HRM-oriented concepts and practices were 
rapidly on course to replacing the original party-led personnel arrangement, the 
failed project of deploying a “competency model” among leading cadres was not 
only out of concern about the evaluating method itself, but also the worries about 
the possibility that the new market and technological environment would 
ultimately dissolve the party’s control over labour management.  
In ElectriCo, the emerging business sectors, such as smart grid and the automation 
system as well as the group’s prototype concept of “Industry 4.0”, have been 
appointed to being the harbingers of the groups’ future orientation of HRM. 
Largely influenced by its European joint-venture partner through various 
exchanging training programmes, managers of these sectors are forging ideas on 
new forms of managing practices in response to new technological trends in 
manufacturing industries, mainly new data technology and cyber-physical 
systems. Trained to have a “networked mentality” to adjust market strategy, those 
managers proposed new managing schemes that put emphasis on the cutting-edge 
skills, such as data analysis, automation system design and “network-based” 
leadership, which leading cadres have frowned upon.  
“… those training courses (organised b they HRM department) make 
us feel rather outdated… the new comer youngsters in (ElectriCo’s 
member) enterprises now do their work on WC (a Chinese mobile social 
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media application , which was totally unimaginable for me when I entered 
the group. I mean having new technology is always good, but those new 
methods must match with the reality of the group.”59 
The new methods Miss F mentioned are the network-based workflow introduced 
by the European company that ElectriCo is partnered with. Having been already 
deployed in ElectriCo’s core high-tech sectors, such as wind-farm and automation, 
the basic idea behind this approach is to integrate different departments of the 
production process, including the research and development as well as the 
marketing and engineering teams, in order to communicate and coordinate in real 
time. Whilst this is still in the preliminary stage of deployment (quoted by HRM 
managers, it is still Industry 3.X), the HRM department has started to formulate a 
new human resource selecting scheme based on these ideas. Moreover, the 
experimental project of the “competency model” was also designed for preparing 
the group’s imagined orientation of “Industry 4.0”. However, as discussed earlier, 
ElectriCo’s leading cadres rejected this experimental project out of concern about 
a universal evaluating scheme being applied to the group’s top party executives. 
In addition, the HRM department also expressed its on the potential impact of such 
an approach: 
“If these European standards become the new normals for us, there will 
be a huge impact upon all of our workers… we still need to work on this in 
cooperation with technical and marketing departments, and I believe at 
this point this is not a realistic solution for us. These concepts look very 
appealing, but if we just copy these (from the European partner) - then 
simply no one can compete.”60  
These concerns reflect the group CCP’s worries on the changes brought by the new 
forms of market and technological contingencies. In the Chinese manufacturing 
business community, it is an extensively discussed topic as to whether the 
imminent arrival of new manufacturing technologies, such as the Web of Things 
and cloud computing, will reshape the entire industry. The “European standards” 
that Mr J mentioned is the new form of manufacturing workflow having been 
adopted by the ElectriCo’s joint-venture partner in its Europe-based companies 
                                                      
59 Interview with Ms F, the ElectriCo cadre who supervise the headquarters HRM department. 
60 Interview with Mr J, ElectriCo manager of headquarters HRM department 
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and plants. Different to traditional manufacturing plants, those “smart factories” 
rely on algorithm-based computing control to create a “web” of men and devices. 
In this “network of things”, procedures of production, ranging from the initial 
stage of designing to the terminal end of marketing, are decentralised and being 
proceeded with in real time. In terms of human resource, it requires workers 
possessing a wider range of knowledge and experiences. Also, as “networked 
players”, workers are required to be equipped with new types of teamwork skills 
that enable them to “process and share fluid information”. Just like what Miss F 
has mentioned, social networking has become a vital part of this new approach. 
Whilst the deployment of a smart controlling system driven by artificial 
intelligence has not been put on agenda yet, a handful of “talent” cadres are now 
being trained to adapt to these new techniques.  
Such a way of acquiring knowledge regarding the new trend in the market through 
partnership with foreign counterparts is not new in SOBGs’ transitioning history. 
From 1999 onwards, ElectriCo started to send labour managing cadres to western 
countries to study “modern, advanced techniques of managing workers”. Their 
destinations, mainly business schools in Canada and the Scandinavian countries, 
offered those future managers HRM courses and opportunities to visit workplaces. 
“We were deeply impressed by the new knowledge. It was an impact in 
notion; for the first time we realised that human resource management is 
not merely a discipline or some sophisticated techniques, but revolution in 
notion.” 
“……I still remember our Canadian mentor saying, ‘the world is 
increasingly growing smaller; resources and information are now far more 
approachable than ever… HRM is about a notion allowing us being able to 
put such a smaller world in hand…”61 
Regarding the newly introduced managing practices, Miss F expressed conflict in 
her feelings: 
“… Now it seems that we are the next ones to become the endangered 
species (laugh)… To be honest, I kind of worry about the group’s future - we 
                                                      
61 Interview with Ms F 
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(leading cadres) are all very clear about what technological evolution 
means to the group. You adapt to or you die - that was the exact lesson from 
the SOE reform in 1990s. I’m not sure that this ‘Industry 4.0’ thing will 
become a prevalent trend of new industrial revolution - Americans haven’t 
done that; neither have Japanese… but the ways of work today indeed are 
very different from the days I was familiar with. Just look at how our men 
are now working on the social networking platform - when I was at their 
age, learning Excel and the English language were sophisticated enough…” 
Inside ElectriCo’s future-oriented business sectors, these new trends of 
management, indeed, have changed working procedures tremendously. 
Conventional production has always entailed an orderly procedure. That is, to 
produce and sell an industrial product, this inevitably starts with market research, 
it then proceeds to the design, actual manufacturing and quality monitoring and 
ultimately, marketing. Each stage of the production process also entails orderly 
organised procedures - targeting problems or asking questions, then figuring out 
methods and solution, thus finally solving the problem. Any kind of working 
procedures in SOBGs has always been subjected to a certain temporal order - 
projects processed with a beginning, middle and an end. However, those new 
managing techniques as well as the cutting-edge technologies that are yet to be 
widely deployed, are creating a new type of working culture. For workers and 
managers, information is less organised and more fluid - departments of all kinds 
of functions are allowed to share information and workers are also required who 
are trained in understanding different types of information. An engineer who leads 
a design team must possess the capability of reading information about market 
conditions, so that he/she is able to make decisions on technical details 
autonomously. ElectriCo’s pioneering manager cohort across different 
departments are encouraged to post ideas and lists of problems on the group’s 
internal social platform. Other managers and workers are urged to leave 
comments on the topics raised. The entire plans of production are shaping a series 
of networking activities, which are constantly adjusted with the help of the group’s 
newly deployed industrial database. In those pioneering sectors, the conventional 
procedures on temporal basis are being replaced with networked behaviours that 
produce all kinds of information in real time. Thanks to the new cloud computing 
technology, workers are able instantaneously to access to information on 
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production procedures in past, present and future. In sum, this network-based 
managing system has no respect for time. 
In reality, such an “atemporal” approach of management is still rather confined in 
the operation at ElectriCo by the fact of absence of many smart technologies. In 
spite of this, the group’s orientation of “atemporal” working culture has 
significantly influenced the strategic goals of the HRM department. Under the 
precept of transforming the entire group into becoming a network-based working 
environment, the selected “talents” are supposed to be competent in handling with 
the fluid nature of knowledge and information. Hence, the selected core workers 
are required to be avail themselves with multiple expertise. Also, the particular 
practices adopted among those pioneering “talents”, such as online social 
networking platforms, is widely deployed throughout the group, despite most 
managers and cadres hardly ever using it. In addressing the leading cadres’ 
concerns on these new forms of technological contingencies, the HRM-based 
labour managing scheme of the whole group is shaped by the few future-oriented 
sectors. 
Looking back to Miss F’s remark on this network working culture, it seems likely 
that the many core workers who were newly selected in recent years will soon 
encounter a bottleneck of competency, if ElectriCo strictly applies the HRM 
department’s “talent” standard to the group’s overall workforce. The group CCP 
would create a talent crisis for itself by purely pursuing the optimising of labour 
managing practice. In other words, even if the party apparatuses in the local state 
sector have demonstrated a managerialist image, party governing principles are 
still at odds with the outside environment of the market and technological 
innovation. In particular, when the changes made in response to the party’s 
business needs collide with the interest of stability among the cadre personnel, the 
party apparatuses tend interfere in forcefully in the manner of conservative 
politics. As a managerialist party, the CCP at the workplace level has always been 
seeking a managerial approach to balancing the politics of growth with the politics 
of labour harmony. In terms of labour management, the firm-level meritocratic 
approach of selection represents a compromise solution between those two. That 
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is, there is the absorbing of new skills and talents outside the Party-based 
establishment, for the purpose of adapting to the new market and technological 
environment, whilst simultaneously flattening the organisations’ motivation 
towards new market trends, which is brought about by the influx of new core 
workforces with politically-related “merits”.  From being recruits to “talents”, then 
co-opted into cadre cohorts, those new core workforces have to go through a mini-
version of Chinese civil servant selection, which functions to consolidate the CCP’s 
collective governance in workplaces.  
One can only speculate what an “atemporal” future of new manufacturing 
technologies means to the CCPs’ governance over labour management. So far, the 
CCP’s success of stable ruling over local state industries lies in the party’s flexible 
and pragmatist approaches in response to the ever-changing market environment. 
Will such an approach continually work in maintaining a stable cohort of a core 
workforce in the wake of the arrival of smart technologies and a highly fluid labour 
market? To answer this question, it necessary to consider further how new 
technologies are going to widen skill gaps among highly-educated workforces. The 
new computing technologies and “networked” culture are already changing the 
way how labour forces acquire new knowledge and skills - to be competent in 
manufacturing industry, a worker nowadays is required to master the fluidity of 
information in order to update skill in real time. It is now a major orientation for 
global high-end manufacturing industry that the production process is 
increasingly transitioning into be network-oriented. For those enterprises in 
China’s local state sector, these trends could bring immense uncertainty to labour 
management in the future. In the face of the future of “atemporality”, will the CCP 
be able and willing to uphold its pragmatic stance? Just as the ElectriCo HRM 
manager remarked on “industry 4.0”: 
“…Not sure in future, it will still be the state 62, or the state’s computer 
‘resettles’ us.” 
                                                      
62 “State” (guojia) in casual spoken language can either mean “party-state” or any kind of party-
related managers.  
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Summary of the chapter 
In this chapter, CCP’s flexible approaches of controlling labour management are 
conceptualised as four types of roles: manager, enforcer, facilitator and regulator. 
The empirical findings also suggest that differentiation of the form of control can 
be found at all levels of SOBG hierarchies. Such flexible choices of labour strategy 
can be understood as the CCP’s pragmatism of seeking survival solution in the 
rapidly changing market environment. To survive from emerging market and 
technological contingencies, group-based party apparatuses constantly adjust 
their ideological stance between management and workforces. They also actively 
seek managerial solutions to re-create labour segmentation within organisations, 
in order to balance the SOBGs’ dual interests of long-term profitability and labour 
harmony. In all, CCP’s influence upon labour management can be seen as a form of 
authoritarian unitarism reinforced with managerial “toolbox”, enabling CCP 
flexibly manage labour forces with a top-down manner so as to guarantee the 
groups’ viability in face of market contingencies.  
CCP’s capability to sustain such flexible approaches in controlling labour 
management has also been discussed in this chapter. CCP’s quest of SOE reform is 
unfinished, and the party’s dilemma between efficiency and equality remains. New 
market and technological contingencies, such as the rise of data technology and 
automation, have already stirred worries of uncertainty among group cadres. The 
empirical findings suggest that CCP has intention to strengthen managerial control 
over various aspects of labour management with reinforcement of new 
technologies and managing techniques. However, the risk of such enduring 
managerialism in future is noteworthy in that the present core workforces will 




Chapter 8 Conclusions and contributions 
8.1 Introduction 
Before I embarked on my journey to conduct fieldwork in SASAC and the first 
piloting case study, I was fairly baffled by the chaotic debates in existing bodies of 
literature. I conceptualised this indescribable force of dominance over labour 
arranging issues as “labour management”; and hoped that the pre-existing 
analytical framework of “strategic choice”, the seemingly closest framework to my 
own conception in terms of definition and range of matters, could help to shape 
my own approach regarding how to express the labour arrangement in Shanghai’s 
local state sector. But in fact, the true definition of such “management” was not 
certain until I had accomplished my pilot study. Before that, my research 
experience had long been disrupted by the interchangeable use of terms. There 
seemed to be an absence of vocabulary in the existing academic writings to guide 
the orientation of my empirical inquiry precisely. This raises the questions what 
do they (the respondents during the fieldwork) actually mean by “HRM”? Does this 
entail some acceptance of the western school of HRM? Do the seemingly 
managerial expressions, such as “human resource” and “strategy making”, also 
informally include political meanings? In general, it is extremely difficult to bridge 
the expression conveyed in academic works, either those business school or 
institutional/political writings, with the reality I experienced in the field. 
Everything seemed blended - business and political agenda, managerial and 
labour interests, and even managers speaking the Communist Party’s ideological 
jargon in the businesses’ round table sessions. As a consequence, I felt that recent 
narratives by researchers have failed to grasp the meanings and hence, the 
purpose of the rhetoric owing to their lack of a dictionary that could assist in the 
translation of these phenomena with accuracy. Given this mismatch, I realised that 
an alternative route into investigating the Party-state’s rhetoric was crucial, if light 
was to shed on what lay behind it.   
At the end of an interviews with one of the managing cadres, who literally refused 
my further access to the organisation he worked for, largely due to our mutual 
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confusion when exchanging questions and answers, I asked one last question that 
came from nowhere - “what do you actually feel about doing this job? I mean from 
being a state-run factory director to all these (HRM jargons and practices)?” He 
replied to me, “I am just a follower - the party changed, and we change” That was 
the starting point for me to reassess the focus of my research questions. All those 
obscurely expressed reports, strategy guidelines and managing protocols can be 
trace back to their origin of CCP-driven governance. To explore further the 
bureaucratic and personnel arrangements in those state-owned organisations, I 
realised that it was not a question of to what extent SOEs are still attached to the 
party-state’s political agenda, but instead, it was a question of what are those 
departments and personnel’s location in the CCP’s grand scheme of corporate 
governance? The Party’s control is ubiquitous and sovereign. Hence, the interest 
lay in identifying the firm-based CCP approaches to the changing face of various 
labour arranging matters so as to elicit how it has manged to maintain its control. 
This inevitably also required exploration into the Party-state’s stance in terms of 
“managing labour” in general, over the last few decades. In addition, I hope that 
this work is able to contribute a new “language” for discussing the reality of 
Chinese SOEs’ labour arrangements in a way that transcends the business 
dominated tone. I have also argued in this research that these topics ought to be 
scrutinised with a contextually-grounded lenses, with the support of the 
knowledge from the discussions on the Chinese Party-state’s governance. Further 
discourse should also include reflexive thinking on capitalist managerialism, and 
how China’s social/political settlement will respond to emergent technological 
and market contingencies.  
8.2 Summary of research aims and findings 
8.2.1 Research questions and approach: locating the thesis in a 
fragmented body of literature  
This thesis was set out to explore the dynamic of labour rule making in China’s 
local state sector. Taking the local state-owned business groups governed by 
SASAC as research cases, in particular, I was initially curious about those SOBGs’ 
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underlying rationale for blending HR-oriented practices with their old ways of 
personnel management. Given Shanghai’s distinct role in the overall state-owned 
economy of China (as discussed in Chapter 3), it was hoped that China’s overall 
path of industrial relations would be illuminated by unveiling the Shanghai cases. 
In light of these concerns, the original aim of this research was centred on the 
SOBGs “labour management” - from the traditional ways of personnel 
management in the Maoist era to the current status of highly market-oriented 
managing practices. Do such changes signify a particular path of model shaping for 
China’s state sector? To achieve these objectives,, the following research questions 
were posed: 
1) What is the party and its affiliating apparatuses’ roles in present day-to-day 
management? Have the party apparatuses retreated from market-oriented 
decision making in relation to labour matters as a result of ongoing SOE reform in 
the Shanghai region? If not, what kind of roles are they playing in the course of 
Shanghai’s “national giants” building? 
2) Who is/are making the rules for the jobs within those LSOEs? What kind of rule 
making mechanism is functioning? Has the maketisation procedure loosened the 
party’s grasp on management and created room for autonomous voice 
representation? 
3) How and to what extent is the LSOEs’ “labour management” related to 
Shanghai’s local politics? If this is the case, then the pro-market/pro-management 
forces will have been playing influencing roles in shaping the Party-state’s local 
politics? Then, what becomes of particular interest is how great has this influence 
been and in what contexts? 
The identification of these research questions came from the concern that existing 
literature regarding China’s management and industrial relations seems to be 
unable to account for the complex dynamic taking place in Shanghai’s state sector. 
In Chapter 2, I reviewed various assessing approaches adopted by a wide range of 
schools of academic writing. As I concluded in that chapter, the body of literature 
has undergone a series of paradigmatic shifts as China’s social-political reforms 
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unfolded. It also emerged that there was also a lack of a shared body of literature 
for scrutinising the internal politics and shaping of market-oriented management 
at the organisational and industrial levels. The old debates on China’s institutional 
trajectory of marrying Party-driven politics and market-oriented managing 
practices were seemingly diminishing, and empirical assessment on the forms of 
management and employment relations within transitioning workplaces have 
now become dominated by neoliberal-oriented writings from business schools. 
This research centres on business-related topics, such as the efficiency of HRM 
practices and the “Chinese model” of HRM. As for the topics in relation to workers’ 
voice representation and labour relations, there are no academic accounts more 
effective than those produced by labour sociologists, who have attempted to paint 
a Marxian picture of China’s exploitative managerialism and the shaping of new 
workforces.  
All of these accounts have suggested the diverse nature of China’s social-political 
settlement regarding labour issues. Such diversity exists within and across 
different regions, industrial sectors and in relation to the ownership types of 
organisations. With respect to management school writings, discussion in this 
regard has been long absent. The institutional approach, initially contributed to by 
industrial relations scholars, has appeared to be side-lined in recent years in 
favour of addressing China’s rapid post-reform changes in the realm of legislation 
and the growing market economy from a management studies perspective. In the 
meantime, labour sociologists have used the term “regimes of production” (see 
Burawoy and Lee) or “politics of labour” (see Lüthje) to anchor their speculation 
regarding China’s heterogenous industrial relations and segemented workforces.  
In Shanghai, where the local party authority has political responsibility to ensure 
both SOEs’ business success and political prestige, the political and institutional 
settlement in the local state sector has its distinctive features when compared to 
the overall state sector (discussed in Chapter 3). My original research questions, 
as listed above, were based on the consensus regarding such heterogeneity. As a 
less explored realm, I proposed to use the term “labour management” for 
anchoring the research emphasis, which simultaneously highlights 1) the complex 
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segmentation of workforces within the sector (as suggested by “labour” rather 
than employees or “human resource”); and 2) the managerialist approach in 
pursuing business and political interests (as suggested by “management”). To 
uncover such a hybrid dynamic of “managing labour“ and “politically-driven 
management” in an exploratory manner, I proposed a reflexive, case-based 
inquiring solution, which involved a combined use of qualitative methods and 
techniques (see Chapter 4). The proposed fieldwork procedures entailed a 
subsequent process of case selection, namely “casing” - by raising questions based 
on the data collected from the previous case(s), it was hoped that such an 
approach would provide a refined case selection compared to the multiple case 
studies based on the a priori theoretical constructs. The initial case selection for 
the pilot study was based on Kochan’s analytical framework of “strategic choice” 
(outlined in Chapter 4). That is, the key aspects of IR/HR practices listed in 
Kochan’s framework were drawn upon in my pilot research scheme. Such a 
methodological design was aimed at 1) testing the validity of a pre-existing 
framework, and looking for the possibility of refining it on the basis of reflexive 
rationale; and 2) to provide meaningful explanations on the grounds of Shanghai’s 
particular institutional conditions. In general, the methodological design of this 
research sought to provide insights that would help to build bridges between 
different bodies of literature in an exploratory manner. 
The findings from the pilot study revealed an unexpected picture of labour 
management in Shanghai’s local state sector - there is even more extensive 
diversity within organisations than was anticipated. The SOBGs are complex 
compounds of various forms of economic entities, in which labour managing styles 
are unevenly determined by their respective institutional and market conditions. 
In addition, it was found that the Party-state’s influence is ubiquitous within and 
across those organisations. Party cadres and various forms of apparatuses are 
seemingly able to engage with business matters in highly flexible ways - labour 
strategies are pragmatically governed by Party-led governing approaches and 
rhetoric, whilst managerial personnel often possess various kinds of political 
backgrounds. In light of these unexpected (and also exciting) findings from the 
pilot experience, I realised that it was necessary to refine the emphasis of this 
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research from the vaguely conceptualised institution of “labour management” to 
the Party’s governing methods regarding workforces. An additional research 
question also emerged: how does the party-state change its roles in LSOEs’ labour 
management and what does that mean for the CCP’s governance over business. To 
sum up, in order to study labour management (no matter whether from a 
managerial or institutional perspective), we need firstly to investigate how the 
party operates.  
8.2.2 Empirical findings 
Overview on case studies 
The two case studies have revealed different pictures regarding the investigated 
SOBGs’ labour management. In ElectriCo, the corporatised successor of Shanghai’s 
historically long-standing electromechanical engineering industry, the group-
based CCP opted to undertake an incremental path to labour organising transition. 
Resorting to deploying HR-oriented managing system throughout the entire group 
hierarchy, the group has sought to forge new competent workforces by blending 
old and new personnel. The group CCP avidly participates in the member 
organisations’ day-to-day management with the guise of HR-oriented rhetoric. In 
terms of employment relations, management and ACFTU seek to make collective 
agreements that are largely based on pro-business interests. The collective 
contracts are usually settled with little labour voice and the ACFTU apparatuses in 
ElectriCo merely play consulting roles in relation to the group’s labour arranging 
decisions. By deploying “talent-based” practices of training and promotion, the 
group hopes to select capable employees on the basis of merit. There has already 
been a sizeable cohort of new long-term, skilful workforces shaped thanks to the 
group’s extensively deployed HR-oriented managing practices. However, the in-
depth inquiry into the group’s high-level HR decisions found that the group’s long-
standing party cadres are unlikely to be willing to be assessed by the quantified 
approaches proposed by the HRM department.  
In another case study conducted in TexCo, the corporation inheriting from the 
state industry that defined Shanghai’s former role of textile manufacturing 
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powerhouse in the Maoist era, the group CCP has undertaken a very different 
trajectory of transformation. The current business group consists of the most 
valuable state assets that are governed by the former state-run bureau of the 
textile industry. As a result of large-scale of downsizing and de-centralising reform, 
enforced by the local CCP in the early 1990s, there have been over 48,000 state 
workers laid-off or driven away from their posts through various resettlement 
channels. Today’s group still retains some of the old types of production during 
the old days of state-run bureau, such as fibre and garment production. The 
majority of TexCo’s profit comes from its trading business, even though the group 
claims to have shifted its orientation to the high value-added business sectors, 
such as high-end fibre production and the fashion designing industry. In terms of 
labour management, there are fewer HR-related influences in the rule making 
process when compared to ElectriCo - the group’s business interests are often 
subject to making compromises with the group CCP’s political concerns. Despite 
this group seeming to have an agenda aimed at forging a globally competent 
corporation, which apparently would require considerable effort in deploying 
pro-business labour managing practices, TexCo takes a conservative approach to 
HR-oriented practices, with only a handful of workplaces geared towards high 
value production undertaking them as piloting projects. The issues in relation to 
labour configuration are largely settled through informal negotiations between 
the different party apparatuses. In light of such a combined agenda, TexCo’s 
selection of new long-term core workers weighs heavily on non-skill-related traits, 
such as loyalty and seniority in the corporation.  
SOBGs as the party’s governing solution to market contingencies  
As the case studies have revealed, both business groups have dual interests in 
relation to their practice of configuring new labour forces. It is these groups’ 
diverging trajectories of transforming history that have forged their present 
managing ways and purposes. The case studies have also revealed the CCP’s 
sovereign influence upon corporate governance, strategy making and even day-
to-day managing matters. Ontologically speaking, it could be argued that the 
forming of these SOBGs was the Party’s governing solution in response to 
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emergent market contingencies. No matter how the CCP apparatuses tackle their 
tasks of transforming state industries, they always have to balance business 
interests and the interest of maintaining labour harmony. Such a seeming paradox 
can only be achieved through creating supra-organisational institutions, like 
SOBGs and arriving at settlements on the best way forward through reaching 
compromise. In other words, rather than being merely corporatised organisations, 
these state-owned groups, by their very nature, are CCP innovations in state 
industry governance in the wake of the arrival of the market economy. As such, 
the study on these corporations should be considered as synonymous with the 
Party-led institution of state-owned industries.  
In light of such a situation, the SOBGs, as the Party’s new form of governing bodies, 
may seem an enigma in terms of their ways of organising labour management - 
they can appear to be highly top-down organised certain matters, whilst also being 
seemingly huge collectives of organisations, in which the components are loosely 
connected. I conceptualised such an elusive phenomenon as a “hierarchy-network 
duality” in this study. Within the SOBGs, the party apparatuses flexibly engage in 
various labour managing matters with a wide range of governing options, which 
is because the Party has a combined interest of seeking effective long-term and 
short-term business strategies underpinning it decision to form business groups. 
Consequently, in response to the existing debate on “flexible firms”, I pointed out 
that it is crucial to understand SOBGs’ managing practices from the CCP’s 
perspective of state sector governing. That is, such a perspective enables us to 
illuminate the nature of “supra-organisational” institutions in the search for 
meaningful explanations regarding the mixed strategies involving complex 
interests in the particular context of Shanghai’s local state sector.  
Group-level CCP’s flexible approaches in responding to labour diversity  
In the discussion chapter, such complexity has been further elaborated upon by 
way of discussing four types of conceptualised roles that the CCP apparatuses play 
in various labour managing matters. Regarding the nature of the SOBGs’ 
“hierarchy”, some findings from the case studies have suggested that the group 
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CCPs may directly engage with the LR reshaping practices, such as enforcedly 
deploying the state’s scheme of collective consultation and cutting the number of 
“agency workers”, in accordance with the local CCP’s labour plans.  As such, I have 
conceptualised such roles as “Enforcers” (section 7.2, Chapter 7), with these 
labour managing arrangements being made through the group CCP apparatuses’ 
duly fulfilling their political missions. They are assigned tasks in various ways 
regarding Party governance, including direct decrees, guidelines, roundtable 
sessions and the party-state’s “Five-Year Plan”. Driven by such Party-state 
imperatives, different types of apparatuses often work for common goals with 
little divergence in opinion. Consequently, should one observe these particular 
issues, the SOBGs may appear to be “hierarchies”, in which the party-state deploys 
its strong political control over labour arrangements. In addition, such 
“hierarchical” features could also reflect group CCPs’ approaches to deploying HR-
oriented managing practices. Conceptualised as the role of “Manager” (section 7.3, 
Chapter 7), the firm-level CCP might be deeply involved in the groups’ introducing 
and shaping process of HRM. Both case studies (especially in the ElectriCo case) 
have suggested that the cadre personnel may undertake day-to-day managerial 
responsibilities by using HR-oriented rhetoric and also doing so in the 
management practices. Hence, it is possible to see the CCP playing a pivotal role in 
building up the SOBGs’ hierarchical system of HR-oriented management. 
However, regarding the nature of SOBGs’ “network”, other findings from the case 
studies have suggested that the CCP engages with some of LR matters with distant 
but effective approaches. To deal with the increasingly diverse organisational 
formations, these SOBGs have sought “innovative” ways of union organising in 
order to maintain the Party’s control over labour managing matters. Without 
concrete guidance on what and how to operate, the union and managerial cadres 
in the groups’ member organisations were left to figure out labour representing 
and bargaining solutions on the basis of their own conditions. As it was 
conceptualised in the discussion chapter (subsection 7.2.4), the CCP at 
headquarters hopes to play such “regulator’ roles so as to distance itself from 
direct involvement in the process of settling rules of labour arrangements with 
managers in the branches. They also hope that those “institutional innovations” in 
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union organising will generate codified regulations to be added to the group’s 
collective consultation rulebook, so as to reduce the need to use political means 
for intervening in labour rule making in member organisations. In subsection 7.3.1, 
I also discussed CCP’s “Facilitator” approach to deploying HR-oriented managing 
practices in the TexCo case. In contrast to the “Manager” role that ElectriCo’s CCP 
plays, TexCo only permits HRM personnel to lead a handful of forefront businesses 
with a piloting purpose. Its member firms also have high managerial autonomy in 
determining their own managing practices to suit their own business conditions. 
All of these findings suggest that SOBGs may represent a picture of a collective of 
state-owned entities that are loosely organised, but somehow gathered within 
CCP’s power sphere.  
Configuring new core workforces for the party’s flexible firms  
To sum up, the CCP’s changing face of labour management derives from the Party’s 
dual agenda of: a) configuring a new core workforce in the wake of new market 
and technological contingents; and b) minimising potential political risk caused by 
labour reconfiguration. As SOBGs move their strategic orientation to the high 
value-added, forefront business sectors, there is an  increasing need to forge a new 
long-term workforce, who are professionally competent as well as politically 
trustworthy. At the same time, both case studies have suggested that SOBGs still 
have tremendous need to retain a considerable size of “periphery” workforce. 
These workers include those who are less skilful and highly disposable, as well as 
those long-standing workers who have been guaranteed high job security by their 
employers. Two seemingly contradictory staffing strategies, those of seeking 
“functional flexibility” and “numerical flexibility”, co-exist in both cases. The 
headquarters’ CCP apparatuses carefully oversee the groups’ portfolio of 
businesses, and pragmatically choose optimal solutions to engage with labour 
managing matters. For the CCP apparatuses at all levels, both business and labour 
harmony are political missions to be accomplished. 
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8.3 Theoretical contributions and implications 
8.3.1 CCP’s governance over labour management - a shared body of 
literature  
As it was explicated in the methodological chapter, the study’s focus on the CCP’s 
governance over SOBGs was derived from the unexpected findings from the pilot 
studies, i.e. that both the rhetoric and practices that SOBGs adopt in labour 
managing configuration are embedded in the Party’s pragmatic controlling 
approaches. Such findings also illuminate an entry point for explaining the party’s 
ubiquitous existence in businesses, which has long been an unsolved conundrum 
debated by scholars from all kinds of disciplinary backgrounds. In this research, I 
attempted to point out the importance of bridging two bodies of literature that 
have barely been jointly discussed in previous research - the literature on China’s 
party-state governing mechanisms and the general literature on China’s evolving 
labour management.  
Firstly, the findings from empirical inquiries suggested that the labour managing 
arrangements in both cases are largely the  results of the group-level CCP’s 
operation of Party guidelines and decrees in relation to labour configuration. 
Specifically, regarding the employment relations reshaping within the groups’ 
member organisations, managers and union officials’ moves are governed by the 
Party-state’s various forms of directives, including the “Five-Year Plan”, the 
tripartite-based negotiating mechanism between the Party apparatuses on both 
the management and labour side as well as the national project of selecting 
capable “talents”. The case studies have further elicited that state-driven projects 
are operated through the CCP’s task-based system of governance, whereby 
specific tasks are set for individual cadre personnel, rather than it directly 
engaging with the implementation process, the headquarters-level CCP 
apparatuses are able to oversee and supervise at a distance those labour managing 
practices operated at the grass-roots level. Regardless of the cadres’ types of 
profession, their capacity for completing political tasks remains a significant 
driver in terms of determining their career inside the Party-state system.  
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These findings also brought another discussion into the analysis of this study 
regarding what does it mean to be “cadres” in SOBGs? Cadre, as a political term in 
China’s socialist rhetoric, is widely applied to the managerial/administrative and 
senior technological personnel in the Party-state’s organisations. In both cases, 
“cadres” are often used to stand for the core workers who have managerial 
responsibilities. These groups’ agenda of forging new core workforces also 
overlap with the group CCP’s political process of selecting new cadre personnel. 
Evidence in both cases shows that the capable managerial and technical personnel 
at grass-roots levels have considerable chances to be included in each groups’ 
potential cadre cohort. The CCP apparatuses either integrate themselves into the 
HR-oriented system (see ElectriCo’s case) or intervene in the selecting process 
(see TexCo’s case). In other words, the group CCPs seek to sustain the Party’s 
traditional ways of cadre selection with the inclusion of managerial language.  
I have provided analysis from the CCP’s perspective to make sense of these hybrid 
approaches. There has already been substantial academic work engaging with the 
bureaucratic system of China’s party state 63. However, few scholars have applied 
this knowledge to labour managing studies as a pivotal component of the analysis. 
It is important to acknowledge that the group-level cadres see both business 
interests and labour stability as political tasks. That is to say, these SOBGs may 
appear to be wearing a corporate-styled skin and operated with a corporate 
governance structure, but the ultimate decisions regarding labour arrangements 
would appear to be generated from the CCP-dominated institutions. As was 
explained in the discussion chapter (subsection 6.3.2), both groups formulate their 
core-workforce selecting strategies under the guidance of a national-level “talent” 
scheme. It is a process full of closed-door negotiation and discussion among Party 
cadres from all levels of the SOBGs. Also, employment relations arrangements are 
settled through various forms of formal and informal negotiations between the 
                                                      
63 See Pieke’s ethnographical study on the Party’s cadre training. He found that the capable 
cadre personnel are those who are better equipped with professional skills as well as 
internalised with a sense of conformity and loyalty. Also, Brødsgaard’s institutional inquiry 
(2002) into the “nomenklatura” system in Chinese party-state organisations found that the 




different apparatuses (such as the within-organisational tripartite system 
unveiled in Chapter 6, regarding the TexCo case study). In general, as Pieke (2009) 
summed up in his book on the CCP’s governance and elite reproduction, “socialism” 
for China’s party apparatuses is a form of governance instead of an ideology-
driven political project. In addition, the Party operates its governance as practices 
of management, rather than politics. It is crucial to introduce such insights into 
future research in relation to China’s labour management.  
 
8.3.2 China’s authoritarian unitarism  
In this research, the two case studies have unveiled Shanghai’s unique role in the 
Party-state’s overall economic landscape: 
1) They are tasked to represent the state’s most efficient and advanced industrial 
capabilities. Hence, successful cases of reform are treated as exemplars for the 
counterparts in other regions, or even for SOEs at the central level. 
2) They contribute a considerable proportion of local revenues. Also, their 
business strategies are to a great extent determined by the local political agenda, 
whereby they have an important as the drivers of many local development 
schemes.  
3) Labour configuration is highly diverse within and across the workforces of 
these SOBGs, with them being significantly segmented in terms of their income, 
security and opportunities to be promoted.  
Given such complex conditions, the SOBGs seek to realise various business 
interests flexibly by setting combined staffing strategies. High-skilled, long-term 
workers and periphery, contingent workers widely co-exist in the groups’ member 
organisations. Accordingly, both “mechanistic” and “fluid” approaches of labour 
managing practices are pragmatically chosen and deployed by the group CCPs. In 
this research, Shanghai’s state sector has provided a lens for scrutinising the CCP’s 
governing ways overall regarding a variety of labour arrangements. The Party’s 
agenda on configuring workforce has never been uniform - it often varies across 
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different business sectors. It also strives to prevent any potential unrest caused by 
changes to labour relations. To conclude, Shanghai’s local state sector embodies a 
relatively effective pattern of the Chinese Party-state’s authoritarian unitarism - 
marrying the establishment of Party-state governance with managerial rhetoric 
and practices (primarily HRM-oriented), the group CCPs treat all kinds of labour-
related issues as managerial matters. There is little evidence suggesting any signs 
of pluralism.  
The thesis has also discussed the group CCPs’ meritocratic approach to selecting 
core workers. I contend that such a “talent-based” meritocracy is the CCP’s new 
traditionalist approach to improve workforce efficiency without risking labour 
disharmony. The testing and evaluating ways of selection within the SOBGs 
emulate the Party-state’s civil servant selecting system. Both workers’ 
professional skills and “redness” will be tested. Also, the newly selected 
managerial and technical personnel are granted Party-state system titles, meaning 
that they will be treated as members of the groups’ cadre cohorts. These practices 
largely overlap with the party’s old ways of cadre selection, which are widely 
perceived as a repackaged “Bianzhi” system (the Party-state’s old personnel 
compiling system).  
One can only speculate as to whether such a form of pragmatism can be sustained. 
Looking back to the transitioning history of labour settlements in these SOBGs, it 
could be argued that the Shanghai’s local state sector has undergone a compressed 
evolving history of the industrial relations systems in the European context. From 
political monolithism in the pre-reform era to the present managerial supremacy 
at all levels of the SOBGs, the group CCPs have had to endure dilemmas and 
challenges in relation to labour-management collision that European countries 
experienced throughout the entire post-war years. Moreover, as these groups aim 
to break into high value-added businesses, the challenges brought by emergent 
market and technological contingencies have become increasingly intense in 
recent years. It would be no surprise if those groups were to initiate new waves of 
labour reconfiguration. It can also be foreseen that the CCP’s attempts to maintain 
“flexible organisations” will most likely become even more challenging.  
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8.4 Reflections and future orientation  
8.4.1 Still ongoing reform  
Today, SOE reform is still an unfinished quest for the Party-state. Haunted by 
industrial overcapacity and high corporate debt, China’s state sector is still 
striving to find a balance between efficiency and social stability. “Letting-go” 
practices, such as job cuts and enforced closure, are still crucial for alleviating the 
Party-state’s financial burden, but the risks of unemployment, open collision and 
unrest are obviously substantial challenges to the Party apparatuses. The flexible 
approaches adopted by the Shanghai local state sector are hailed by the party’s 
mouthpiece media as the nation’s exemplars in terms of “institutional innovation”. 
The Financial Times reported that the state watchdog at the central level is now 
looking at Shanghai’s experience and hoping to apply similar approaches to 
central SOEs as well as those at the local level in other regions.  
Despite being regarded as a success in balancing business interests and fulfilling a 
stability agenda in the “Shanghai model”, the state is still finding it difficult to 
replicate it elsewhere. By controlling LGFPs, or “managing capital” (guanziben), 
Shanghai’s local CCP is able to reintegrate quality, profitable state assets through 
stake selling and stock market listing. For other regions, where there is lack of 
well-organised LGFPs, it is not yet realistic to distance the Party’s direct control 
away firm-level decision making, through “managing capital”. Also, there is 
substantial diversity across regions in terms of SOE business types. That is, 
Shanghai SASAC’s targeted treatment - classifying local SOBGs into three types: 
“competitive”, “functional”, and “public”, might be difficult to replicate in other 
regions, since they do not have equivalent numbers of “competitive” SOEs that 
have been proactively created. As a result, the Party is not particularly enthusiastic 
about the idea of promoting Shanghai’s “Temasek”-like solution to capital reform. 
It is also partly out of the concern that the other localities would interpret such 
approaches as merely pushing SOEs into the market.  
In addition, the latest moves by the central CCP make the future path of SOE reform 
even more unpredictable than before, as a process of re-centralisation appears to 
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be on its agenda. Regarding which, in Oct 2016, Xi’s government issued a directive 
asking party apparatuses to strengthen their grasp over SOEs. The directive itself 
addressed SOE reform issues in an equivocal way, whereby, as usual, there is lack 
of clarity as to what such “strengthening” entails. However, as the directive paper 
includes the term “the Party’s control over enterprises” (dangguanqiye), it has 
been widely interpreted as the central authority’s intention to strengthen the 
Party apparatuses’ direct control over managing matters at the firm level. There is 
speculation that the party’s U-turn on reform might have something to do with the 
anti-corruption movement launched by Xi’s administration. However, one can 
never give a precise forecast of the CCP’s next move when seemingly contradictory 
visions co-exist on the table, despite the Singaporean “Temasek” model working 
well in Shanghai.  
8.4.2 “Managing labour” – how far will it go? 
In this thesis, it has been conceptualised that SOBGs’ have flexible approaches to 
labour managing matters, in terms of the CCP’s strategic choices, when responding 
to the ever-changing technological and market contingencies. The case studies 
have elicited that the CCPs in SOBGs have resorted to meritocratic approaches to 
selecting the groups’ new core workers from a highly diverse and segmented 
group workforce. Emulating the Party-state’s meritocratic hierarchy of civil 
servant selection, such a strategic choice is perceived as a fair and effective way, 
for it involves drawing on people from all walks of life to create a new elite cadre 
cohort. Especially for the groups looking at the high value-added market, there is 
an urgent need for configuring the labour force on the grounds of institutionalised 
selecting mechanisms rather than through political decisions.  
It can only be speculated how persistent China’s authoritarian unitarism will be. 
Its effectiveness largely derives from the absence of labour democracy in China’s 
one party state. In a political system that translates all kinds of politics into 
managerial issues, the HR-oriented meritocracy can be easily adapted to the Party-
state’s transitioning institutions. During the party-state’s “compressed” history of 
IR system transformation (see the detailed discussion in subsection 6.4.3), the 
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CCP’s managerial approaches to reshaping skilful workforces has often been 
driven by the political agenda of downsizing significantly the overall number of 
state workers. Unlike European contexts, where a voice expressing channel is 
considered as a key component in the IR system, labour’s voice has long been 
suppressed by the Party-state. The impacts from market liberalisation since the 
1980s have not led to the replacement of the Party-state’s reign over the state 
economy. In fact, the market-oriented managing approaches have reinforced such 
industrial unitarism, by enabling the CCP to adopt more flexible approaches that 
have led to the strengthening of its authoritarian control over labour managing 
matters in the workplace.  
Nowadays, the CCP’s governing agenda entails a wide range of seemingly 
contradictory issues, from continuous economic growth to income equality; 
building a “fleet” of national corporate behemoths to gain global business success 
as well as maintaining labour stability among state workforces. So far, Shanghai’s 
experience implies that meritocratic approaches could enable the party to resolve 
such dilemmas on a temporary basis. However, it is still difficult to predict what 
kind of impact the imminent new challenges of technological and market changes 
(see the example discussed in subsection 6.4.4) will bring to the Party-led labour 
management - a new unitarist leviathan augmented by new technology or 
potential turbulence caused by a more precarious, insecure labour market for 
skilful workforces? By the time that I was approaching the end of writing this 
thesis in 2016, the social-political shifts around the world that were coming to the 
fore gave me the impression that these were beginning to mirror the situation in 
China. In the political spectrum of western democracies, there is now the absence 
of a progressive, critical left-wing force, which could address the issues of 
workforces’ powerlessness in the wake of contagious managerialism. Industrial 
democracy is also facing an increasing risk in the wake of rising automation and 
artificial intelligence technologies. In the UK, the Conservative government has set 
out to build a meritocratic society with the guise of resurrecting “One-Nation” 
conservatism - in fact a pragmatic approach to embrace simultaneously a variety 
of conventional left- and right-wing political agendas. To what extent is Tories’ 
meritocracy different from that of the CCP? Would labour forces deserve what they 
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get in a system purportedly only judging by workers’ “merits”? In such a unitarist 
IR system, who would possess the power to control technology and to make 
decisions in relation to “managing labour”? Can we expect an organised opposition 
against such a hierarchical managerialism? In a world where pragmatism prevails 
in traditional right-wing politics, “managing labour” should be questioned not only 
in China, but also in the rest of the capitalist world. Especially in the wake of a 
Trumpian era, when populist rhetoric is replacing equality-driven ideologies and 
policy making is infected by the explicit rationales of corporate businesses, the 
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Appendix 4 List of Interviewees’ information 
  
INTERVIEWEES CURRENT JOBS INTERVIEW 
TOPICS 
BRIEF HISTORY OF CAREER 
ELECTRICO Mrs. Q The chief director 
of cadre managing 
office 









Used to be the ACFTU officer 
of the turbine factory during 
1990s; joined ElectriCo 
headquarters in 2005, and 
was initially in charge of union 
officers' training courses 
Mrs. F Deputy director of 












Mrs F started her career in the 
former Associates 
Corporation's personnel 
management office. In 2001, 
she was one of the nine 
selected cadre officers who 
were sent to Canada for HRM 
training. She has been on her 
current post at headquarters 
since the founding of the 
group in 2004. 
Mr. J The manager of 










Graduated from one of the 
top universities based in 
Shanghai, and recruited 
through the group's campus 
hiring scheme in 2005. 
Accomplished his period of 
apprenticeship and job 
rotating in 2014, Mr. J was 
instantly promoted to be the 
manager of the department 




Ms. L The deputy 











Graduated from one of the 
top universities based in 
Shanghai; had initially worked 
in the holding company's HRM 
department as contracted 
employee. Ms. L was selected 
to be a member of ElectriCo's 
young cadre cohort in 2012 
for her excellent performance 
and active presence in the 
holding company's party 
affairs. 
Mr. LX Deputy director in 
HQ's cadre 












One of the earliest trainees 
sent to Canada for HRM 
trainings during 1990s; Mr. LX 
was also the first manager of 
HQ's HRM manager. Before 
being transferred to cadre 
managing office in 2010, Mr. 
LX was in charge of creating 
the group's currently 
functioning performance 
assessing system. 
Mr. C Deputy director in 
HQ's cadre 












Mr. C has worked in ElectriCo 
group for over twenty years. 
Started his career as a director 
of one of supplying factories, 
he was directly promoted to 
HQ level when the group was 
organised in 2004. Since then, 
Mr.C's main job has been to 
strengthen the group's cadre 
cohort by partnering with the 
ElectriCo party committee. 










grass root level 
Mr. G has been a ACFTU 
veteran since the age of state-
run bureau. Initially worked in 
the turbine factory ACFTU, the 
largest union organisation 
within ElectriCo hierarchy, he 
was transferred to HQ as the 
factory was integrated into 
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the newly found holding 
company in 2005. 











grass root level 
Mr. M was allocated to the 
current post in accordance to 
the HQ ACFTU's will. Before 
that, he was the union leader 
of Mechatronic LLC. 








Entered ElectriCo through the 
group's campus recruiting 
scheme in 2009, initially 
worked in HRM department of 
Mechatronic LLC; had a 
master degree of human 
resource management; still in 
her job rotating year with HQ 
cadre managers' supervision 
Mr. S HRM team leader, 
in charge of the 







Graduated from a German 
business school; previously 
worked in another SOBG's 
joint venture. After her 
contract expired, Mr. S quitted 
her job after contract expired, 
and was hired by ElectriCo 
through internal recruitment 
within Shanghai local state-
sector. 







Entered the holding company 
through 2005 campus 
recruiting scheme; Mr. N is 
the holding company's first 
HRM manager who has fully 
accomplished recruits' 




Ms. SL Deputy HRM 









Entered the holding company 
through 2006 campus 
recruiting scheme; had 
working experiences in 
various ElectriCo companies, 
and specialised in arranging 
training courses. 
TEXCO Mr. Z The chief director 









Mr Z is the youngest cadre 
managing director since 
TexCo's pre-reform years. 
Entered TexCo in 2004, he 
initially took part in the 
groups's project of setting up 
tripartite form of collective 
consultation. Before his 
current job, Mr Z rotated 
across various newly formed 
companies where he took 
charge of leading their party 
committees. 

















Mr. Y is a veteran leader of 
TexCo ACFTU. Formerly 
leading ACFTU in one of the 
biggest TexCo garment 
factories, Mr. Y gained his 
reputation for his efficient and 
flexible approach in dealing 
with the factory's worker 
resettling mission. The main 
focus of his current job is to 
strengthen uniformity of 
leading cadres at various 
TexCo workplaces in the 
course of exploring 
"innovative" union organising 
solutions. 
Mr. L The director of 
personnel 









Before his current job in 
personnel department, Mr. L 
has worked in TexCo ACFTU 
for seven years - mainly in 
charge of solving labour 








from union to HQ's personnel 
managing office in 2009, when 
the new labour law was 
enacted. 
Mrs. X Deputy director of 
personnel 










Mrs. X has been worked in 
TexCo personnel managing 
office since the age of 
industrial bureau. Given her 
twelve years of experiences 
on negotiating severance deal, 
she was promoted to be the 
deputy director in 2011. 








Mrs XU was one of the few 
graduate recruits who were 
hired through TexCo's campus 
recruiting scheme in 2004. 
Graduated from the university 
that has partership relation 
with TexCo, Mrs XU started 
her internship in TexCo in her 
third undergraduate year. She 
initially worked in TexCo's 
newly formed fashion brand 
company, then promoted to 
HQ for her outstanding 
performance. 
















Mr. ZY was one of the few 
graduate recruits who were 
directly hired by HQ. He has a 
BA degree of garment 
designing and a MA degree of 
fahion management in the 
university that TexCo partners 
with. Started his career in 
2006 as a HR manager, Mr. ZY 
has been tasked to lead 
several HR related projects in 
ElectriCo's fashion business 
sectors. His current job is to 
supervise HRM projects 
deployed in those workplaces. 
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Previously worked as tenured 
engineer in TexCo's research 
institute prior to the forming 
of business group in 2004. 
Since the research institute 
was re-organised and 
integrated into TexCo HQ, Mr 
W was transferred to HQ and 
has been rotated across 
several managerial posts. 
Mrs. W Secretary of party 
general office, was 
tasked to supervise 












Mrs. W has been at her 
current post since the forming 
of group in 2004. As a 
standing technocrat at HQ, 
she is usually assigned with 
various types of tasks. 










grass root level 
Mr. GH led the laying-off 
project in early 2000s, which 
resulted in over 800 garment 
manufacturing workers 
resettled or early retired. Such 
experiences also paved his 
way to become the head of 
group ACFTU. 
Mrs. A Head of ACFTU at 









grass root level 
Mrs A has worked in various 
ACFTU apparatuses within 
TexCo hierarchy for 13 years. 
She was appointed to the 
current post by following HQ's 




Mr. LF General manager 












Mr. LF was initially the 
director of one of the major 
TexCo garment factoriesl. 
After being enforced to close 
in early 2000s, Mr. LF has 
been transferred to multiple 
posts within Shanghai local 
state sector. He also finished 
his MBA degree during the 
years of being away TexCo. In 
2007, he came back to TexCo 
in accordance with SASAC's 
personnel arrangement. Given 
his rich experiences in 
garment trading businesses, 
he was appointed to manage 
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